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PUTTING EXPERT TESTIMONY IN ITS 
EPISTEMOLOGICAL PLACE: 
WHAT PREDICTIONS OF 
DANGEROUSNESS IN COURT CAN 
TEACH US  
M. NEIL BROWNE∗
RONDA R. HARRISON-SPOERL∗∗
Judges and juries must make momentous and intricate decisions.  
The temptation is overwhelming for the court to request assistance from 
those who claim to know facts, interpretations, and explanatory models 
that promise to make those decisions more accurate.1  As long as some 
of us know more than others about specific probative matters, courts 
will certainly seek to know what those experts know or, to anticipate, 
what they claim to know.  But how can courts optimize their 
consumption of this expertise? 
The use of expert knowledge to settle legal disputes is not a new 
phenomenon.2  However, cases involving complex technical and 
scientific issues3 are becoming increasingly common, prompting what 
∗   Distinguished Teaching Professor of Economics, Bowling Green State University. 
∗∗ Psychologist, Independent Practice, Tallahassee, Florida. 
1. The desire for expertise to provide sure resolutions to human dilemmas is aptly 
described in Faust.  Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, FAUST 3–9 (Bayard Taylor trans., 
MacMillian Co. 1930) (1870) (The discussion in the Prologue among the poet, the Stage 
Manager and the Jester makes it clear that the poet has a more refined and nuanced 
appreciation of the kinds of questions theatre presents than the masses whom he demeans as 
he discusses the impending stage production.). 
2. See Learned Hand, Historical and Practical Considerations Regarding Expert 
Testimony, 15 HARV. L. REV. 40, 41 n.2 (1901) (tracing the use of expert testimony to the 
thirteenth century); see also Steven R. Smith, Mental Health Expert Witnesses: Of Science and 
Crystal Balls, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 145, 147 (1989). 
3. See Ellen E. Deason, Court-Appointed Expert Witnesses: Scientific Positivism Meets 
Bias and Deference, 77 OR. L. REV. 59, 60 (1998) (“Technical, scientific, and complex subjects 
pose formidable challenges for the judicial system . . . .”); see also William W. Schwarzer, 
Introduction to FEDERAL JUDICIAL CTR., REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 
1, 1 (1994) (asserting the need for courts to comprehend issues that are increasingly “esoteric 
and complex”). 
 Although courts encounter complex scientific issues, many scholars suggest that the legal 
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some4 would call a proliferation of experts5 in the courtroom.  More 
recently, judges have begun to recognize the potential for experts in 
social science research to assist the trier of fact6 in both civil and 
system is not the best way to resolve scientific controversies.  See, e.g., Paul Roberts, Science 
in the Criminal Process, 14 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 469, 469 (1994) (noting the problematic 
relationship of science and law).  For example, legal causation and scientific causation have 
very different standards.  See, e.g., Matthew J. Smith, The Admissibility of Expert Testimony 
and the Toxic Tort, 15 J. PROD. & TOXICS LIAB. 97, 110 (1993) (describing the forms of 
evidence that the scientific community requires to prove causation as opposed to causation 
requirements in the legal standard of causation). 
4. See James S. Laughlin, When Students Confront the Experts: Toward Critical 
Thinking, 81 ENG. J. 72, 72 (1992). 
 
We surrender our car to the auto-repair expert, we surrender our children 
to the education specialist, we surrender our marriages to the sex 
therapists, our diet to the health experts, our beaches to the oil-spill 
experts, our defense to the military and foreign-policy experts in the 
Pentagon, our tax policy to the corporate-supported economic experts, 
[and] the administration of justice to the expert witnesses in the 
courtroom. 
 
Id.  See generally STEVEN BRINT, IN AN AGE OF EXPERTS: THE CHANGING ROLE OF 
PROFESSIONALS IN POLITICS AND PUBLIC LIFE (1994) (arguing, as the title suggests, that the 
role of professionals in politics and public life today are signs of a new “age of experts”). 
5. See DOUGLAS WALTON, APPEAL TO EXPERT OPINIONS 1 (1997), (“[N]early 
everything we believe is believable because it is based on the opinion of experts.  In this age 
of specialization and professionalization, it is not possible to escape accepting things on the 
basis of authority.”); see also Thomas L. Haskell, Introduction to THE AUTHORITY OF 
EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY xii (Thomas L. Haskell ed., 1984) (“[E]xperts 
have become so numerous and their knowledge and services have become so deeply 
interwoven with the fabric of our existence that some writers regard our reliance on expertise 
as the most distinctive feature of modern culture.”).  James Laughlin agrees that “[a] 
dominant characteristic of this age is the proliferation of experts.”  See Laughlin, supra note 4, 
at 72.  Laughlin further argues, “Because we need those who can interpret this vast output of 
information and because an increasingly technological society demands a specialized 
workforce, the United States has come to rely on experts to guide the entire life of the 
nation.”  Id.  These needs have led to the increasing power of the expert in society.  Magali 
Sarfatti Larson, The Production of Expertise and the Constitution of Expert Power, in THE 
AUTHORITY OF EXPERTS: STUDIES IN HISTORY AND THEORY, supra, at 28 (“Expertise . . . 
increasingly provides a base for attaining and exercising power by the people who can claim 
special knowledge in matters that their society considers important.”).  See also Michael D. 
Bayles, Professional Power and Self-Regulation, 5 BUS. & PROF. ETHICS J. 26, 29 (1986) 
(arguing that much of the reason experts have power over non-experts is that in a majority of 
the situations in which an expert opinion is needed, non-experts are experiencing some type 
of a crisis).  “The professional has the specialized knowledge and means to diagnose the 
problem, determine the alternative approaches to resolving it, and then take the necessary 
steps.  This knowledge gives a professional power over an individual.”  Id. 
6. Perhaps the first recognition of social science research by courts was in Muller v. 
Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) and the “Brandeis Brief,” which was used to support the decision 
that regulation of the working hours of women was a legitimate governmental interest.  See 
id. at 419 & n.†.  Another notable early case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 
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criminal proceedings.7
Despite its frequent use,8 applying social science knowledge9 to legal 
questions entails persistent difficulties.10  Scholars have vigorously 
(1954), and its acclaimed footnote eleven cited Kenneth Clark and other social psychologists’ 
work on the detrimental effects of segregation.  Id. at 494 n.11.  See also NOREEN L. 
CHANNELS, SOCIAL SCIENCE METHODS IN THE LEGAL PROCESS 5 (1985), for a discussion of 
both Muller and Brown. 
7. Experts have been called to testify on such widely diverse issues as eyewitness 
testimony, child abuse accommodation syndrome, post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
discrimination issues.  See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 41 M.J. 46, 47 (C.M.A. 1994) 
(involving an expert on child sex abuse); United States v. Houser, 36 M.J. 392, 394 (C.M.A. 
1993) (describing rape trauma syndrome); United States v. Suarez, 35 M.J. 374, 375 (C.M.A. 
1992) (involving descriptions of child abuse accommodation syndrome).  See generally Saul M. 
Kassin et al., The “General Acceptance” of Psychological Research on Eyewitness Testimony: 
A Survey of the Experts, 44 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1089 (1989); Christopher Slobogin, 
Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: To Junk or Not to Junk?, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 
(1998).  Additionally, some experts have been called to testify as gang experts in gang 
injunction cases.  See, e.g., Plácido G. Gómez, It Is Not So Simply Because an Expert Says It Is 
So: The Reliability of Gang Expert Testimony Regarding Membership in Criminal Street 
Gangs: Pushing the Limits of Texas Rule of Evidence 702, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 581, 605 (2003).  
Gómez argues that expert testimony to identify gang members relies heavily on experience 
and observation, and it is not reliable and thus should not be admissible.  Id. 
8. See Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Julius G. Getman, Social Science in Legal Decision-
Making, in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 581, 581–88 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler 
eds., 1986) (discussing the frequency and variety of social science interactions with the law); 
Sharon D. Herzberger, Social Science Contributions to the Law: Understanding and Predicting 
Behavior, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1067, 1067 (1993) (describing the “substantial involvement of 
social scientists” in the legal arena). 
 Expert testimony may be used in various ways.  See, e.g., L. Grant Foster, Comment, A 
Case Study in Toxic Tort Causation: Scientific and Legal Standards Work Against Recovery 
for Victims, 19 ENVTL. L. 141, 149 (1988) (explaining how expert testimony is often used to 
link an injury to exposure to a toxic substance).  However, scholars often lament the use of 
expert testimony in the courtroom because their testimony often allows “junk science” into 
the courtroom.  See, e.g., Ronald J. Allen & Joseph S. Miller, The Common Law Theory of 
Experts: Deference or Education?, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 1131, 1131 (1993) (noting the 
“increasingly controversial” nature of expert testimony). 
9. See, e.g., Bruce D. Black, The Use (or Abuse) of Expert Witnesses in Post-Daubert 
Employment Litigation, 17 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 269, 283 (2000).  With regard to social 
sciences, Black says, “[T]he research, theories and opinions cannot have the exactness of hard 
science methodologies.”  Id. (quoting Jensen v. Eveleth Taconite Co., 130 F.3d 1287, 1297 
(8th Cir. 1997)). 
10. See M. Neil Browne et al., The Epistemological Role of Expert Witnesses and Toxic 
Torts, 36 AM. BUS. L.J. 1, 39–40 (1998) (contrasting the legal system’s methods for obtaining 
truth with truth that is sought by scientific processes); Sheila Jasanoff, What Judges Should 
Know About the Sociology of Science, 77 JUDICATURE 77, 80 (1993) (“[T]he ultimate goal of 
the courts is the attainable one of dispensing justice, not the impossible one of finding 
objective truth.”); see also Peter W. Sperlich, The Evidence on Evidence: Science and Law in 
Conflict and Cooperation, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EVIDENCE AND TRIAL PROCEDURE 325, 
337–342 (Saul M. Kassin & Lawrence S. Wrightsman eds., 1985) (describing jurists’ concerns 
about scientific evidence); Thomas M. Crowley, Help Me Mr. Wizard! Can We Really Have 
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debated the extent to which courts should rely on mental health 
professionals’ predictions of violence.11  The introduction of these 
professionals’ predictions of violence12 has become a generally accepted 
practice, and yet, an examination of “dangerousness” research13 reveals 
“Neutral” Rule 706 Experts?, 1998 DET. C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 928–30 (asserting the 
danger of deluding oneself into thinking that any expert can be truly neutral); Emily C. 
Lieberman, Forced Medication and the Need to Protect the Rights of the Mentally Ill Criminal 
Defendant, 5 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 479, 480 (2007) (discussing the difficulty 
of predicting dangerousness). 
11. See, e.g., JOHN W. PARRY, NATIONAL BENCHBOOK ON PSYCHIATRIC AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY 20 (1998); Charles P. Ewing, “Dr. Death” and 
the Case for an Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of Dangerousness in 
Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & MED. 407, 409 (1983) (“Over the past two 
decades, empirical research has consistently demonstrated that psychiatric and psychological 
predictions of dangerousness generally prove to be inaccurate.”); Eric S. Janus & Paul E. 
Meehl, Assessing the Legal Standard for Predictions of Dangerousness in Sex Offender 
Commitment Proceedings, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 33, 35 (1997) (“There is continuing 
debate about whether predictions of dangerousness are accurate enough to support 
deprivation of liberty.”); Thomas Regnier, Barefoot in Quicksand: The Future of “Future 
Dangerousness” Predictions in Death Penalty Sentencing in the World of Daubert and Kumho, 
37 AKRON L. REV. 469, 476–77 (2004); Gary Gleb, Comment, Washington’s Sexually Violent 
Predator Law: The Need to Bar Unreliable Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness from 
Civil Commitment Proceedings, 39 UCLA L. REV. 213, 222–28 (1991) (describing psychiatric 
predictions of long-term dangerousness as “highly unreliable and prejudicial evidence”); 
Eugenia T. La Fontaine, Note, A Dangerous Preoccupation with Future Danger: Why Expert 
Predictions of Future Dangerousness in Capital Cases Are Unconstitutional, 44 B.C. L. REV. 
207, 229–35 (2002) (arguing that expert testimony about future dangerousness is unreliable, 
inaccurate, and unconstitutional).  But see Alexander D. Brooks, The Constitutionality and 
Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 709, 
736–40 (1992) (suggesting that mental health professionals can accurately predict future 
sexual violence). 
12. See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307–09, 321 (2002) (remanding a case in 
which a mentally retarded individual was sentenced to death for a capital crime, based in part 
on predictions of “future dangerousness”); United States v. Wattleton, 296 F.3d 1184, 1192–94 
(11th Cir. 2002) (acquitting Defendant Wattleton on grounds of insanity, but committing him 
on grounds of dangerousness). 
13. Many commentators have criticized the use of the word “dangerousness” as 
problematic.  See John Monahan, Introduction to THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT 
BEHAVIOR: CRIME AND DELINQUENCY ISSUES 4–5 (1981) (“‘Dangerousness’ confuses 
issues regarding what one is predicting with the probability one is assigning to its 
prediction.”); Edwin I. Megargee, The Prediction of Dangerous Behavior, 3 CRIM. JUST. & 
BEHAV. 3, 5 (1976) (“‘Dangerousness’ is an unfortunate term, for it implies there is a trait of 
‘dangerousness’ which, like intelligence, is a relatively constant characteristic of the person 
being assessed.  However, the degree of danger an individual represents to himself or others 
varies markedly as a function of a number of variables.”); see also Thomas Grisso & Paul S. 
Appelbaum, Is It Unethical to Offer Predictions of Future Violence?, 16 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 621, 623 n.3 (1992). 
  
Future discourse in this area might be facilitated by ridding ourselves of 
the phrase predictions of dangerousness.  It has no logical meaning in the 
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the problems inherent in the field and in social science literature as a 
whole. 
This Article challenges the widely held assumption that social 
science evidence generally, and predictions of violence specifically, are 
sufficiently objective, neutral, or “true” to warrant anything but a wary 
acceptance in the judicial system.14  Our argument will follow two paths.  
The first is the more abstract argument based on philosophy of science 
notions about what science is and what it can offer.  When we examine 
the case law relevant to expert witnesses, we will see how the standards 
for admissibility of this testimony fail to adequately consider how 
scientific pronouncements are shaped15 by the “argumentative aspects of 
social life.”16  Science is more appropriately conceived of as a 
contextually based, social endeavor17 and is not capable of providing the 
objective, universal truths18 that justify presentation by a single expert.19
context of the behavioral and social sciences.  To “predict” is to make a 
statement about the likelihood of a future event or behavior.  
Dangerousness seems to refer not to an event or behavior, but to a 
condition that exists as a function of the presence of someone or 
something perceived as “dangerous.” 
 
Id. at 623 n.3.  For the purposes of this portion of the Article, the terms “violent behavior” or 
“violence” will be used except when quoting sources. 
14. The positivist perspective of science contends that the truth exists and is waiting for 
humans to find it.  See DONALD POLKINGHORNE, METHODOLOGY FOR THE HUMAN 
SCIENCES 16–20 (1983) (describing the naturalism-empiricism-positivism tradition and its 
proposition that experience of the senses is the only source of knowledge); Richard Rorty, 
Science as Solidarity, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 38, 38–39 (John S. Nelson 
et al. eds., 1987) (describing the notion that truth corresponds with reality); David C. Geary, 
The Evolution of Cognition and the Social Construction of Knowledge, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 265, 
266 (1996) (describing the basic assumption “that all knowledge is culturally mediated and is 
constructed through” social activities). 
15. See Browne et al., supra note 10, at 72 (revealing that scientific knowledge is created 
in a social context that is full of power struggles). 
16. MICHAEL BILLIG, ARGUING AND THINKING: A RHETORICAL APPROACH TO 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 4 (1987); see also Jeanine Czubaroff, The Deliberative Character of 
Strategic Scientific Debates, in RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 28, 28–29 (Herbert W. 
Simons ed., 1989). 
17. See SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY 
IN AMERICA 52–53 (1995).  “The authority of scientific claims derives, according to the 
sociological account, not directly, from the representation of physical reality, but indirectly, 
from the certification of claims through a multitude of informal, often invisible, negotiations 
among members of relevant disciplines.”  Id. at 52. 
18. See Bert Black et al., Science and the Law in the Wake of Daubert: A New Search for 
Scientific Knowledge, 72 TEX. L. REV. 715, 765 (1994).  Black points out that law and science 
have different ends.  He admonishes, “Lawyers and judges need to understand that the 
scientific landscape encompasses many hypotheses that lie between the poles of speculative 
conjecture and established scientific fact.  There is no absolute level of certainty that makes a 
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The second component of this argument will demonstrate that, even 
accepting the logical empiricists’ position that “truth” exists and can be 
revealed through scientific methodology, violence predictions have not 
attained the degree of objectivity, neutrality, or universalism frequently 
posited, and thus, need for presentation of multiple expert opinions 
exists in this particular illustration of social science expertise.  Thus, 
Parts V and VI familiarize the reader with the empirical literature on 
the prediction of dangerousness and challenge some of the 
misconceptions about mental health professionals’ ability to predict 
future violence.20  We begin by providing a brief history of the “first-
generation”21 dangerousness prediction literature and the legal 
community’s response to this research.  Part V includes a representative, 
although not comprehensive, review of recent methodological 
improvements in “second-generation”22 research, followed by an 
analysis of the current empirical evidence. 
A key component in this discussion is the description and 
comparative analysis of clinical23 and actuarial24 prediction strategies 
proposition scientific.”  Id. 
 Additionally, see Philip Mirowski, The Rhetoric of Modern Economics, 3 HIST. HUM. 
SCI. 243, 246 (1992), which recounts Descartes’ inclination to “redefine rationality so as to 
isolate it from all emotional attachment[].”  Id.  By doing so he hoped to establish thought in 
the mind that would be as orderly and dependable as the natural order of numbers.  Id.  This 
yearning for certitude is both old and understandable, but yearning does not ipso facto create 
fulfillment of the desire. 
19. Experts who suggest that experts are truth dispensers, rather than thoughtful people 
presenting an argument, are probably persuasive to uninformed listeners.  But see ROBYN M. 
DAWES, HOUSE OF CARDS: PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOTHERAPY BUILT ON MYTH viii 
(1994) (arguing that any mental health expert taking a position of certainty regarding the 
future behavior of a particular individual is “by definition incompetent” given the 
documented inability of such experts to justifiably make such a claim). 
20. Inaccuracies in the literature concerning prediction accuracy abound.  See infra notes 
229–30 and accompanying text. 
21. See John Monahan, The Prediction of Violent Behavior: Toward a Second 
Generation of Theory and Policy, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 10, 10 (1984).  Professor Monahan 
coined this phrase—“first-generation”—to refer to the five seminal studies conducted in the 
early 1970s examining the accuracy of mental health professionals’ predictions of violence.  
Id.; see infra notes 245–51 and accompanying text. 
22. Monahan, supra note 21, at 10 (describing the methodological limitations of 
dangerousness research and calling for empirical research to address these methodological 
problems); see infra Part V.C. 
23. Clinical prediction relies upon information gathered by an experienced clinician who 
then forms an estimation of risk intuitively or subjectively based on the information obtained.  
See infra Part VI. 
24. Actuarial strategies rely on mathematical equations to predict violence based on the 
presence or absence of factors previously identified to be correlated with future violence.  See 
infra notes 366–69.  These equations produce numerical probability estimates describing the 
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presently used to inform dangerousness decision making.  Prediction 
strategies have generally been divided into two types: clinical and 
actuarial.25  Early prediction studies relied exclusively on clinical 
judgment while more recent research efforts have attempted to quantify 
prediction methods with the use of mathematical equations. 
Critics challenging proffered predictions of dangerousness have 
based their objections on a few evidentiary doctrines including: the 
relevancy doctrine,26 the reliability or “trustworthiness” standard27 
articulated in the Federal Rules of Evidence28 and elaborated in Daubert 
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,29 and the “unfair prejudice” 
doctrine.30  The question of whether violence prediction testimony can 
risk of future violent acts.  Id.  See generally infra Part VII. 
25. This dichotomy is a vast over-generalization.  Clinical judgments can be informed by 
numerical probability estimates, while actuarial instruments can incorporate subjective 
impressionistic data into the equation.  See infra note 403 and accompanying text. 
26. See infra notes 225–28 and accompanying text. 
27. This requirement ensures that proffered testimony meets what the court considers as 
minimum standards of reliability and validity.  Critics of opposing expert dangerousness 
predictions assert that existing data concerning violence prediction fails to demonstrate 
accurate, valid, or reliable findings to meet these standards.  See, e.g., George E. Dix, Expert 
Prediction Testimony in Capital Sentencing: Evidentiary and Constitutional Considerations, 19 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 21 (1981) (“Increasingly it is agreed that [clinical dangerousness] 
testimony, which is of dubious accuracy and questioned by the mental health professional 
community, is unlikely to aid the trier of fact to a significant degree.”); Ewing, supra note 11, 
at 409 (“[E]mpirical research has consistently demonstrated that psychiatric and 
psychological predictions of dangerousness generally prove to be inaccurate.”). 
28. See FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”).  See also Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for 
Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743 (1999), for a comprehensive analysis of the 
evidentiary requirements of proffered expert testimony. 
 An addendum to Rule 702 was passed by the Committee on Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Judicial Conference of the United States in 2002 that requires “(1) the 
testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the testimony is the product of reliable 
principles and methods, and (3) the witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to 
the facts of the case.”  FED. R. EVID. 702.  This committee is composed of twenty-five federal 
judges who determine the policy of United States courts.  See 28 U.S.C. § 331 (2006). 
29. 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993) (asserting that the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded 
the Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923), “general acceptance” standard for 
evidence previously governing expert testimony); see also Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  The Court 
concluded Rule 702 mandates a gatekeeping role for the judiciary.  Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597.  
Judges performing this role are to ascertain whether proffered testimony provides a 
sufficiently reliable foundation based on scientific knowledge.  Id. at 590.  This has become 
known as the “evidentiary reliability” test.  Id. 
30. Courts are wary of the “aura of scientific infallibility” that may prejudice the trier of 
fact.  See Margaret A. Berger, Evidentiary Framework, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE, supra note 3, at 37, 115.  Both the Federal Rules of Evidence, FED. R. 
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withstand these challenges is examined and leads to the authors’ 
conclusions that expert testimony based solely on clinical judgment 
should frequently fail to meet admissibility standards. 
Therefore, we contend that the party providing this testimony must, 
on a case-by-case basis, bear the burden of proof in demonstrating the 
efficacy of violence prediction testimony by the proposed expert.31  
Further, we acknowledge that empirical research supports the efficacy 
of actuarial based predictions,32 but conclude that no single, universally 
accepted actuarial instrument has been acknowledged at present.33  
Finally, the relative inefficacy of cross-examination to challenge 
unreliable or arbitrary prediction testimony requires presentation of 
opposing experts.  Thus, we argue that the trier of fact must ascertain 
the appropriateness of the instrument in the particular case, as well as 
assess the competence of each proffered expert in using the assessment 
instrument before admitting proffered testimony of this type. 
We use illustrative cases as a vehicle to explore the application of 
actuarial prediction testimony to statutory standards of proof 
requirements.  Recommendations are made concerning the kinds of 
questions members of the judiciary should consider when evaluating 
proffered expert violence prediction testimony.  Some general maxims 
are also provided concerning the types of questions and circumstances 
that might lead the trier of fact to determine whether the testimony fails 
to pass evidentiary muster. 
I.  SCIENCE MEETS LAW: THE ROLE OF EXPERTS IN THE COURTROOM 
A.  Legal and Scientific Discourse 
Legal and scientific paradigms are separate and incongruous entities. 
The legal system is adversarial in nature:34 each party in a dispute ideally 
EVID. 403 (“Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or 
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 
presentation of cumulative evidence.”), and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595, provide for the 
exclusion of relevant, but possibly prejudicial or misleading, evidence that may unduly sway 
the trier of fact.  See Brown, supra note 28, at 750.   
31. For the courts, efficacy must be demonstrated by empirical evidence admissible 
under the Federal Rules of Evidence.  See infra Part II. 
32. See infra notes 365–73 and accompanying text. 
33. See VERNON L. QUINSEY ET AL., VIOLENT OFFENDERS: APPRAISING AND 
MANAGING RISK 169 (1998) (discussing the selection criteria for choosing one actuarial 
instrument over another). 
34. See, e.g., DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE 
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has an equally skilled and knowledgeable advocate armed with the best 
arguments for his side,35 and the jury arrives at the “just” conclusion by 
watching the battle between the conflicting arguments.36
Lawyers on each side of a case present only that evidence favorable 
to their own clients.37  The legal system relies on the cross-examination 
and refutation that takes place in the courtroom to clarify the evidence38 
and allow the jury to fill in the evidence gap on either side and make the 
best decision.39  The “truth” that is sought by the legal process is thus 
not simply the most objective or descriptive conclusion, but a conclusion 
ensuring justice and fairness40 instead of some elusive “truth.”41
LEGAL PROFESSION 56 (2000) (“The claim that adversarial clashes yield factually accurate 
results is not self-evident.”) 
35. See, e.g., ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY 
OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND PROFESSIONAL LIFE 3–13 (1999). 
36. The “best” arguments as determined by a jury are defined from a legal perspective, 
not an intellectual one.  The adversarial principle is similar to the metaphor of the “market 
place of ideas.”  If everyone presents his or her “wares” in the market, we will have the best 
opportunity to arrive at the “truth.”  See Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, 26 
VAL. U. L. REV. 723, 733 (1992); Clifton T. Hutchinson & Danny S. Ashby, Daubert v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: Redefining the Bases for Admissibility of Expert Scientific 
Testimony, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1875, 1878–80 (1994).  This “market place of ideas” 
metaphor may not be appropriate for the courtroom, where there may not be equal 
availability of expertise, whether from lack of ability or financial resources, to the particular 
parties in the dispute.  Such inequalities in representation would be not an equal exchange, 
but an oligopolistic situation, invalidating the competitive metaphor. 
37. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1481, 
1587 (1995) [hereinafter Confronting the New Challenges]. 
38. Congress relied on this process when it enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence with 
its lenient standards of admissibility.  See Leslie A. Lunney, Protecting Juries from 
Themselves: Restricting the Admission of Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Cases, 48 SMU L. 
REV. 103, 105 (1994). 
39. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1587 (citing a case where, because 
lawyers failed to emphasize counterarguments, the jury believed that all asbestosis victims 
would have identical symptoms). 
40. See, e.g., Michael S. Jacobs, Testing the Assumptions Underlying the Debate About 
Scientific Evidence: A Closer Look at Juror “Incompetence” and Scientific “Objectivity,” 25 
CONN. L. REV. 1083, 1086 (1993). 
41. See Browne et al., supra note 10, at 39 (recognizing that the legal system is in hot 
pursuit of justice, and discussing that, if truth were sought in the courtroom, juries would 
consist of the intellectual elite, not average members of the community); Jacobs, supra note 
40, at 1086 (citing, e.g., Richard O. Lempert, Civil Juries and Complex Cases: Let’s Not Rush 
to Judgment, 80 MICH. L. REV. 68, 80–84 (1981)); ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY 
IN AMERICA 295 (Vintage Books 1945) (1840).  De Tocqueville writes, 
 
The jury, and more especially the civil jury, serves to communicate the 
spirit of the judges to the minds of all the citizens; and this spirit, with the 
habits which attend it, is the soundest preparation for free institutions.  It 
imbues all classes with a respect for the thing judged and with the notion 
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In contrast, science is a pursuit for more knowledge and better 
understanding of the world, marked by openness and rational 
deliberation by its participants, under few or no time constraints.42  
Objectivity and empirical observation are lauded as the prime 
determiners of scientific fact.43
When an expert enters the courtroom, the two worlds of science and 
law are brought into play.44  Despite the difference in approach and 
standards of proof for the two disciplines,45 the specialized product 
of right.  If these two elements be removed, the love of independence 
becomes a mere destructive passion.  It teaches men to practice equity; 
every man learns to judge his neighbor as he would himself be judged.  
And this is especially true of the jury in civil causes; for while the number 
of persons who have reason to apprehend a criminal prosecution is small, 
everyone is liable to have a lawsuit. . . .  It invests each citizen with a kind 
of magistracy; it makes them all feel the duties which they are bound to 
discharge towards society and the part which they take in its government.  
By obliging men to turn their attention to affairs other than their own, it 
rubs off that private selfishness which is the rust of society. 
 
DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra, at 295. 
42. Science’s advantage of lack of time pressure illustrates differences between the legal 
system and science.  Unlike science, the legal system does face deadlines and short time 
periods.  But see Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1533 (suggesting that the 
distinction between the rigor required by law and science is a false dichotomy). 
43. See Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1878–79.  Although jurors may assume 
that scientists embody these attributes, other commentators reject the view of science as 
objective in any meaningful sense of that word; instead, a scientist in the courtroom is 
considered a parallel to the advocacy approach to truth used in our legal system.  Stephen J. 
Gould is a prominent critic of claims of objectivity by scientists.  See, e.g., STEPHEN J. 
GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 20 (1981); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 
Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993) (“[T]here are no certainties in science.”); Allan Megill, 
Introduction: Four Senses of Objectivity, in RETHINKING OBJECTIVITY 1, 5–8 (Allan Megill 
ed., 1994). 
44. See Eileen A. Scallen & William E. Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: 
Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1143, 1143–44 (1998) (“[T]he testimonial discourse of experts, though not cast in the 
elegant form of oratory, has rhetorical tenor and effect.  Expert testimony, even that based on 
natural or social science, is argumentation, made for, and in, a unique context—the law 
. . . .”). 
45. .See, e.g., Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1484.  While considering 
the “inherent inconsistency” between the demands of the legal and scientific worlds, Dan 
Burk stated: 
 
Lawyers, who dwell . . . in an adversarial realm, are governed by written 
rules of professional conduct that require them to . . . act as zealous 
advocates on their client’s behalf. . . .  Scientists, on the other hand . . . 
have developed strong unwritten professional rules—based on norms of 
intellectual objectivity—that are different from those governing lawyers. 
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offered by the expert46—scientific knowledge47—is in demand by the 
legal system to provide necessary input48 on issues of scientific 
complexity.49  As we seek an optimal role for experts in the legal system, 
it is essential to inquire into the origins and attributes of their expertise. 
Dan L. Burk, Using Scientists as Courtroom Witnesses: System Needs Improvement, THE 
SCIENTIST, Oct. 26, 1992, at 11, 11. 
 Benjamin Cardozo, however, compared science to the legal system, saying, “The work of 
a judge is in one sense enduring and in another sense ephemeral. . . .  In the endless process of 
testing and retesting, there is a constant rejection of the dross, and a constant retention of 
whatever is pure and sound and fine.”  BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE 
JUDICIAL PROCESS 178–79 (1921) (quoted in Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 n.13). 
 The legal system’s time constraints are illustrated by its regulations on the number of 
experts who may testify and the time that may be given to hear their testimony.  See, e.g., Jack 
B. Weinstein, Scientific Evidence in Complex Litigation, in TRIAL EVIDENCE, CIVIL 
PRACTICE, AND EFFECTIVE LITIGATION TECHNIQUES IN FEDERAL AND STATE COURTS 
709, 726 (1991) (citing Flannigan v. GAF Corp., 904 F.2d 36 (6th Cir. 1990)). The Court in 
Daubert also emphasized the legal system’s need to settle disputes “finally and quickly.”  
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597. 
 Unfortunately, the structure of the adversary system discourages honest skepticism and 
reflection.  See, e.g., Peter W. Huber, On Law and Sciosophy, 24 VAL. U. L. REV. 319, 347 
(1990) (“Any half-competent lawyer will prefer committed support from the fringe to even 
the slightest ambivalence from the middle.”). 
46. See, e.g., Robert Hairman, The Rhetoric of Inquiry and the Professional Scholar, in 
RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 16, at 211, 224 (“Disciplinary knowledge is 
both a claim to know and a means of social control, . . . a body of knowledge and a 
suppression of interpretive thinking.”). 
47. “Scientific knowledge,” according to Daubert, is evidence derived by the scientific 
method and supported by appropriate validation.  509 U.S. at 590.  Evidence will assist the 
trier of fact if it is relevant.  Id. at 591.  This relevancy requirement however is not sufficient 
to meet the assistance criterion.  Id.  Instead, the evidence also must contain a “valid scientific 
connection to the pertinent inquiry.”  Id. at 592. 
48. In some states, this appeal to expertise is mandatory.  See Stephen D. Easton, “Yer 
Outta Here!” A Framework for Analyzing the Potential Exclusion of Expert Testimony Under 
the Federal Rules of Evidence, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 8 (1998) (“In medical or other 
professional malpractice actions based upon the law of some states, plaintiffs must present 
admissible expert testimony about the standard of care and the defendant’s failure to meet 
this standard.”). 
49. As confusing as this input may be, the inadequacy of our personal knowledge base to 
form adequate reasoning is highlighted by Haskell, supra note 5, at x, where he concedes that 
 
If it could be done, I suppose all of us would prefer to base everything we 
do and think on “good reasons” rather than expert authority.  But the 
conduct of everyday affairs requires us to hold so many opinions and 
make so many decisions that we cannot possibly base them on the 
personally examined evidence and the inwardly compelling logic that 
“good reasons” imply. 
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B. Expert Testimony: Uses and Misuses 
Expert testimony in the courtroom is subject to certain pitfalls.  A 
brief look at the roles of jury, judge, and expert when such testimony is 
heard gives a sense of the difficulty of evaluating expert testimony and 
the need for a clearer understanding of the nature and origins of expert 
testimony in what is essentially an epistemological issue.50  The difficulty 
of sorting through expert testimony makes us wonder: Who should be 
responsible for this evaluation?  Different admissibility standards51 
produce different interpretative roles for the players.52
High on the list of concerns associated with a court’s use of expert 
testimony is misinterpretation of such testimony by the finder of fact.  
Id. 
50. By epistemology, we mean in this Article “How do we know what we think we 
know?” rather than “How do we know the truth?”  The latter question is from a realist 
perspective we do not share, as will become plain. 
51. However, as we shall see later, admissibility may not be the only, or even the prime 
concern in a reevaluation of experts.  Tweaking admissibility standards may not address a 
more central issue: the origins of the evidence being admitted.  See Scallen & Wiethoff, supra 
note 44, at 1149 (“[C]ourts have focused on the issue of the admissibility of expert testimony 
at the expense of understanding how issues of admissibility, sufficiency and credibility all 
work together to determine the ethos of expert testimony presented at trial.”).  The same 
could be said of many legal scholars who focus excessively on issues of admissibility.  Contra 
Thomas D. Lyon & Jonathan J. Koehler, The Relevance Ratio: Evaluating the Probative Value 
of Expert Testimony in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 43, 43 (1996) (arguing 
that “[s]tandards pertaining to the admissibility of scientific testimony are critical to the 
outcome in many trials.”).  No doubt they are correct; however, the authors’ suggestions for 
improving admissibility standards using a relevance ratio do not embrace the larger concerns 
of expert witness testimony.  See generally Michael H. Graham, The Expert Witness 
Predicament: Determining “Reliable” Under the Gatekeeping Test of Daubert, Kumho, and 
Proposed Amended Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 317 
(2000).  Graham points out significant ambiguities regarding the admissibility of expert 
witnesses’ testimony in the courtroom, but he does not examine the consequences of expert 
testimony per se.  Id.  But see generally Bruce Abramson, Blue Smoke or Science? The 
Challenge of Assessing Expertise Offered as Advocacy, 22 WHITTIER L. REV. 723 (2001).  
Abramson’s article is concerned with procedural issues aimed at keeping “bad science” out of 
the courtroom.  Despite the lack of attention to experts’ monopolization of the truth and the 
moral hazard surrounding their practice, he recognizes that “[e]xpert testimony is inherently 
problematic.”  Id. at 765; see also Lorie S. Gildea, Sifting the Dross: Expert Witness Testimony 
in Minnesota After the Daubert Trilogy, 26 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 93, 93–94 (2000) (arguing 
that Minnesota should change its expert witness testimony admissibility criteria to that of 
Daubert). 
52. The admissibility standards are based not only on a sense of roles, but of the legal 
goals of those players.  See Weinstein, supra note 45, at 730.  The use of experts varies 
depending on the legal goals; the goal of reducing litigation is served by a stringent standard 
for admission, while the goal of obtaining compensation for deserving plaintiffs may 
necessitate the admission of less pristine expertise.  See, e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 
1131 (noting the “increasingly controversial” nature of expert testimony). 
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Experts have been defined as follows: 
 
[P]ersons who are qualified, either by actual experience 
or by careful study, so as to enable them to form definite 
opinions with respect to a division of science, branch of 
art, or department of trade about which persons having 
no particular training or special study are incapable of 
forming accurate opinions or of drawing correct 
conclusions.53
 
This definition of expertise points to the usefulness of such 
specialized knowledge54 as an aid to the jury in evaluating the evidence 
in many legal controversies.55  However, the knowledge gap between 
expert and juror56 that necessitates expert testimony leads to a different 
problem: If the role of the expert is to enable the juror to assess the 
evidence in the case, what happens when the juror is unable to assess the 
testimony of the expert?57 
53. 31A AM. JUR. 2D Expert and Opinion Evidence § 1 (2002) (citations omitted). 
54. See Eric G. Jensen, Comment, When “Hired Guns” Backfire: The Witness Immunity 
Doctrine and the Negligent Expert Witness, 62 UMKC L. REV. 185, 186 (1993).  Jensen 
explains, “With the increase in legislation and government regulation over the last thirty 
years, no one, not even a highly educated judge, can remain fully knowledgeable of all 
pertinent issues.  Thus, the testimony of expert witnesses is often needed and used to clarify, 
explain and assist on many important issues.”  Id. at 189–90 (citations omitted). 
55. The role of expert as educator for the jury has been the predominant view.  See, e.g., 
Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1131–33, 1141 (noting that the Federal Rules of Evidence 
encourage the educational role of the expert). 
56. Id. at 1133.  This knowledge gap may be the largest in cases involving “novel 
scientific testimony.”  See id. 
57. See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1088 (stating “the oft-expressed notion that lay jurors 
‘are incompetent to evaluate scientific proof critically’” (quoting Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preliminary Facts Conditioning the 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984))).  Given this 
inability to distinguish between “charlatans” and “Nobel prize winners,” presented with two 
extremes, jurors are likely to presume the truth lies somewhere in between.  Id. at 1088–89; 
see also Browne et al., supra note 10, at 13 n.67 (“[D]enunciation of juror competence and 
reliance on outside help to assess the reliability of the evidence should apply likewise to the 
jury’s ability to evaluate the testimony that is admitted.”). 
 Vidmar and Diamond, on the other hand, argue that juries are competent: 
 
Jurors appear motivated to critically assess the content of the expert’s 
testimony and weigh it in the context of the other trial evidence, as they 
are instructed to do.  They appear to understand the nature of the 
adversary process, at least in the context of their specific trial.  Even 
though many jurors may not have had prior exposure to the trial process, 
it appears that they develop an understanding from the give and take of 
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When the court hears the testimony of an “expert,” especially 
someone recognized as a “scientific expert,” the jury may be overly 
impressed58 by the credentials presented59 and terminology used by this 
individual,60 hindering the jury’s ability to fully understand61 and 
examination and cross-examination and exposure to opposing experts.  
Indeed, rather than simply deferring automatically to experts, as critics 
have claimed, the trial process appears to make them aware of the 
fallibility of expert testimony.  This is not to say that every juror is 
motivated and grasps the expert testimony, because the data seldom shed 
light on the thought processes of individual jurors, but the deliberation 
process appears to result in closer examination of diverging views and 
understandings—just as the legal system assumes it does. 
 
Neil Vidmar & Shari Seidman Diamond, Juries and Expert Evidence, 66 BROOK. L. REV. 
1121, 1174 (2001).  Vidmar and Diamond describe another study conducted by Vidmar 
involving five malpractice cases: 
 
[These studies] show that the jurors were not passive in evaluating the 
experts or their testimony. Indeed, one of the findings from the interviews 
of jurors was that they clearly understood the adversary system.  They 
identified basic disagreements between the experts. They considered 
absence of evidence and incompleteness of testimony. They scrutinized 
possible motives behind each expert’s testimony such as money and the 
possibility that an expert was giving testimony to support a fellow 
physician. They had a basically solid understanding of burdens of proof 
and where the expert testimony fit into assessing that burden. Most 
importantly, the jurors in each case evaluated the testimony in the context 
of other trial evidence. 
 
Id. at 1141–42. 
 One recent proposal was to extend Frye and have the judge present the proffered 
scientific evidence to a committee of scientists who would testify at trial as to its validity.  See 
Weinstein, supra note 45, at 728. 
58. See PAULO FREIRE, PEDAGOGY OF THE OPPRESSED 58 (Myra Bergman Ramos 
trans., 1970) (stating that nonexperts are often led to act as “containers” or “receptacles to be 
filled” by unexamined pronouncements of expert knowledge). 
59. See, e.g., John W. Osborne, Judicial/Technical Assessment of Novel Scientific 
Evidence, 1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 497, 501 (arguing that the jury may be more impressed by the 
string of credentials than by the actual testimony of the expert). 
60. See, e.g., IAN R. FRECKELTON, THE TRIAL OF THE EXPERT: A STUDY OF EXPERT 
EVIDENCE AND FORENSIC EXPERTS 141 (1987) (describing how an expert can use technical 
or foreign language, uncommon words, and complex sentences); see also Stephen A. 
Saltzburg, Improving the Quality of Jury Decisionmaking, in VERDICT: ASSESSING THE CIVIL 
JURY SYSTEM 341, 363 (Robert E. Litan ed., 1993) (arguing that if a judge is unable to 
comprehend expert or scientific testimony, she should assume that the jury is similarly 
perplexed). 
61. See Bayles, supra note 5, at 29 (“Because they allegedly lack the necessary 
knowledge, laypersons cannot even evaluate professionals’ recommendations or actions.”).  
The recognition of this paradox is, of course, nothing new.  In his dialogue, Charmides, Plato 
has Socrates address this very issue.  After questioning one of his students, Socrates 
eventually comes to conclude the following: 
BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13 7/5/2008  2:34:02 PM 
2008] EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS 1133 
 
evaluate the evidence62 presented by the expert.63  Commentators have 
noted the “aura of scientific infallibility”64 that surrounds the expert,65 
especially when offering certain forms of evidence, such as statistical 
 
Then assuredly, wisdom or temperance, if only a science of science, and of 
the absence of science or knowledge, will not be able to distinguish the 
physician who knows from one who does not know but pretends or thinks 
that he knows, or any other professor of anything at all; like any other 
artist, he will only know his fellow in art or wisdom, and no one else. 
 
PLATO, Charmides, in THE DIALOGUES OF PLATO 22 (Benjamin Jowett trans., 1937).  What 
Plato is arguing here is that those who are not physicians will never be able to distinguish 
between the physician who really knows what she is talking about and the physician who does 
not. 
62. One expert in Texas, known as the “Doctor of Doom,” offered testimony in over 
seventy capital punishment cases that the defendant was a dangerous “sociopath who would 
kill again.”  RHODE, supra note 34, at 104.  Although this evidence was, in some cases, not 
based on personal examination of the defendant by the expert, juries imposed the death 
penalty in all but one trial.  Id. 
63. See Lunney, supra note 38, at 104–05; see also United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 
1224, 1236 (3d Cir. 1985) (recognizing that jurors may be swayed into believing that scientific 
testimony is especially reliable and trustworthy).  But see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 
1194, 1199 (2d Cir. 1978) (rejecting the defendant’s argument that the expert “awed [jurors] 
by an ‘aura of mystic infallibility’”); Weinstein, supra note 45, at 711 (noting that the fear that 
jurors will give too much weight to testimony from one labeled an “expert” has little evidence 
to support it); Neil Vidmar, Pap and Circumstance: What Jury Verdict Statistics Can Tell Us 
About Jury Behavior and the Tort System, 28 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1205, 1205–06 (1994) 
(arguing that statistics suggesting problems with jury decision making in tort cases are subject 
to numerous methodological problems). See generally Augustine Brannigan & Michael 
Lynch, On Bearing False Witness: Credibility as an Interactional Accomplishment, 16 J. 
CONTEMP. ETHNOGRAPHY 115 (1987). 
64. See Weinstein, supra note 45, at 723. 
65. One commentator suggests that this aura could be mitigated by a revelation of 
communications between experts and the attorneys for whom they testify.  See Stephen D. 
Easton, Ammunition for the Shoot-Out with the Hired Gun’s Hired Gun: A Proposal for Full 
Expert Witness Disclosure, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 465, 508–09 (2000).  Easton wants to limit the 
partisanship of expert witnesses by making full disclosure of communication between expert 
witnesses and attorneys mandatory, and he wants to end attorney-crafting of expert witness 
testimony and give opposing lawyers assistance revealing expert witnesses’ biases.  As Easton 
says, 
 
In a system which holds itself out as one that is designed to search for the 
truth, one would expect that the substantial benefits enjoyed by experts 
should be accompanied by increased reporting about the formation of 
expert, as opposed to fact witness, testimony.  Instead, as a practical 
matter, reporting regarding the formation of expert testimony is often 
more limited than discovery regarding the formulation of fact witness 
testimony. 
 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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evidence.66  When expert testimony from a single perspective is 
presented, the jury may be influenced to regard such testimony67 as 
indisputably accurate68 or decisive,69 thus abandoning its role as decision 
maker.70  When testimony from multiple perspectives is heard, the 
66. See MORRIS E. CHAFETZ, THE TYRANNY OF EXPERTS: BLOWING THE WHISTLE 
ON THE CULT OF EXPERTISE 103 (1996), where he points out that the average American is 
particularly intimidated by mathematical and scientific knowledge.  “A large part of the 
population, when asked about their proficiency in the mathematics, confessed that they were 
not ‘number people.’  They believe they cannot understand numbers and statistics, so they 
invest in the incantations of those who purport to unravel the mysteries of the universe: the 
scientists.”  Id; see also WALTON, supra note 5, at 22 (“We tend to be intimidated by experts, 
not only because they so often use technical jargon but because we ourselves . . . are not in a 
good position to really understand the expert’s reasons for advocating a particular conclusion 
or recommending a particular course of action.”). 
67. See IRVING M. COPI & CARL COHEN, INTRODUCTION TO LOGIC 165 (10th ed. 
1998). 
 
 In attempting to make up one’s mind about some difficult or 
complicated question, it is entirely reasonable to be guided by the 
judgment of an acknowledged expert who has studied the matter 
thoroughly.  When we argue that a given conclusion is correct on the 
ground that an expert authority has come to that judgment, we commit no 
fallacy.  Indeed, such recourse to authority is necessary for most of us on 
very many matters.  Of course, an expert’s judgment constitutes no 
conclusive proof[,] . . . but expert opinion surely is one reasonable way to 
support a conclusion. 
 
Id.   
68. But see, e.g., Franklin Strier, Making Jury Trials More Truthful, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REV. 95, 115 (1996) (“The adversary system is not a reliable means of bringing all the 
relevant scientific data to the adjudicator’s attention or for separating valid research from 
unwarranted conclusions.”) (citation omitted).  Strier laments that because of the decision in 
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), “almost any practitioner’s 
view, no matter how iconoclastic, may be welcome if reached via the scientific method.”  
Strier, supra, at 115.  He goes on to say that “[s]ocial scientists generally shirk the 
responsibility to expose the limits of their own expertise.”  Id. 
69. See, e.g., Allan Raitz et al., Determining Damages: The Influence of Expert Testimony 
on Jurors’ Decision Making, 14 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 385 (1990).  In a mock jury study, the 
researchers found that “many jurors wholeheartedly accepted the figures proffered by the 
expert for the plaintiff.”  Id. at 390.  Specifically, the jurors awarded the exact amount 
mentioned by the plaintiff’s expert: “[T]he analyses of monetary awards indicated that expert 
testimony influenced awards in an upward direction.  Jurors unaided by expert testimony 
awarded significantly less than those exposed to an expert.”  Id. at 392; see also Weinstein, 
supra note 45, at 712 (noting the potential impact of the “imprimatur of the trial judge’s 
decision that [the person testifying] is an ‘expert’”). 
70. Some scholars have proposed educational measures for juries to help them better 
execute their role.  See Keith Broyles, Note, Taking the Courtroom into the Classroom: A 
Proposal for Educating the Lay Juror in Complex Litigation Cases, 64 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
714, 745 (1996).  Because “jurors do not enter the trial with a blank slate,” and they must 
evaluate the testimony of expert witnesses, it is argued that they need assistance in their 
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resulting jury confusion71 can impel such coping tactics as “splitting the 
difference”72 between the two opinions.73  Jurors may also be unduly 
decision-making process.  SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN 
JURY ON TRIAL: PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 86 (1988).  For example, in one case, 
counsel furnished the jurors with definitions of all the exotic terms to be used in some patent 
litigation.  See CytoLogix Corp. v. Ventana Med. Sys., Inc., 424 F.3d 1168, 1170 (Fed. Cir. 
2005).  For example, Jack B. Weinstein has suggested the use of pedagogical aids to better 
allow the jury to organize the information.  Weinstein, supra note 45, at 728; see also Stanley 
D. Davis, A Fresh Look at Hypothetical Questions and Ultimate Issues: The Kansas 
Experience, 36 U. KAN. L. REV. 311, 353 (1988).  Jurors awed by the mental prowess of 
experts may not rely upon their own experience, even if they are instructed to do so.  See 
Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1878. 
71. This confusion may be heightened by the belief Chafetz points out: “Many people 
believe someone does, in fact, have answers that they do not possess.  Because they want to 
believe in that magical ‘someone,’ they are defenseless against those who claim to have 
special knowledge.”  CHAFETZ, supra note 66, at xiii. 
 
[A]mong 170 million adult Americans, 27 million read below the fifth-
grade level.  Some 60 to 65 million read below the ninth grade level.  To 
comprehend public policy discussions on the op-ed pages of the New York 
Times, the Washington Post, or the Wall Street Journal, a reader needs at 
least a twelfth-grade reading level.  In other words, nearly two out of five 
Americans are ill-equipped to participate fully in public life.  They do not 
have the resources available to them should they wish to question the 
scientists and would-be prognosticators. 
 
Id. at 117–18. 
 Although courts and scholars may doubt the capabilities of the jury, protecting them 
from scientific “banter” between opposing experts may lead the jury to view the expert’s 
testimony as unquestionable.  See Alan W. Tamarelli, Jr., Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals: Pushing the Limits of Scientific Reliability—The Questionable Wisdom of 
Abandoning the Peer Review Standard for Admitting Expert Testimony, 47 VAND. L. REV. 
1175, 1176 (1994) (arguing that other experts should make decisions about the reliability of 
scientific evidence). 
72. In a situation where jurors are faced with testimony from two or more conflicting 
experts, each with his or her own “aura” of unquestionable accuracy and wisdom, they may 
try to compromise by “splitting the difference” between the multiple viewpoints.  See Richard 
A. Epstein, A New Regime for Expert Witnesses, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 757, 758 (1992); Jacobs, 
supra note 40, at 1090 (noting the concern that jurors may “split the intellectual difference” 
between the “charlatans and Nobel prize winners”); Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1132.  
The dichotomous thinking that presents scientific experts as either “charlatans” or “Nobel 
Prize winners” is also reflected in the label “junk science.”  Such hasty categorization restricts 
the court’s understanding of expertise and its usefulness, and it substitutes for careful 
consideration of the merits of such testimony, particularly when “junk science” is used as a 
dismissal of the opponent’s testimony. 
73. The response of jurors to conflicting opinions is described by Franklin Strier.  Supra 
note 68, at 115.  He explains that in the O.J. Simpson criminal trial, People v. Simpson, No. 
BA097211 (Cal. Super. Ct. L.A. County 1995), jurors became visibly disinterested as experts 
tepidly debated each other’s claims.  Strier, supra note 68, at 115 n.65 (“What was supposed 
to be educative was instead combative and confounding.”). 
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influenced by the appearance74 or speaking ability of the experts.75 
Furthermore, there are concerns that jurors might be persuaded by 
testimony from “hired guns”76 or experts whose opinions are based on 
74. See David L. Wiley, Comment, Beauty and the Beast: Physical Appearance 
Discrimination in American Criminal Trials, 27 ST. MARY’S L.J. 193, 234–35 (1995) 
(considering how jurors discriminate according to physical appearance and suggesting that 
some type of remedy should be made to ensure defendants are judged according to their 
actions instead of their appearance). 
75. See FRECKELTON, supra note 60, at 146.  Freckleton refers to a study in which an 
actor hired to play an expert giving a lecture was reviewed by three audiences of trained 
educators.  These audiences awarded the lecture favorable reviews, even though it contained 
almost no substantive communication.  FRECKELTON, supra note 60, at 146 (citing Donald H. 
Naftulin et al., The Doctor Fox Lecture: A Paradigm of Educational Seduction, 48 J. MED. 
EDUC. 630 (1973)).  “This highlights the vital role that the presentation by the expert plays in 
his or her effectiveness in purveying a point of view to the tribunal of fact.”  Id. 
 An expert’s speaking abilities can also influence the juror’s acceptance of testimony.  “If 
witnesses are articulate and confident in their assertions, jurors are likely to attach much 
more credibility to their testimony than if the witness speaks in a ‘powerless style.’”  Id. at 
147–48; see also Strier, supra note 68, at 114 (“Attention is too often focused on the personal 
characteristics of expert witnesses instead of the quality of their evidence.”). 
76. See Jensen, supra note 54, at 187; Lunney, supra note 38, at 110.  Jensen explains, 
“Trial, the magazine of the Association of Trial Lawyers, contains numerous experts’ 
advertisements proclaiming that they can bring in the highest judgments possible.”  Jensen, 
supra note 54, at 187; see also Easton, supra note 65, at 465.  Lamenting the current rules of 
expert witness testimony, Easton states, “In fact, it is difficult to imagine a system that would 
lead to more biased testimony.”  Easton, supra note 65, at 471; see also Justin P. Murphy, 
Note, Expert Witnesses at Trial: Where Are the Ethics?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 217 (2000).  
Murphy concludes, “Today, criticism of expert witnesses is widespread throughout the legal 
community.  One can find and hire an expert to testify on virtually any topic, and even simple 
lawsuits often involve the testimony of an expert witness.”  Murphy, supra, at 217–18 
(citations omitted); see also L. Timothy Perrin, Expert Witness Testimony: Back to the Future, 
29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1389, 1393 (1995).  Perrin writes with a tone of disgust and outrage 
toward the expert witness system.  He states, “The combination of zealous advocates, paid 
experts, liberal rules of admission, and untrained jurors raises the question of whether the 
adversary system produces a reliable and accurate evaluation of expert witness testimony, and 
whether it is capable of doing so.”  Perrin, supra, at 1393; see also AM. MED. ASSOC., HOUSE 
OF DELEGATES PROCEEDINGS, 147TH ANNUAL MEETING 75–78 (June 14–18, 1998), 
[hereinafter AMA REPORT].  After stating that “medical witness[es] must not become an 
advocate or a partisan in the legal proceeding,” the AMA Board states that “[e]conomic 
incentives can color the nature of the physician expert’s testimony.”  AMA REPORT, supra, at 
77, 78; see also PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO’S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE 
COURTROOM 17 (1991).  Objective truth might be the goal of the judicial process, but it is not 
the goal of hiring an expert witness.  Huber quotes a former president of the American Bar 
Association who proclaimed, “I would go into a lawsuit with an objective uncommitted 
independent expert . . . about as willingly as I would occupy a foxhole with a couple of 
noncombatant soldiers.”  HUBER, supra, at 18; see also Dick Thornburgh, Junk Science—The 
Lawyer’s Ethical Responsibilities, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 449, 449 (1998).  Former Attorney 
General Thornburgh gives a straightforward condemnation: 
 
A look at the classified section of any legal publication will produce 
samples of a whole industry of “experts” advertising their abilities to 
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“junk science.”77
Should the judge be responsible for evaluating expert testimony 
prior to trial?  The current Federal Rules of Evidence require the judge 
to determine whether an expert may testify.78  Some commentators 
provide a wide range of expert testimony.  Many of them get right to the 
point, highlighting jury awards or settlement amounts gained as a result of 
their testimony. . . .  Their business is litigation, not science.  Their 
motivation raises serious questions about the use of expert testimony 
generally.  Are these experts really seeking to assist the trier of fact, or are 
they hired guns aiming at a pre-determined result? 
 
Thornbrugh, supra, at 452; see also Daniel W. Shuman et al., An Empirical Examination of the 
Use of Expert Witnesses in the Courts—Part II: A Three City Study, 34 JURIMETRICS J. 193, 
205 (1994).  Most experts are paid quite handsomely for their testimony.  Shuman found that 
the average fee charged by expert witnesses was $185 per hour, with a range from $50 per 
hour to $500 per hour.  Shuman et al., supra, at 205; see also Perrin, supra, at 1414.  Perrin 
concludes, “[N]o expert is immune from the bias that comes with compensation.”  Perrin, 
supra, at 1415.  Similarly, Jeffrey L. Harrison argues that the preference for effective rather 
than honest expert witnesses leads to social costs, including “wrong” decisions and excessive 
costs in courts’ attempts to expose expert biases.  See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, 
Reconceptualizing the Expert Witness: Social Costs, Current Controls and Proposed 
Responses, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 253 (2001).  These costs, which are not internalized by 
experts themselves, must be absorbed in other parts of the judicial system.  Id. at 259.  
Harrison argues that several controlling devices on experts, such as excluding expert 
testimony, “judicial shunning,” and legal action, are unlikely to reduce levels of dishonesty 
and bias testimony because these devices are not internalized by the experts themselves.  Id. 
at 314.  But see Miles J. Vigilante, Note, Screening Expert Testimony After Kumho Tire Co. v. 
Carmichael, 8 J.L. & POL’Y 543, 546 (2000) (acknowledging problems associated with the use 
of expert testimony, but nevertheless, arguing that the current rules governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony make for an adequate system); Scott E. Sundby, The Jury as 
Critic: An Empirical Look at How Capital Juries Perceive Expert and Lay Testimony, 83 VA. 
L. REV. 1109 (1997).  In his discussion of juries’ perceptions of witnesses in capital cases 
Sundby concludes, “[E]xperts are only one of many tools necessary to build an effective case 
in mitigation.”  Id. at 1188.  Sundby also found juries reported negatively evaluating 
testimony of experts who they thought were biased.  Id. at 1128.  He found that defense 
experts in capital murder cases were more likely to be viewed unfavorably than their 
counterparts on the prosecution.  Id. at 1123.  Most importantly, his study of jurors found that 
experts were criticized for being hired guns and jurors were “skeptical of experts and their 
ability to explain human behavior.”  Id. at 1125. 
77. See, e.g., Browne et al., supra note 10, at 7; Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 467.  
Thornburgh suggests that “if . . . attorney[s] were to be held accountable for introducing 
evidence that later turns out to be junk science, attorneys would be less likely to risk the 
introduction of junk science.”  Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 467.  But see David S. Caudill, 
Advocacy, Witnesses, and the Limits of Scientific Knowledge: Is There an Ethical Duty to 
Evaluate Your Expert’s Testimony?, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 341, 354–55 (2003) (arguing that 
because the lawyer has a duty to act as a zealous advocate for her client, she should not be 
responsible for preventing junk science from coming into court).  See generally HUBER, supra 
note 76 (decrying the presence of “junk science” in modern legal proceedings). 
78. FED. R. EVID. 104.  Rule 104(a) provides: 
 
BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13 7/5/2008  2:34:02 PM 
1138 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:1119 
 
argue that the judge, as the “gatekeeper,” is more capable of evaluating 
the expertise than is the jury.79  Depending on the amount of trust they 
put in their own evaluative capabilities regarding complex evidence and 
testimony, judges may be more or less flexible in admitting evidence.80  
While judges are permitted to request help in evaluating an expert 
witness’s testimony,81 some judges may simply rely on the adversarial 
nature of court proceedings to elicit reliable testimony or rely on the 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall 
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges. 
 
This requirement means that the judge must consider whether the expert is proposing to 
testify to scientific knowledge and whether that knowledge will assist the trier of fact.  See 
FED. R. EVID. 702. 
79. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmeceuticals, Inc., the Court takes the position that 
judges are more capable than juries to evaluate expertise.  509 U.S. 579, 593 (1993).  But see 
id., at 599 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing doubts that 
judges can understand areas of expertise in which they lack formal training); see also James J. 
Elacqua & L. Gene Spears, Technical Trials Call for Unique Strategies, NAT’L. L.J., June 6, 
1994, at C2 (“A jury, when properly educated through trial witnesses, argument and 
instruction, is every bit as qualified as a judge to decide a technical case.”). 
80. See, e.g., Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1513.  Some 
commentators suggest that when a judge feels uncertain about his or her ability to evaluate 
evidence, she may be more lenient in allowing the expert’s testimony.  See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. 
United States, 870 F. Supp. 15, 19 (D. Conn. 1994). 
  Jurors, however, may not be aware of this self-doubt, and may tend to regard testimony 
admitted by the judge as endorsed thereby.  See Easton, supra note 65, at 480. 
 
Just in case the recitation of an expert’s credentials might not be enough 
to elevate her to a special status above fact witnesses, in many courtrooms 
this recitation is followed, sometimes even in the absence of an objection 
to the expert’s opinion testimony, by a judicial declaration that the witness 
is indeed an “expert” who is thereby specially qualified to “assist the trier 
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.” 
 
Id. 
81. See generally Note, Improving Judicial Gatekeeping: Technical Advisors and 
Scientific Evidence, 110 HARV. L. REV. 941 (1997) (examining and arguing for the use of 
technical advisors by the courts to assist judges in weighing expert testimony).  See also 
Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1517.  Institutions are creating texts to aid 
the judge in this task.  For an argument based on optimism about judges’ abilities, see SHEILA 
JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR: LAW, SCIENCE, AND TECHNOLOGY IN AMERICA 42, 68 
(1995).  Jasanoff suggests that judges should increase their scientific literacy to decrease the 
distorting power of expert witnesses.  Id. at 68.  For example, given the frequency of toxic tort 
cases, it may be extremely beneficial for judges to gain understanding of common medical 
procedures and studies including cancer bioessays, risk analysis, and epidemiological studies.  
Id. 
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scientific community to help determine the admissibility of evidence. 82  
In any case, the judge’s general understanding of expertise, as well as 
the legal standards for regarding admissibility of expert testimony,83 
influence the judge’s ability to fulfill the role of gatekeeper.84
Experts themselves may have a significant role in this process of 
evaluating expert testimony.  As we will see in our survey of the 
historical treatment of experts in American courts, the admissibility 
standards have been, at times, based heavily on a determination of 
“general acceptance”85 within the specific discipline to which the expert 
belongs.86  In other words, when the court allows testimony under the 
criterion of “acceptance,” it is according deference to the determination 
of the experts themselves87 about which testimony is appropriate.88
82. See Kaushal B. Majmudar, Daubert v. Merrell Dow: A Flexible Approach to the 
Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence, 7 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 187, 195–96 (1993). 
83. David L. Faigman, Mapping the Labyrinth of Scientific Evidence, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 
555 (1995).  When considering admissibility standards, Faigman argues that the judges must 
be “sophisticated consumers of science.”  Id. at 556.  He believes this sophistication should 
come from understanding basic principles of statistics and research used by scientists.  Id. at 
558–59. 
84. See, e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1144.  Admitting or excluding evidence may 
determine a case’s outcome.  Wendy Fleishman & Russell Jackson, Challenges to the 
Admissibility of Expert Testimony: What Works After Daubert?, 723 P.L.I. Comm. 121 (1995); 
see also Rosen v. CIBA-GEIGY Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 318 (7th Cir. 1996) (noting that excluding 
the expert’s testimony regarding the role of a nicotine patch would have “doomed” the 
plaintiff’s case). 
85. The Frye standard offered the most comprehensive statement of this idea.  See infra 
Parts II.B.–D. and accompanying text. 
86. Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1511 (“[T]he community of 
experts within a particular field is most qualified to assess the validity of an expert’s theory or 
technique on that subject.”); see also United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743–44 (D.C. 
Cir. 1974). 
87. A questionable idea, according to this quote by George Bernard Shaw: “All 
professions are conspiracies against the laity.”  See CHAFETZ, supra note 66, at 123 (citing 
GEORGE BERNAD SHAW, THE DOCTOR’S DILEMMA (1906)). 
88. The reaction of experts to each other may be used in other more obvious or 
profitable ways.  For one suggestion, see Samuel R. Gross, Expert Evidence, 1991 WIS. L. 
REV. 1113.  One of Gross’s many suggestions to improve the use of expert witnesses in the 
legal system is to have opposing counsels’ experts present objections directly to each other, 
with time to “respond intelligently or even revise their positions.”  Id. at 1149.  He believes 
that this adjustment would lead to clearer presentation and overall higher quality expert 
evidence.  Id.; see also Perrin, supra note 76, at 1445–46; Strier, supra note 68, at 168–70 
(stating that experts are better equipped to be fact finders than lay juries and discussing a 
number of ways in which individuals with expertise could play a nonpartisan role in the 
judicial system); Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 469 (“[T]he court should always reserve the 
right to refer disputes over alleged ‘junk science’ to an independent panel of experts, not to 
decide the question in controversy, but to assess the quality of the expertise as required under 
the ‘gatekeeping’ regimen of Daubert.”). 
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A major focus of this Article will be questioning the epistemological 
assumptions about scientific knowledge that this role of the expert 
entails.  Seeing how the various players in the courtroom drama interact 
with this expertise leads us to realize the importance of understanding 
the nature of expert testimony as we seek to optimize its use in legal 
controversies.  As we will see in examining the evolution of the 
American legal system’s guidelines for such testimony, this question of 
roles has been central to the various standards held at one time or 
another. 
II.  THE LAW REGARDING THE USE OF EXPERTS 
A.  The Historical Treatment of Experts 
Historically, a witness was allowed to testify only to what he had 
personally seen or heard89 and not to any inferences or opinions the 
witness made from his or her observations.90  However, the expert was 
not constrained by this restriction.91  Although the expert was not 
permitted to testify to the ultimate issue in the case,92 expert testimony 
was generally admissible as long as it pertained to knowledge “‘not 
within the common knowledge of the layman.’”93  For the testimony he 
89. A “witness” is defined, in part, as “one who, being present, personally sees or 
perceives a thing.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1603 (6th ed. 1990). 
90. Although the categories of “facts” and “opinions” do not have a bright yellow line 
painted between them to clearly discern their separate identities, this distinction in legal 
thought continues to this day and plays a large part in the debate over legal testimony.  See, 
e.g., Allen & Miller, supra note 8, at 1132.  By restricting the layperson from testifying to 
opinions and inferences, the jury could gain closer access to the pure facts.  Likewise, experts, 
providing the court finds the “right” experts, are expected to dispense from the storehouse of 
scientifically established truths.  The difficulty comes, as we will see, when competing 
scientific truth claims are brought to the courtroom.  Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1089 n.27. 
91. In the 1782 case of Folkes v. Chadd, Lord Mansfield equated an expert’s knowledge 
in his field with personal knowledge, reconciling this deviation from the personal knowledge 
requirement.  (1782) 99 Eng. Rep. 589, 589–90 (K.B.). 
 Under the present Federal Rules of Evidence, a lay witness can testify to opinion or 
inferences only if the opinions or inferences are rationally based on the perception of the 
witness and helpful to create a clear understanding of the witness’s testimony or the 
determination of a fact in issue.  FED. R. EVID. 701.  An expert, however, is not subject to this 
restraint on opinion with some exceptions.  Under the Rules, an expert may testify to 
opinions so long as it will assist the trier of fact or determine a fact in issue.  FED. R. EVID. 
702. 
92. Lee Waldman Miller, Comment, Cross-Examination of Expert Witnesses: Dispelling 
the Aura of Reliability, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1073, 1076 (1988). 
93. Id. at 1074 (citing Bridger v. Union Ry., 355 F.2d 382, 387 (6th Cir. 1966)).  The 
Federal Rules of Evidence eliminated the requirement that limited expert testimony to 
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did offer, the expert had to state his qualifications, describe the facts 
underlying his opinions, and explain the basis for these opinions.94  The 
fact finder could then evaluate whether the testimony was consistent 
with the data used by the expert.95
B. The Frye Test 
Under the common law, experts had to explain the facts underlying 
their opinions.  One particularly common, yet confusing, type of 
evidence that experts have been asked to explain is scientific evidence.  
The courts have treated novel scientific evidence differently from other 
types of evidence since the 1923 Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia decision in Frye v. United States.96  This case posed a 
confusing standard dictating that the science forming the basis of the 
expert testimony is to be “generally accepted” in the scientific 
community,97 placing the burden of demonstrating this standard upon 
the expert.98  In spite of the uncertainty as to how the courts should 
apply this standard,99 the precedent remained in place for the following 
matters outside a layperson’s understanding.  See FED. R. EVID. 702 (requiring only that the 
testimony aid the trier of fact). 
94. These facts had to be facts of which the expert had personal knowledge, eliminating 
the dangers of hearsay testimony, and the facts, data, and opinions presented by the expert 
had to be submitted as hypothetical questions. Miller, supra note 92, at 1074. 
95. Id. 
96. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).  In Frye, the defendant attempted to offer expert 
witness testimony regarding the results of a systolic blood pressure deception test, a test 
similar to a polygraph machine.  Id. at 1013.  The expert claimed that the results of the test 
verified the defendant’s innocence.  Id. at 1014. 
97. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 10–11.  The authors explain that this short, citation-
free opinion was riddled with ambiguity.  Id.; see also Frye, 293 F. at 1013–14.  The court 
determined that the deception test had not gained sufficient recognition with physiological 
and psychological experts.  Frye, 293 F. at 1014.  According to Justice Van Orsdel, 
 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between 
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define.  Somewhere 
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be 
recognized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert 
testimony deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or 
discovery, the thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in 
which it belongs. 
 
Id. 
98. Miller, supra note 92, at 1093; Browne et al., supra note 10, at 11. 
99. Miller, supra note 92, at 1093–94.  It is clear, however, that the acceptance of one, let 
alone ten, qualified experts is not enough to make a scientific procedure admissible testimony 
under this standard.  See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at  1486.  Moreover, 
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fifty years.100
C. Application of The Frye Test 
The scope of the Frye decision is a matter of debate.  The standard 
for admissibility was created in the criminal context in relation to 
scientific testimony, and most courts initially limited the decision to the 
criminal law setting.101  However, in 1984, Frye was first applied to the 
civil context.102  The aspect of testimony under evaluation by the court is 
both the scientific technique applied by the expert and the principles on 
which the technique rests.103
if there is a three-way tie among experts, under the Frye standard, there is no general 
acceptance.  Id.  Professor McCormick has suggested a standard in which any relevant 
evidence supported by a qualified expert would be admissible, a standard perhaps even more 
permissive than the current standard.  See Osborne, supra note 59, at 512 (citing CHARLES T. 
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 363–64 (1954)). 
100. See Clayton C. Skaggs, Evidence: Say Good-Bye to the Frye “General Acceptance” 
Test, 33 WASHBURN L.J. 450, 450, 458 n.59 (1994); Miller, supra note 92, at 1075; Jon P. 
Thames, It’s Not Bad Law—It’s Bad Science: Problems with Expert Testimony in Trial 
Proceedings, 18 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 545, 549 (1995). 
 The Frye standard has been applied to various types of scientific evidence.  See United 
States v. Tranowski, 702 F.2d 668, 669 (7th Cir. 1983)  (astronomer’s testimony dating 
photographs by measuring lengths of shadows); Hughes v. Mathews, 576 F.2d 1250, 1258 (7th 
Cir. 1978) (psychiatric testimony); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508, 510 (9th Cir. 1978) 
(forward looking infrared imaging systems); Lindsey v. United States, 237 F.2d 893, 894 (9th 
Cir. 1956) (sodium pentothal); United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 743 (D.C. Cir. 1974) 
(voice prints); People v. Palmer, 145 Cal. Rptr. 466, 472 (Ct. App. 1978) (scanning electron 
microscope); People v. Slone, 143 Cal. Rptr. 61, 68 (Ct. App. 1978) (bite-mark comparisons); 
People v. Alston, 362 N.Y.S.2d 356, 362 (Sup. Ct. 1974) (blood testing); State v. Smith, 362 
N.E.2d 1239, 1246 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (gunshot residue tests). 
 Some of the areas to which the opinion has been applied are particularly remote.  In one 
context, courts have prohibited experts from testifying that an accused child molester deviates 
from the profile of a child abuser because that testimony is infringing on the jurors’ role of 
assessing the credibility of the abuser.  See, e.g., People v. Berrios, 568 N.Y.S.2d 512, 513 (Sup. 
Ct. 1991) (refusing to admit profile testimony of a child abuser). 
 The Frye standard was applied by courts even several years after the enactment of the 
Rules.  See, e.g., United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (application of Frye 
standard subsequent to Rules’ enactment); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541, 542 (6th 
Cir. 1977) (applying Frye subsequent to enactment of the Rules). 
101. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1529 (citing Paul C. 
Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 105, 111 
(1993)); see also Huber, supra note 36, at 733. 
102. See Paul C. Giannelli, “Junk Science”: The Criminal Cases, 84 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 105, 111 (citing Barrel of Fun, Inc. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 739 F.2d 
1028 (5th Cir. 1984)). 
103. See Melissa M. Horne, Note, Novel Scientific Evidence: Does Frye Require That 
General Acceptance Within the Scientific Community be Established by Disinterested 
Scientists?, 65 U. DET. L. REV. 147, 154–55 (1987) (citing Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility 
of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 
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Thus, the Frye test can be seen to possess some advantages.  The 
burden to evaluate complicated scientific evidence is removed from 
judge and jury,104 consistency within the legal system may be attained, 
and questionable testimony can be more carefully excluded.105  
Defenders of the standard recognize that requiring generally accepted 
scientific evidence excludes testimony that may be valid.106  However, 
they argue that the cost of excluding worthy testimony from the fringes 
is outweighed by the benefit of protecting the court from scientific 
charlatanism.107
However, the confusion precipitated by the Frye standard was 
remarkable.108  Depending on the court’s stipulated meaning of “general 
1197, 1211 (1980)). 
104. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 14; John William Strong, Language and Logic in 
Expert Testimony: Limiting Expert Testimony by Restrictions of Function, Reliability, and 
Form, 71 OR. L. REV. 349, 366 (1992); Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1179. 
105. Browne et al., supra note 10, at 14.  The authors point out that the jurors will be 
spared having to wade through “scientific banter” and “unpublished hunches,” both of which 
can hinder the fact finder’s quest for truth.  Id. (citations omitted). 
106. Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1178–79; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 
509 U.S. 573, 597 (1993) (acknowledging that some authentic insights will still be excluded 
under the new standard). 
107. The Frye standard could let in so-called charlatans as well.  See Confronting the 
New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1511 (citing HUBER, supra note 76, at 14); Osborne, supra 
note 59, at 509–11 (recognizing that unreliable evidence could satisfy the Frye standard, and 
the scientific community will not always extensively test a novel scientific technique).  For 
example, the paraffin test, generally accepted in the scientific community as a way to detect 
nitrate residues from gunpowder on a person’s hands, was found to create a high number of 
false positives (from tobacco or nail polish) after having been used to convict defendants for a 
quarter-of-a-century.  See Jacobs, supra note 40, at 1088 (citing Edward J. Imwinkelried, 
Judge Versus Jury: Who Should Decide Questions of Preiminary Facts Conditioning the 
Admissibility of Scientific Evidence?, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (1984)).  The problem 
of jurors splitting the difference between conflicting experts is related to a concern that jurors 
cannot distinguish between “charlatans and Nobel prize winners.”  Id. at 1084 n.8; see, e.g., 
Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1176; Osborne, supra note 59, at 508–09.  But see United States v. 
Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1975) (preferring the approach of permitting the jury to 
hear testimony and assess the credibility through cross-examination and refutation). 
108. See Campbell v. People, 814 P.2d 1, 8 (Colo. 1991) (refusing to apply Frye to expert 
psychological testimony on eyewitness reliability because eyewitness testimony was not a 
scientific device); Hutchinson & Ashby, supra note 36, at 1907 n.157 (“Few decisions have 
dominated an area of the law or caused as much confusion as Frye v. United States.” (quoting 
Bert Black, A Unified Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 629 (1988))).  
But see Frank R. Emmerich, Jr., Note, The Supreme Court Strengthens the Discretionary 
Powers of the District Courts in Admitting Expert Scientific Testimony: Daubert v. Merrell 
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 1051, 1053–54 (1994) (“[T]he application 
of this new rule [the Daubert standard] will only lead to greater confusion and frustration 
than that associated with Frye.”). 
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acceptance,”109 evidence may be accepted in some courts while rejected 
in others.110  Furthermore, giving such a substantial role to the expert, 
some argue, deprives the parties of their right to trial by jury111 and 
keeps them from presenting evidence that supports their case.112  As a 
response to this confusion, the Federal Rules of Evidence were created. 
D. The Federal Rules of Evidence 
In 1975, Congress adopted the Federal Rules of Evidence.113  The 
Rules specifically addressed the admissibility of expert testimony, 
eliminating some of the barriers to the admission of expert testimony.114  
Rule 401 defines “relevant evidence” as any evidence that makes the 
existence of a material fact more or less probable,115 while Rule 402 
permits admissibility of all relevant evidence.116  Rule 104(a) requires 
the judge, rather than the jury, to determine whether an expert can 
testify.117  Rule 702 provides the specific guidelines for the judge’s 
decision, stating that a witness qualified as an expert may testify to 
scientific, technical, or specialized knowledge, in the form of opinion or 
109. Tamarelli identified various judicial definitions of “general acceptance,” such as 
“widespread, prevalent, extensive though not universal.”  See Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 
1186–87. 
110. See generally Eileen A. Scallen, Classical Rhetoric, Practical Reasoning, and the 
Law of Evidence, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1717 (1995). 
111. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
112. See, e.g., Paul C. Giannelli, The Admissibility of Novel Scientific Evidence: Frye v. 
United States, a Half Century Later, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1197, 1230–31 (1980).  Stringently 
excluding expert testimony may infringe on the defendant’s right to present exculpatory 
evidence; however, too much flexibility in admitting evidence may prejudice the jury.  Id. 
113. Enacting the rules took over thirteen years.  S. Rep. No. 93-1277 (1974), reprinted in 
1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7051, 7051–52. 
114. See, e.g., Holbrook v. Lykes Bros. S.S. Co., 80 F.3d 777, 781 (3rd Cir. 1996) (noting 
Rule 702’s liberal policy of admission); see Lunney, supra note 38, at 105. 
115. FED. R. EVID. 401; see Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 587 
(1993) (“The Rule’s [Rule 401] basic standard of relevance thus is a liberal one.”). 
116. FED. R. EVID. 402 (“All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise 
provided by the Constitution of the United States, by Act of Congress, by these rules, or by 
other rules prescribed by the Supreme Court pursuant to statutory authority.  Evidence which 
is not relevant is not admissible.”). 
117. FED. R. EVID. 104.  Rule 104(a) provides: 
 
Preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a person to be a 
witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall 
be determined by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b).  
In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except 
those with respect to privileges. 
 
BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13 7/5/2008  2:34:02 PM 
2008] EXPERT PREDICTIONS OF DANGEROUSNESS 1145 
 
otherwise,118 if it “will assist” the trier of fact.119  If an expert bases her 
opinion on facts and data that are reasonably relied upon by other 
experts in their fields, Rule 703 permits the admission of those facts or 
data.120  Finally, according to Rule 706, the judge has the discretion to 
appoint an expert for assistance.121  Rule 706 has particular salience for 
118. The Rules eliminated the requirement that counsel use hypotheticals in certain 
circumstances, see FED. R. EVID. 705, and abolished the restriction against testifying to the 
ultimate issue, see Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1486–87.  At common 
law, an expert could testify that something could have caused a particular result but not that 
the expert believed it did cause that outcome in the case at hand.  Miller, supra note 92, at 
1076. 
 Despite the allowance of testimony on the ultimate issue in the case, most judges still 
keep the expert from taking that final step, preferring to leave the jury to draw its own 
conclusions on the implications of the expert’s testimony.  See Weinstein, supra note 45, at 
717. 
 Congress retained one exception to the lifting of the ultimate issue ban in Rule 704(b), 
which forbids an expert from testifying as to the mental state or condition of a criminal 
defendant, specifically as to whether the defendant had the mental state or condition 
constituting an element of the crime charged.  FED. R. EVID. 702. 
119. FED. R. EVID. 702 (“If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will 
assist the trier-of-fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness 
qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify 
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.”). 
 Professor Frederic I. Lederer, holding that reliability of testimony is the universal 
underlying concern, proposed the insertion of the word “reliable” before “scientific” in Rule 
702.  See Frederic I. Lederer, Proposals for a Model Rule on Admissibility of Scientific 
Evidence: Resolving the Frye Dilemma—A Reliability Approach, 115 F.R.D. 79, 84 (1987). 
120. See FED. R. EVID. 703.  Some scholars argue this provision incorporates the Frye 
standard into the Rules by appealing to the mainstream expert community view.  See, e.g., 
Laurel Beeler & William R. Wiebe, Comment, DNA Identification Tests and the Courts, 63 
WASH. L. REV. 903, 937 n.176 (1988); Gordon J. Beggs, Novel Expert Evidence in Federal 
Civil Rights Litigation, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 34 n.246 (1995). 
121. Rule 706(a) provides: 
 
Appointment.  The court may on its own motion or on the motion of any 
party enter an order to show cause why expert witnesses should not be 
appointed, and may request the parties to submit nominations.  The court 
may appoint any expert witnesses agreed upon by the parties, and may 
appoint witnesses of its own selection.  An expert witness shall not be 
appointed by the court unless the witness consents to act.  A witness so 
appointed shall be informed of the witness’ duties by the court in writing, 
a copy of which shall be filed with the clerk, or at a conference in which 
the parties shall have an opportunity to participate.  A witness so 
appointed shall advise the parties of the witness’ findings, if any; the 
witness’ deposition may be taken by any party; and the witness may be 
called to testify by the court or any party.  The witness shall be subject to 
cross-examination by each party, including a party calling the witness. 
 
See Margaret G. Farrell, Coping with Scientific Evidence: The Use of Special Masters, 43 
EMORY L.J. 927 (1994), for a detailed discussion of the use of court-appointed witnesses.  For 
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this Article because it provides the judge with an opportunity to better 
use social science expertise. 
The Rules are considered more liberal than the Frye test;122 however, 
Frye was not mentioned anywhere within the Rules.  Thus, scholars 
debated whether the Rules took precedence over the Frye test.  Those 
who believed that Frye was overruled held that the drafters of the Rules 
would have explicitly mentioned Frye had it remained applicable to 
expert testimony.123  Those who held that Frye continued to be valid 
argued that the drafters would have explicitly mentioned Frye as being 
overruled124 and that the Rules were not a comprehensive statement of 
further discussion of court-appointed experts, see, for example, Strier, supra note 68, at 115.  
Strier states, “[E]xpert testimony is today almost always confined to those experts hired by 
the parties—often to the detriment of the factfinder.”  Id.  Strier goes on to say, “No question 
exists as to the judge’s authority to call expert witnesses.”  Id. at 177.  He speculates that court 
appointed expert witnesses are not used frequently because judges fear they would be too 
influential.  Id. at 177–78.  Strier tries to allay fears of excessive influence by suggesting that 
judges could tell jurors not to assume that court appointed experts had their testimony 
endorsed by the court.  Id. at 178.  However, the tendency to treat court appointed experts’ 
testimony with superior reverence seems likely.  See, e.g., AMA REPORT, supra note 76.  “If it 
is difficult for the judge to evaluate the evidence, the [c]ourts should be encouraged to 
exercise a power that they have, but seldom use: the ability to retain their own nonpartisan 
expert under Fed. R. of Evid. 706.”  Id.; see also Deason, supra note 3, at 61.  Deason 
recognizes that appointed experts can help juries and judges understand specialized issues.  
Id. at 81–94.  However, she points out that eliminating payment to expert witnesses does not 
eliminate all biases that an individual carries.  Id. at 112 (“An expert’s financial interests may 
be the most straightforward to identify and even regulate, but they may not be as influential 
as intellectual or other personal motivations.”); see also Vigilante, supra note 76, at 588–89 
(claiming that court appointed expert witnesses are still biased and have too much power). 
 Germany similarly uses court-appointed experts in certain cases.  See Sven Timmerbeil, 
The Role of Expert Witnesses in German and U.S. Civil Litigation, 9 ANN. SURV. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 163, 163 (2003).  If both parties use experts and the experts disagree about the 
evidence, the German judge is required to hire a court expert who must testify.  Id. at 178.  
Additionally, partisan experts’ testimony is not considered evidence in Germany.  Id. at 178.  
Timmerbeil argues that this use of court experts may unduly influence judges and juries such 
that the court expert becomes the “de facto decision-maker.”  Id. at 182.  Furthermore, 
Timmerbeil argues that German judges may exert greater influence than American judges 
because German judges must choose the court expert.  Id. at 185. 
122. See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1487. 
123. See U.S. v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1234 (3d Cir. 1985) (quoting Jack Weinstein & 
Margaret Berger, 4 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 702[03], at 702–12 n.6); U.S. v. 
Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978).  The Third Circuit stated that the Frye test was 
out.  Downing, 753 F.2d at 1237.  The Second Circuit, decrying the simplistic head-counting of 
Frye, held that courts should consider the potential rate of error of the expert’s scientific 
technique, the standard, or lack thereof, controlling the given technique, how the technique 
was used, and whether the technique was subject to abuse.  Williams, 583 F.2d at 1198. 
124. Congressional history, including the Advisory Committee Notes, floor debates, 
hearings, and committee reports regarding Rule 702, does not indicate whether Congress’s 
intent was to eliminate Frye.  Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1182. 
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common law guidelines for evidence.125  A majority of circuit courts 
interpreted the two standards as coexistent,126 until the 1993 Supreme 
Court ruled otherwise in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 
Inc.127
E. Daubert: A New Standard of Admissibility 
In Daubert, each party’s case rested on expert testimony, and the 
conflict between the two scientific viewpoints hinged upon the court’s 
admission of this testimony.  Two children brought suit against Merrell 
Dow, alleging that its drug, Bendectin, caused their limb reduction birth 
defects.128  Merrell Dow produced a “well-credentialed expert” who 
testified that based on his review of more than thirty published studies 
regarding Bendectin and human birth defects the causal link was not 
supported by any study.129  In response, the plaintiffs’ eight experts130 
testified that test tube and animal studies demonstrated a link between 
the drug and defects.131
Relying on circuit court decisions, the district court reasoned that 
the animal study evidence was inadmissible because it was not generally 
accepted in its field.132  Furthermore, the epidemiological analyses by the 
plaintiff’s experts of previously published studies were inadmissible 
because the results of those analyses had not been published or 
subjected to peer review.133
125. Horne, supra note 103, at 153; see also Tamarelli, supra note 71, at 1185 (stating 
that Rule 702 did not contain “a completely integrated standard of admissibility”). 
126. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) 
(assuming the Frye standard survived the Rules); United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 350–51 
(7th Cir. 1989). 
127. 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
128. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 571 (S.D. Cal. 1989).  
Doctors prescribed Bendectin to pregnant women to reduce nausea. 
129. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 582 (“[There were] more than 30 published studies involving at 
least 130,000 patients.”). 
130. These experts had the following credentials:  Chief of the California Department of 
Health and Services Division, Senior Science Advisor to the Environmental Protection 
Agency and consultant to the Food and Drug Administration on causation issues, Professor 
of Epidemiology at the University of Texas, Associate Professor of Pediatrics, Pharmacology 
and Toxicology at the University of Texas Medical Branch, Professor of Pediatrics and 
Pharmacology at Wayne State University College of Medicine, Specialist in Pathology and 
Pharmacology, and director of the multi-discipline teaching labs and an Assistant Professor of 
pharmacology at the University of Arizona College of Medicine.  Id. at 583 n.2. 
131. The scientists believed that Bendectin ingestion while the fetus’s limbs were 
forming could interfere with development.  Id. at 583. 
132. Id. at 583–84. 
133. Daubert, 727 F. Supp. at 575.  Various circuit courts refused to admit reanalysis 
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The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision by ruling that 
the test tube studies were not sufficient to provide a basis for 
causation.134  The Supreme Court heard the case to determine whether 
the Frye test had survived the enactment of the Rules.135
In Daubert, the plaintiffs argued that the Rules superseded the Frye 
rule; specifically, they claimed that Rule 402 admitted all relevant 
evidence.136  In contrast, Merrell Dow, the defendant, suggested that 
Rule 702 created a general acceptance standard.137  The Supreme Court 
rejected the traditional test for admissibility.138  They decided that 
instead of relying on external groups to determine validity, judges 
themselves should make the decisions.139  The Court ruled that evidence 
could be admitted under the Rules even if its scientific basis was not 
generally accepted;140 thus, the Court settled the controversy that the 
Rules displaced the Frye test.141  However, the Court determined that 
judges needed to admit evidence only if it is both relevant and 
reliable.142  Some have suggested that this new standard, reliant upon the 
studies of Bendectin risks because those studies had not been subjected to peer review.  
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1130–31 (9th Cir. 1991). 
134. Three circuits had determined that animal and chemical studies were insufficient to 
demonstrate the link between Benedectin and birth defects.  Id. at 1130 (citing Brock v. 
Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 874 F.2d 307 (5th Cir. 1989), modified by 884 F.2d 166 (5th Cir. 
1989); Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 857 F.2d 823 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Lynch v. 
Merrell-National Labs, 830 F.2d 1190 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
135. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.  The Court’s example of the conflict among the circuits is 
the decisions of United States v. Shorter, 809 F.2d 54, 59–60 (D.C. Cir. 1987) and DeLuca v. 
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 911 F.2d 941 (3d Cir. 1990).  Daubert, 593 U.S. at 586.  In 
Shorter, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals used the Frye test to evaluate an expert’s 
testimony regarding an asserted compulsive gambling disorder defense to income tax evasion.  
Shorter, 809 F.2d at 59–60.  In contrast, the Third Circuit in DeLuca, following a Rules 
derived standard, considered the following: “(1) the soundness and reliability of the process 
or technique used in generating the evidence, (2) the possibility that admitting the evidence 
would overwhelm, confuse, or mislead the jury, and (3) the proffered connection between the 
scientific research or test result to be presented, and particular disputed factual issues in the 
case.”  DeLuca, 911 F.2d at 954–55. 
136. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
137. See Emmerich, supra note 108, at 1061 & n.47 (citing Brief for Respondent at 9, 
Daubert (no. 92-102)). 
138. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587. 
139. Id. at 589. 
140. Id. at 588; see also Faigman, supra note 83, at 563 (“Daubert’s replacement of Frye 
anticipates that there will be many cases in which the research lacks general consensus in its 
field, but it is accurate enough to assist the trial process.”). 
141. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 588.  The Court supported this decision by noting that 
nowhere in the Rules, or the drafting history, was Frye mentioned.  Id. 
142. Id. at 591–92.  To assist trial judges in determining relevancy and reliability, the 
Supreme Court offered four considerations.  Id. at 593–94.  First, did the expert use the 
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judge’s determination,143 may exclude as much or more relevant 
evidence than did Frye: the judge cannot admit any testimony unless its 
scientific validity and connection to the scientific field can be 
established.144  Moreover, the judge must be able to evaluate the 
scientific principles and methodology of the experts in question.145
F.  After Daubert 
There have been a multitude of cases concerning, involving, 
struggling with, or contemplating the Daubert ruling.  However, one 
theme has emerged: confusion.  Since the Daubert decision in 1993, the 
Supreme Court has addressed Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 
702 only four times.146  The most important of these four decisions was 
scientific method defined as forming and testing a hypothesis?  Id. at 593.  Second, has the 
expert’s theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication?  Id.  Third, does 
the scientific technique have a significant rate of error?  Id. at 594.  Finally, is the 
methodology generally accepted in the relevant community?  Id.  Another possible question 
to aid determination of admissibility might be the following: Did the expert conduct any 
research with this litigation in mind?  See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 
1515 (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 1317).  According to the Court in Daubert, other rules must 
bear on this inquiry as well where applicable.  509 U.S. at 595 (citing to Rule 706 allowing for 
court experts and Rule 403’s balancing test).  Additionally, Rule 703 allows for hearsay if the 
opinion is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts . . . in forming opinions or inferences 
upon the subject.”  FED. R. EVID. 703. 
143. The Supreme Court in Daubert first found that the Frye Court’s exclusive reliance 
on the general acceptance standard was improper.  509 U.S. at 588.  For a case admitting 
testimony not “generally accepted” in the community under Daubert, see FDIC v. Suna 
Assocs. Inc., 80 F.3d 681 (2d Cir. 1996). 
144. See, e.g., Lunney, supra note 38, at 141; Emmerich, supra note 108, at 1106 
(describing the Daubert standard as more conservative than Frye). 
145. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 595; see also Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 
1513.  But see Daubert, 509 U.S. at 598–601 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (noting that judges are trained in interpretation of cases and statutory provisions, not 
interpretation of scientific knowledge, method, and validity).  One scholar has noted the 
tension between the role of reliance upon evidence and the evaluation of that same evidence.  
See Confronting the New Challenges, supra note 37, at 1510.  A possible improvement on the 
American role of judge as evaluator would be the British practice where complex matters are 
tried under “lay judges” with particular technical expertise.  See Warren E. Burger, Agenda 
for Change, 54 JUDICATURE 232, 235 (1971). 
146. General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141–42 (1997).  This case is generally 
cited for the Court’s holding as to guidelines for appellate review of Daubert rulings.  
According to the Court, decisions concerning admitting expert testimony can only be 
reviewed under an “abuse of discretion” standard.  Id. 
 Following the Joiner decision, the Supreme Court was compelled to indirectly address 
the Daubert ruling in United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998), regarding the admissibility 
of polygraph evidence.  Here, the Court described some of the limits to Daubert’s flexibility 
and, in very vague terms, attempted to define reliability.  Id. at 312. 
 The third case to reference the Daubert decision is Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 
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Kumho Tire Co.147  The Court concluded that the Daubert ruling 
U.S. 137 (1999).  The fourth time the Court referred to Daubert was in Weisgram v. Marley 
Co., 528 U.S. 440 (2000).  Weisgram informed the appellate courts as to what remedies they 
could use when reviewing Daubert appeals.  Id. at 446.  The Court held that appellate courts 
may remand a case, direct it for a new trial, direct the district court to decide if a new trial is 
warranted, or if the evidence is insufficient to a party’s claim, the court may enter a judgment 
as a matter of law.  Id. at 457.  The Court opined, “We adhere to Neely’s holding and 
rationale, and today hold that the authority of courts of appeals to direct the entry of 
judgment as a matter of law extends to cases in which, on excision of testimony erroneously 
admitted, there remains insufficient evidence to support the jury’s verdict.”  Id. at 457. 
 Weisgram won a jury verdict.  However, during the trial and in the post-trial motions, 
Marley repeatedly objected to certain evidence as inadmissible.  Id. at 456. “[A]lthough 
Weisgram was on notice every step of the way that Marley was challenging his experts, he 
made no attempt to add or substitute other evidence.”  Id.  The Court, citing Lujan v. 
National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 897 (1990), notes, “[A] litigant’s failure to buttress 
its position because of confidence in the strength of that position is always indulged in at the 
litigant’s own risk.” Weisgram, 528 U.S. at 456. 
 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed with Marley, ruling that the district court 
had erred in admitting Weisgram’s expert testimony.  Id. at 440–41.  Subsequently, the court 
entered judgment for Marley as a matter of law.  Id.  Weisgram appealed, contending that 
entering a verdict as a matter of law for a loser in a jury trial was not within the scope of the 
appellate court’s authority.  Id. at 448–49.  Specifically, the Court ruled that Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 501(a) can be applied to Daubert appeals.  Id. at 445–46.  The appeals court 
can direct a judgment as a matter of law for the loser of a jury trial if the court deems that 
evidence used by the other party, the winner, was erroneously admitted.  The Court stated 
specifically, 
 
But if, as in the instant case, the court of appeals concludes that further 
proceedings are unwarranted because the loser on appeal has had a full 
and fair opportunity to present the case, including arguments for a new 
trial, the appellate court may appropriately instruct the district court to 
enter judgment against the jury-verdict winner.  Appellate authority to 
make this determination is no less when the evidence is rendered 
insufficient by the removal of erroneously admitted testimony than it is 
when the evidence, without any deletion, is insufficient. 
 
Id. at 444. 
 However, a judgment as a matter of law can only be entered if the remaining evidence 
properly admitted does not support a decision for that party.  Id. at 457. 
 
 Since Daubert, . . . parties relying on expert evidence have had notice 
of the exacting standards of reliability such evidence must meet.  It is 
implausible to suggest, post Daubert, that parties will initially present less 
than their best expert evidence in the expectation of a second chance 
should their first try fail. 
 
Id. at 455 (citations omitted).  Circuit courts are granting summary judgments after the 
opposing party’s expert testimony was expelled as inadmissible.  Similarly, this case is cited in 
numerous circuit court decisions to quiet the objection that the court should not grant 
summary judgment but rather remand for a new trial.  See, e.g., Alfred v. Caterpillar, Inc., 262 
F.3d 1083 (10th Cir. 2001). 
147. 526 U.S. 137 (1999). 
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extended to non-scientific expert testimony.148  Specifically, trial courts 
must judge the admissibility and reliability of all expert testimony in 
accordance with Federal Rule of Evidence 702.149  Thus, Kumho Tire 
Co. effectively incorporated many of the soft sciences,150 even those at 
one time considered junk science.  Despite this guidance, circuit and 
district courts have been battling to understand the evidence presented 
in order to determine reliability to properly perform their “gate 
keeping” function. 
The circuit courts have encountered problems interpreting and 
applying Daubert.  A major obstacle appears to be a general lack of 
understanding concerning Daubert and its principles.  Certain courts are 
taking the principles as rigid standards of admission that have effectively 
raised the bar for expert testimony, while others view Daubert as a 
flexible set of principles aimed at allowing the novel and respected 
minority expert opinions into the courtroom.  On occasion the courts 
have varied significantly enough that they directly contradict one 
another. 
Yet another problem that seems to be evident is the court’s ability to 
judge the merits of technical testimony.  As gatekeepers for the court, 
judges are forced to evaluate the merits of testimony that is obviously 
beyond the purview of any court.151  Oftentimes the judges listen to the 
148. Id. at 138. 
149. Id. 
150. See, e.g., Milanowicz v. Raymond Corp., 148 F. Supp. 2d 525 (D.N.J. 2001).  The 
court, discussing the Daubert difficulties regarding Kumho Tire, states, “That guidance 
notwithstanding, in the wake of Kumho, courts have nevertheless struggled, with varying 
degrees of success, to apply the Daubert factors to seemingly recalcitrant technical subjects 
such as engineering.”  Id. at 531; see also Kimberly M. Hrabosky, Note, Kumho Tire v. 
Carmichael:  Stretching Daubert Beyond Recognition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REV. 203, 222 (1999) 
(arguing that “mechanical application of Daubert to nonscientific expert testimony defies 
logic and could lead to substantial injustice in the criminal context”); cf. Erica Beecher-
Monas, The Heuristics of Intellectual Due Process: A Primer for Triers of Science, 75 N.Y.U. 
L. Rev. 1563, 1566–68 (2000) (arguing that judges gloss over genuine scientific inquiry due to 
perplexity over required inquiry). 
151. See Nelson v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 243 F.3d 244, 252 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 
If anything, Kumho supports the magistrate judge’s consideration of 
factors not mentioned by the Supreme Court, including the fact that 
Kilburn’s study was conducted and the experts’ opinions were formed for 
purposes of litigation.  This factor is consistent with our observation that 
close judicial analysis of expert testimony is necessary “because expert 
witnesses are not necessarily always unbiased scientists.”  Here, the 
magistrate did not abuse his discretion by considering this factor as he did, 
or by concluding that “the fact that the study was performed in connection 
with litigation and funded by plaintiffs’ counsel does not militate in Dr. 
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arguments made by each side’s witnesses about the validity of technical 
testimony and then are forced to apply vague guidelines enumerated by 
the Supreme Court in Daubert that may not be appropriate. 
Courts also vary in their perceptions of their role under Daubert.  
The Ninth Circuit, for example, cited the district courts’ “gatekeeper” 
role as “excluding ‘junk science’ that does not meet the standards of 
reliability required under Rule 702.”152  In Domingo v. T.K., the court 
held that if an expert does not test his own hypothesis, there are several 
other procedures the expert can employ to demonstrate validity and 
reliability.153  “[I]f an expert did not conduct his or her own research, 
independent of the litigation, on the subject of the testimony, the district 
court must determine whether there exists any ‘objective, verifiable 
evidence that the testimony is based on “scientifically valid 
principles.”’”154  This interpretation offers multiple methods other than 
testing to demonstrate reliability and validity, thereby allowing more 
expert testimony to be admitted. 
The courts also have conflicting interpretations as to the extent to 
which an expert’s qualifications can make up for gaps or assumptions in 
the reasoning.  In Campbell v. Metropolitan Property & Casualty 
Insurance Co.,155 the court did not require the expert to make scientific 
tests of his hypothesis but instead concluded that his assumptions were 
validated based on the credentials he possessed.156  Based on his résumé, 
Kilburn’s favor.”  
 
Id. (citations omitted). 
152. Domingo v. T.K., 289 F.3d 600, 605 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted). 
153. Id.  The court states, 
 
On remand from the Supreme Court in Daubert, this court explained that, 
if an expert did not conduct his or her own research, independent of the 
litigation, on the subject of the testimony, the district court must 
determine whether there exists any “objective, verifiable evidence that the 
testimony is based on ‘scientifically valid principles.’”  Here, because Dr. 
Harrington had not conducted his own independent research on FES, the 
court correctly looked for objective and verifiable evidence of the validity 
of his theory. 
 
Id. at 605 (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc. (Daubert II), 43 F.3d 1311, 1317–18 
(1995)). 
154. Id. (quoting Daubert II, 43 F.3d at 1317–18). 
155. 239 F.3d 179 (2nd Cir. 2001).  In this case, the expert was asked to testify as to the 
time period in which lead poisoning began to affect the Campbell children.  Id. at 179.  Based 
on the impressive credentials of the expert witness the court granted him significant leeway.  
Id. at 186. 
156. The court noted his credentials in responding to the claim his testimony was not 
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the court felt any inconsistencies in his method went to weight rather 
than admissibility, thus permitting him the benefit of the doubt.157  Other 
courts have ruled that an extensive listing of credentials does not justify 
unsupported leaps of logic.  The latter opinion can be seen in Coffey v. 
Dowley Manufacturing, Inc.,158 where the court found that it must look 
beyond the expert’s extensive pedigree.159  Finding that his methods 
required taking his word as gospel, the court deemed his testimony 
inadmissible under Daubert.160
In summary, depending on the court, circuit or district, expert 
testimony may be subject to radically different analyses.161  The role of 
valid.  Id. at 185–86.   
 
He wrote several sections in the air-lead-criteria document published by 
the EPA, and he was chairperson of the Centers for Disease Control’s 
advisory committee on the reports “published in ‘85 and ‘91 on preventing 
lead poisoning in young children, which are used nationally by 
departments of health as well as pediatricians for the treatment, diagnosis 
and management of childhood lead poisoning.”  Thus, the court noted 
that Dr. Rosen “seems to be a preeminent expert in the field relied on by 
all the relevant government agencies to establish the science for the 
policies that the government has adopted.”   
 
Id. at 186. (emphasis omitted). 
157. Id. at 186.  The court stated, 
 
To the extent that Metropolitan asserts that there were gaps or 
inconsistencies in the reasoning leading to Dr. Rosen’s opinion in this 
case, or that there were responses from which it could be argued that the 
onset of the children’s injuries did not occur prior to the end of the first 
policy period, such arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not to its 
admissibility. 
 
Id. 
158. 187 F. Supp. 2d 958 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). 
159. Id. at 975.  “Yet, although Dr. Wilson’s pedigree is impressive, the Rule 702 and 
Daubert analysis demands that [the] [c]ourt not simply take Dr. Wilson’s bare assertions as 
gospel.”  Id.  “‘[N]othing . . . requires a district court to admit opinion evidence which is 
connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of the expert.’” (quoting Gen. Elec. Co. v. 
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997)) (omission in original). 
160. Id. 
161. See Note, Reliable Evaluation of Expert Testimony, 116 HARV.  L. REV. 2142, 2142–
43 (2003).  The author argues that because Daubert gave judges such little guidance, litigants 
will be tried inconsistently across circuits, and these inconsistencies may occur within the 
same trial court.  Id. at 2147.  To remove these inconsistencies, the author proposes that 
Congress create a taxonomic system for classifying various kinds of experts.  Id. at 2143.  With 
a classification system, judges could more easily and consistently evaluate the reliability of 
expert testimony.  Here, the author suggests a two-tier system, composed of more 
experimental testimony and testimony that is based more on experience.  Id. 
BROWNE_HARRISON-SPOREL_-_13 7/5/2008  2:34:02 PM 
1154 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [91:1119 
 
the players in trial proceedings is still an open question: those 
advocating liberal admissibility standards tend to give a larger role to 
the jury,162 while those advocating increased restrictions163 rely upon the 
judge to evaluate testimony before it is heard in trial.164  In the next Part, 
we will examine the assumptions about the nature and origins of experts 
to see more clearly what it is that experts have to offer for the court’s 
consumption. 
III.  EPISTEMOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS AND THE                                      
REAL STORY OF EXPERTISE 
As we have seen in examining the various admissibility standards 
offered by American common law over the years, different views about 
the nature of expertise are implied by these standards.165  Evaluating the 
162. The jury may or may not be aware of the disputed nature of this evidence.  See 
Perrin, supra note 76, at 1399.  Perrin says, 
 
Information that once would have been brought out by a lawyer on cross 
examination and argued during closing argument is now brought out 
through an expert witness who has access to all the testimonial advantages 
the Rules provide to experts.  The expert can even testify to opinions that 
embrace the ultimate issue, thus enhancing the advocate role of the 
expert. 
 
Id.; see also Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note 44, at 1151 (“[E]xpert witnesses do not have to 
reveal the bases for their opinions.”). 
163. One state’s regulations (Washington) provide examples of such restrictions.  See 
Thornburgh, supra note 76, at 462. 
164. See Scallen & Wiethoff, supra note 44, at 1145–46.  The authors state, 
 
[T]he problem of expert testimony cannot be resolved adequately simply 
be turning judges into “amateur scientists.”  Instead, the problem . . . must 
be addressed by confronting the problem at bottom: Science and law 
speak different languages.  A judge, even one trained in the scientific 
method, cannot alone translate the testimony of expert witnesses into 
meaningful legal discourse. 
 
Id.  They explain that now judges, rather than juries, are given primary responsibility for 
evaluating an expert’s ethos, “thus obscuring the fact that expert testimony is, at bottom, 
‘opinion,’ traditionally evaluated by the trier of fact, often a jury.”  Id. at 1144.  But see 
Abramson, supra note 51.  Abramson argues, “[T]he scientific method and the law of 
evidence converge to place scientific gatekeeping squarely within the realm of judicial 
competence.”  Id. at 726. 
165. See, e.g., Robert Kargon, Expert Testimony in Historical Perspective, 10 LAW & 
HUM. BEHAV. 15, 15 (1986) (offering a general argument that our reverence for “experts” has 
changed significantly throughout history); Haskell, supra note 5, at xii (“[T]he noun form of 
the word [expert]—with all it implies about the distinctiveness of the social role, its visibility 
across a wide spectrum of activities and occupations, and the prospects of earning an income 
from it—did not come into use until the middle decades of the nineteenth century.”).  For 
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standards that have been presented, as well as the often-conflicting 
judicial application of these standards, leads to important questions 
about the epistemological assumptions inherent to these different 
views.166  How do experts arrive at the knowledge they present for our 
edification?  Are scientific “facts”167 as we receive them the products of 
an impersonal and objective scientific force,168 or the results of human 
further discussion of the development of our current reliance upon expertise in the twenty-
first century, see BRINT, supra note 4, at 40 (“[T]he prominence of expert professionalism 
grew naturally out of the sense of progress and power long associated with new technology 
and new intellectual tools of control.”).  See also Haskell, supra note 5, at xii (“[A]scending 
levels of population density and per capita income made it possible for substantial numbers of 
people to make a living by selling advice and specialized services, rather than producing food 
or other tangible goods.”).  But see Larson, supra note 5, at 37 (“[P]owerful as they were, the 
legitimizing factors that we have discussed so far—faith in science, confirmed by technological 
progress; the submission of all to the impersonal laws of the market, rigged though it was—
were not enough to confer upon experts the full scope and character of the power they appear 
to exercise today.”).  Instead, Larson argues that the rise of expert power should largely be 
contributed to the “emergence of a formally free system of mass education.”  Id.  To Larson, 
it was the “pedagogies based on an ‘ideal of simple calculability’” that reinforced the notion 
that “experts, who study longer, master uncertainty better because they know more facts.”  Id. 
at 55.  “Expertise . . . increasingly provides a base for attaining and exercising power by the 
people who can claim special knowledge in matters that their society considers important.”  
Id. at 28. 
 See also Bayles, supra note 5, at 29, arguing that much of the reason experts have power 
over non-experts is that in a majority of the situations in which an expert opinion is needed, 
non-experts are experiencing some type of a crisis.  “The professional has the specialized 
knowledge or means to diagnose the problem, determine the alternative approaches to 
resolving it, and then take the necessary steps.  This knowledge gives a professional power 
over an individual.”  Id. 
166. See Gary Edmond, Science, Law and Narrative: Helping the ‘Facts’ to Speak for 
Themselves, 23 S. ILL. U. L.J. 555, 559 (1999).  Edmond critiques the underpinnings of the 
expert witness system itself by revealing that science’s status as objective and impartial is 
increasingly being questioned.  Id.; see also David S. Caudill & Richard E. Redding, Junk 
Philosophy of Science?: The Paradox of Expertise and Interdisciplinarity in Federal Courts, 57 
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 685, 690 (2000) (arguing that only a weak social constructivist 
approach has found its way into the legal system). 
167. See, e.g., BRUNO LATOUR, SCIENCE IN ACTION: HOW TO FOLLOW SCIENTISTS 
AND ENGINEERS THROUGH SOCIETY 104 (1987).  Latour suggests that facts arise when 
readers are sufficiently convinced about something that there is no debate about it, and the 
processes that led to the successful persuasion of those readers has dropped out of sight.  Id. 
168. See Easton, supra note 65, at 471 n.15.  Easton reveals, “It is axiomatic to state that 
a trial is a search for the truth.”  Id.; see, e.g., Oneida, Ltd. v. United States, 43 Fed. Cl. 611, 
619 (Fed. Cl. 1999) (stating that ”the integrity and reliability of the truth finding process in a 
case should be paramount”); Mark R. Patterson, Conflicts of Interest in Scientific Expert 
Testimony, 40 WM & MARY L. REV. 1313 (1999).  Patterson is skeptical of experts and 
concerned with the relationship between science and the law, but he ignores the clashes in the 
courtroom when experts promulgate different versions of truth.  Patterson, supra, at 1394.  
Strier argues for a less adversarial and more inquisitorial judicial system.  See generally Strier, 
supra note 68.  He justifies his modifications, including the use of court appointed experts, by 
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interactions within certain social structures,169 influenced by the 
particular needs and values of the scientists that inhabit those 
structures?170
The conflicting guidance offered to courts by Daubert follows from 
the conflicting epistemological assumptions on which the Daubert 
decision rests.  On the one hand, Daubert promotes the court’s reliance 
on expertise by creating a more liberal standard in admissibility.  The 
courts’ continued emphasis on turning to experts for the “truth”171 
demonstrates an allegiance to positivism.172  However, because the 
Court in Daubert urges judges to act as a “gatekeeper” by evaluating the 
relevancy and reliability of testimony, the Court is recognizing a 
constructivist notion:173 the idea that truth is socially constructed.174  
appealing to their usefulness in reaching the truth.  Id. at 169–70.  Strier’s unidimensional 
understanding of truth is omnipresent throughout the article.  For example, “The attorney’s 
overriding allegiance is to the client, not the truth.”  Id. at 117.  And, “As opposed to the 
adversary system, the inquisitorial system trial is remarkably unencumbered in its search for 
truth.”  Id. at 144. 
169. See DANIEL LITTLE, VARIETIES OF SOCIAL EXPLANATION: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 68–87 (1991).  Little explains the approach to 
social science truth determination as the fruit of interpretative schemas derived from 
recognition that truth is established in relational networks. 
170. See BRINT, supra note 4, at 145–46 (arguing that experts, while claiming to be value 
neutral, are actually imposing a specific set of values upon society).  “[T]he social values of 
experts, in keeping with the main thrust of the rationalizing process, tend to favor centralized 
control and hierarchy, since these are associated with the virtues of predictability.” Id.  But 
see William Gardner et al., Asserting Scientific Authority: Cognitive Development and 
Adolescent Legal Rights, 44 AM. PSYCHOL. 895, 899 (1989) to find an example of a scientist 
who contends that expert scientific testimony is, in fact, value neutral.  “When we claim to 
speak with scientific authority, it is implicit that our discourse is motivated by the epistemic 
values of science, rather than extra scientific values.  If our scientific evaluations are filtered 
through our political values, why should anyone who disputes our politics accept our 
science?”  Id. 
171. But see Caudill & Redding, supra note 166, at 690.  Caudill and Redding argue that 
courts follow a “pragmatic legal constructivis[t]” approach that ignores philosophical 
problems with defining science.  Id.  The authors conclude that their approach renders science 
in the law “almost wholly independent from the scientific enterprise.” Id.  Caudill & Redding 
argue against what they see as the false dichotomy of positivist approaches to science versus 
social constructionist approaches to science.  Id. 
172. See Margaret G. Farrell, Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.: 
Epistemology and the Legal Process, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2183, 2189–93 (1994) (stating that 
the Frye test’s reliance on the external scientific community for determining truth is another 
illustration of positivism). 
173. But see Caudill & Redding, supra note 166, at 749.  In response to Browne et al.’s 
suggestion for court appointed experts, Caudill and Redding explain, “That is not the 
conclusion we would have expected from social constructivists—we were thinking something 
like ‘court appointed experts will likely be leaders in the field who will further the hegemony 
of mainstream science.’”  Id.  However, whether elites would be appointed to courts as 
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Instead of looking to the expert for truth, the Court seems to recognize 
that experts offer a perspective of truth.175  This Part will more carefully 
consider these two conflicting epistemologies. 
Positivism, the epistemology176 of modernism,177 suggests that there is 
an observable reality.178  Defenders of an objective science typically 
experts is difficult to ascertain.  The same certainly does not occur with court-appointed 
lawyers.  Caudill and Redding have a more serious social constructivist critique of court 
appointed experts: “The use of court-appointed expert panels or science courts, proposed by 
a variety of scholars, does generally represent the view that there is a majoritarian ‘correct’ 
science.  Thus, it is strongly positivist in orientation.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
174. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Strategies of Power, in THE TRUTH ABOUT THE TRUTH: 
DECONFUSING AND RE-CONSTRUCTING THE POSTMODERN WORLD 40, 40–45 (Walter 
Truett Anderson ed., 1995).  Foucault wants us to focus more on identifying how what we call 
truth came to be known and be less concerned about what the truth is.  Id. 
175. See Anthony G. Greenwald, The Totalitarian Ego: Fabrication and Revision of 
Personal History, 35 AM. PSYCHOL. 603 (1980) (suggesting that humans—and thus experts—
permit the external world to determine their perceptions).  Specifically, Greenwald 
discovered humans see what is consistent with positive stories about themselves.  Id. 
176. By epistemology, we mean “How do we know what we think we know?” rather 
than “How do we know the truth?”  The latter question is from a realist perspective we do not 
share, as will become plain. 
177. Postmodernists, on the other hand, believe that there are no “truths” in the world; 
instead, they argue that knowledge is constructed.  Consequently, an expert cannot simply 
report the events that occurred during an experiment.  Because the expert interprets the 
results, she is constructing the knowledge.  Consequently, postmodernists stress the 
importance of many voices, as opposed to a single “canonical” voice.  See PAULINE MARIE 
ROSENAU, POST-MODERNISM AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES: INSIGHTS, INROADS, AND 
INTRUSIONS 77–91 (1992); see also Vivienne Brown, Decanonizing Discourses: Textual 
Analysis and the History of Economic Thought, in ECONOMICS AND LANGUAGE 64 (Willie 
Henderson ed., 1993) (applying Bakhtin’s process of canonization to the treatment of 
economic ideas and suggests that the unilogical system of the epic poem be replaced by the 
heteroglossia of the novel). 
178. During the Enlightenment, notable philosophers including Descartes and Locke 
celebrated rationality and emphasized the powers of individual observation as a means of 
acquiring truth.  See ROGER SMITH, THE NORTON HISTORY OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES 157, 
160–83 (1997).  Logical empiricists nurtured this perception and gradually the notions of 
“science,” “rationality,” and “truth” became intertwined.  See Rorty, supra note 14, at 38–39 
(discussing the impact of equating rationality with science and describing the modernist 
assumption that truth corresponds with reality). 
 In the field of psychology, behaviorism became the dominant method.  Behaviorists 
asserted the position that through carefully controlled experiments, universal laws of human 
behavior like those discovered in the physical sciences would soon follow.  The empiricist 
position that experience of the senses is the only source of knowledge, along with the 
principles of “physicalism” and “operationalism,” legitimized behaviorists’ limitations on 
acceptable questions, method and data, and soon the behaviorist method was considered 
synonymous with the scientific method.  See POLKINGHORNE, supra note 14, at 21; see also 
Stephen Toulmin & David E. Leary, The Cult of Empiricism, and Beyond, in A CENTURY OF 
PSYCHOLOGY AS SCIENCE 594 (Sigmund Koch & David E. Leary eds., 1985). 
 The publication manual of the American Psychological Association provides some 
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focus on science itself; they argue science is “value-free,”179 “honest,” 
important examples of the implicit positivistic assumptions that have been incorporated into 
the field.  See AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., PUBLICATION MANUAL 11 (4th ed. 1994) 
(demonstrating the discipline’s commitment to the view of science as a cumulative, 
collaborative endeavor); G. Scott Budge & Bernard Katz, Constructing Psychological 
Knowledge: Reflections on Science, Scientists and Epistemology in the APA Publication 
Manual, 5 THEORY & PSYCHOL. 217, 219 (1995). 
 
This shift is more than cosmetic, for it reflects a shift from a more 
macroscopic to a more microscopic perspective in both form and content, 
as well as an implicit statement about the nature of language, science, and 
epistemology world-view (Weltanschauung) of psychology.  These are 
that language is a tool, science is the accumulation of information based 
on single experiments that achieve positive results, knowledge is gained 
through the discrete and abstract measure of external behavior and 
recorded through the neutral and objective pen of a scientific observer, 
and the world is a place to be bracketed and controlled. 
 
Budge & Katz, supra, at 219–20.  For further discussion of modernism, see Donald N. 
McCloskey, The Rhetoric of Economics, 21 J. ECON. LIT. 481 (1983).  According to 
McCloskey, the precepts of modernism are the following: 
 
(1) Prediction (and control) is the goal of science. 
(2) Only the observable implications (or predictions) of a theory matter 
to its truth. 
(3) Observability entails objective, reproducible experiments. 
(4) If (and only if) an experimental implication of a theory proves false is 
the theory proved false. 
(5) Objectivity is to be treasured; subjective “observation” 
(introspection) is not scientific knowledge. 
(6) Kelvin’s Dictum: “When you cannot express it in numbers, your 
knowledge is of a meagre and unsatisfactory kind.” 
(7) Introspection, metaphysical belief, aesthetic, and the like may well 
figure in the discovery of an hypothesis but cannot figure in its 
justification. 
(8) It is the business of methodology to demarcate scientific reasoning 
from non-scientific, positive from normative. 
(9) A scientific explanation of an event brings the event under a covering 
law. 
(10) Scientists, for instance economic scientists, have nothing to say as 
scientists about values, whether of morality or art. 
 
Id. at 484. 
179.  See Charles Taylor, Neutrality in Political Science, in READINGS IN THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE 547–48 (Michael Martin & Lee McIntyre eds., 1994).  
Taylor explains the influence of positivism as a retraint on consideration of the value 
dimensions of research conclusions in the social sciences.  The resulting effort to see research 
conclusions as outside the domain of values is an effort to align social science conclusions with 
the well-respected findings of the natural sciences.  
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and “free of irrational prejudice.”180  They claim that science is the 
“ultimate market economy of knowledge, where only valid observations 
and plausible theories survive.”181  The Frye decision, with its reliance on 
“general acceptance,” is a strong example of positivism. 
Social constructionism, on the other hand, offers a view of scientists 
as participants in a particular societal milieu, where “truth” is shaped by 
the various influences182 affecting the humans engaged in scientific 
pursuits.  Constructivists argue that because social forces influence 
scientists, we should pay more attention to the social dimension of truth 
formation.183  Thus, the Federal Rules of Evidence encourage judges and 
juries to consider the epistemological origins of the evidence offered by 
the experts, rather than simply deferring to the scientists to declare 
some univocal truths. 
Defenders of positivism try to argue that scientists are disinterested 
agents who are simply recorders of reality.184  In other words, they clean 
off the “mirror” of reality so that the rest of us can accurately see the 
truth.185  The positivist’s reaction to social constructionism frequently 
180. See Peter Atkins, Science as Truth, 8 HIST. HUM. SCI. 97, 97 (1995).  Atkins treats 
science as an impersonal force, claiming that science is honest and science is free from 
irrational prejudice.  Id.  However, Atkins ignores the human element that influences science.  
See, e.g., FRED BLOCK, POSTINDUSTRIAL POSSIBILITIES: A CRITIQUE OF ECONOMIC 
DISCOURSE 1–32 (1990) (offering an argument against the idea of the market as an 
impersonal force); see also Herzberger, supra note 8, at 1069–72 (claiming that methodology 
ensures that personal viewpoints do not interfere with the unbiased collection and analysis of 
data; faith in “methodological procedures [is] necessary to conduct valid and reliable 
research”). 
181. One way that the truth is uncovered is through quantification.  Quantification gave 
credence to psychology’s claim as an exact science.  See KURT DANZIGER, CONSTRUCTING 
THE SUBJECT: HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH 147 (1990) 
(“Quantification seemed to mark psychology as one of the exact sciences and to distinguish it 
sharply from such questionable pursuits as philosophy and spiritualism, with which it had 
been popularly associated.”). 
182. See generally MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon et al. 
trans., 1980) (arguing that when we speak we have less autonomy than we often claim because 
we always use the categories, argumentative strategies, metaphors, modes of composition, 
and rules of evidence that precede us and that have no single, identifiable author). 
183. WAYNE C. BOOTH, MODERN DOGMA AND THE RHETORIC OF ASSENT xiii (1974).  
Booth presents the argument that truth can be found through the art of rhetoric; rhetoric 
being the art of discovering warrantable beliefs and improving those beliefs in shared 
discourse.  Id. at 112 & n.19 (“[T]he rhetorical philosophy of Cicero” is “the fullest 
development of . . . consensus as a source of reliable knowledge.”). 
184. See, e.g., Stephen Fuchs, Positivism Is the Organizational Myth of Science, 1 PERSP. 
ON SCI. 1, 11 (1993) (arguing that by worshipping the twin gods of scientific method and 
scientific community, positivism merges truth and power and presents a professional claim to 
cognitive monopoly as an innocent claim to truth). 
185. RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE 12 (1979).  Rorty 
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casts it in the opprobrious terms of “relativism” and “nihilism”: if one 
believes scientific knowledge is essentially untouched by power struggles 
and groupthink within disciplines, then “science must be viewed as a 
chaotic heap of unconnected and contradictory assertions.”186
However, we would argue that this overly simplistic dichotomy 
between absolute certitude and utter relativism is unhelpful for 
understanding the processes shaping expertise.  Science does not 
operate in a vacuum; it is subject to social forces,187 both within and 
without the scientific world.  In other words, the scientists play a role in 
argues against “polishing the mirror” as an educational guide.  Id.  “It is pictures rather than 
propositions, metaphors rather than statements, which determine most of our philosophical 
convictions.”  Id. 
186. Peter Huber, Junk Science in the Courtroom, FORBES, July 8, 1991, at 68, 72; see 
PAUL R. GROSS & NORMAN LEVITT, HIGHER SUPERSTITION: THE ACADEMIC LEFT AND 
ITS QUARRELS WITH SCIENCE 1–4 (1994) (arguing that leftist criticisms of science are 
relativistic).  In reviewing this work, Fuller points out that it is the first book entirely 
considering threats posed by academic critics of science, but other books, namely LEWIS 
WOLPERT, THE UNNATURAL NATURE OF SCIENCE (1992), and STEVEN WEINBERG, 
DREAMS OF A FINAL THEORY (1992), addressed these criticisms in single chapters.  See Steve 
Fuller, A Tale of Two Cultures and Other Higher Superstitions, 8 HIST. HUM. SCI. 115, 117 
(1995). 
 Thomas Kuhn calls the sociology of scientific knowledge “deconstruction gone mad,” 
protesting that sociological interpretations of scientific processes cast unjust aspersions on the 
purity of scientific inquiry.  THOMAS S. KUHN, THE TROUBLE WITH THE HISTORICAL 
PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 8–9 (1992); see also LATOUR, supra note 167, at 104.  An answer to 
Kuhn’s characterization of the sociology of scientific knowledge as an example of 
“deconstruction gone mad” is provided by Steven C. Ward, In the Shadow of Deconstructed 
Metanarratives: Baudrillard, Latour and the End of Realist Epistemology, 7 HIST. HUM. SCI. 
73 (1994).  Ward demonstrates the difference between Latour’s epistemology, based on 
Durkheim’s view of truth as inseparable from social organization (“truth as collective 
representation,” as Ward terms it), and Baudrillard’s epistemological nihilism, based on 
Nietzsche’s proclamation that “God [i.e. truth] is dead.”  Id. at 75–82.  “From this position, 
what distinguishes irrationality from rationality, belief from science, text from reality, is not 
the cognitive level or type of the participating actants, but the associational enhanced power 
of some individuals and groups to establish resistant coalitions.”  Id. at 87. 
187. See Edward Phillips, Testing the Truth: The Alliance of Science and Law, in 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 229, 239–40 (Mike McConville & Lee Bridges eds., 1994).  
Phillips writes, 
 
[I]t is tempting to assume that the expert’s conclusion is objective.  This is 
an illusion.  The expert may well be operating from a theoretical or 
intellectual base which involves predetermined conclusions; scientific 
knowledge, like other forms of knowledge, does not exist in a political or 
institutional vacuum.  This may involve methodology as well as ideology.  
Moreover, the conclusions drawn may involve interpretative value 
judgments. 
 
Id.; see also Margaret C. Jacob, Science and Politics in the Late Twentieth Century, 59 SOC. 
RES. 487, 487–88 (1992).   
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creating188 the image of reality they show us.189
Knowledge can be legitimized; yet, we recognize that the knowledge 
is contested.190  The relationships both within and beyond the scientific 
community exert influence on the creation of scientific knowledge.  The 
next section will examine the various forces that impact science. 
A.  The Birth of Scientific Fact 
When factfinders encounter science in the form of expert testimony, 
the expert typically testifies with phrases like, “It is firmly established.”  
Because this testimony is heard so often, it is important for the courts to 
know how such science becomes “firmly established.” 
Science may be categorized as journal science or vandemecum 
science.  Journal science is frequently contradictory and consists of a 
diverse body of published journal articles; in contrast, vandemecum 
science is the institutionalized knowledge of the discipline.191  Instead of 
hypothetical humility, the author uses the rhetorical language of 
188. Jeremy Campbell, Observer and Object, Reader and Text: Some Parallel Themes in 
Modern Science and Literature, in BEYOND THE TWO CULTURES: ESSAYS ON SCIENCE, 
TECHNOLOGY, AND LITERATURE 23 (Joseph W. Slade & Judith Yaross Lee eds., 1990) 
(documenting the commonality between physics and reading in that both create 
understanding via observation, with special emphasis on the idea of “create”). 
189. See, e.g., Daniel Bell, The Turn to Interpretation, 51 PARTISAN REV. 215, 215–19 
(1984).  One role scientists play in creating an image of reality is in the interpretation of their 
observations and “facts.”  Bell argues that facts do not speak for themselves and require 
interpretation: “In its broadest sense, the turn to interpretation is a move away from 
positivism with its emphasis on naïve observation.”  Id. at 218. 
190. Joseph Rouse, Foucault and the Natural Sciences, in FOUCAULT AND THE 
CRITIQUE OF INSTITUTIONS 137, 158 (John Caputo & Mark Yount eds., 1993).  Rouse states: 
 
The crucial point is not that there is no legitimacy . . . .  In the circulation 
of contested, heterogeneous knowledges, disputes about legitimacy and 
the criteria for legitimacy are part and parcel of the dynamics of that 
circulation.  Understanding knowledge as “a strategical situation” rather 
than as a definitive outcome places epistemological reflection in the midst 
of ongoing struggles to legitimate (and delegitimate) various skills, 
practices, and assertions.  Recognizing that the boundaries of science (or 
of knowledge) are what is being contested, epistemology is within those 
contested boundaries. 
 
Id. at 158. 
191. See LUDWICK FLECK, GENESIS AND DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENTIFIC FACT 118 
(English Language ed. 1979).  Fleck also refers to vandemecum science as “handbook 
science,” a science that offers a greater degree of certainty than its counterpart.  Browne 
et al., supra note 10, at 52.  While journal science is contested, vandemecum science is 
considered accepted fact; consequently, vandemecum science acts as a constraint on thinking.  
See FLECK, supra, at 118–19. 
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reliability. 
To the outsider, including judge and jury, the shift from 
vandemecum to journal science is an unknown process, subject to 
metaphors192 such as “ship in a bottle” or “black box”193—the 
complexities of the production facilities converting heterogeneous 
perspectives to homogenous scientific facts are unknown.  However, 
Fleck argues that it is important that the court is informed of these 
processes.194  Understanding the “genesis of a scientific fact” has 
important implications for the role of the expert witness. 
B.  The Social Construction of Scientific Knowledge 
Robert Merton proffers four norms of science: universalism,195 
communism,196 disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.197  If these 
norms were a reflection of the practice of science, we could be confident 
about the results of scientific investigations.  However, these norms are 
not always accurately followed; instead, science is often quite 
arbitrary.198  The acceptance of a proposed scientific claim depends 
192. See, e.g., GEORGE LAKOFF & MARK JOHNSON, METAPHORS WE LIVE BY (1980).  
The use of metaphor in scientific writing has a long and diverse history.  Psychological 
literature is replete with metaphors describing virtually every aspect of psychological 
functioning.  See Donal E. Carlston, Turning Psychology on Itself: The Rhetoric of Psychology 
and the Psychology of Rhetoric, in THE RHETORIC OF THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 14, 
at 145, 146 (“[T]he theorizing of social scientists is metaphorical storytelling.”); see also James 
R. Averill, Inner Feelings, Works of the Flesh, The Beast Within, Diseases of the Mind, Driving 
Force, and Putting on a Show: Six Metaphors of Emotion and Their Theoretical Extensions, in 
METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY 104, 113 (David E. Leary ed., 1990) 
(describing metaphors of emotion including: inner feelings or experience—“He felt his anger 
rising,” “He ached for her”—or emotions as disease of the mind—“He was insane with rage,” 
“She fell madly in love”).  The computer metaphor may arguably be the most familiar of 
cognitive metaphors.  See Robert R. Hoffman et al., Cognitive Metaphors in Experimental 
Psychology, in METAPHORS IN THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY, supra, at 173, 177–89. 
193. See LATOUR, supra note 167, at 2–3.  Some scientists use a “black box” in place of a 
piece of machinery or a set of commands that is extremely complex.  Id. 
194. FLECK, supra note 191, at 121. 
195. ROBERT K. MERTON, THE SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 270–73 (1973) (according to 
the norm of universalism, claims would not be evaluated in a framework that considers race, 
gender, and status). 
196. Id. at 275–77 (according to the norm of communism, scientists would enjoy equal 
accessibility to evaluative resources). 
197. Id. at 273–75 (according to the norms of disinterestedness and organized skepticism, 
claims would be evaluated for their logic and validity).  Furthermore, all claims receive at 
least the same level of scrutiny.  Id. 
198. See LATOUR, supra note 167, at 104.  Latour states, 
 
[T]he fate of a statement depends on others’ behaviour.  You may have 
written the definitive paper proving that the earth is hollow or that the 
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largely upon those scientists199 who come into contact with the proposed 
claim.200
However, the scientist is not without his own methods for gaining 
recognition.  Scientists engage in network building in the effort to turn 
their claims into accepted fact.  The actor-network theory of scientific 
development describes how they make “allies” in support of their 
proposed claim out of facts, people, money, theories, and 
organizations.201  These actions lead to the construction of facts, as 
opposed to the objective discovery of facts.202  Scientists compile huge 
reference lists creating a network of support for their position, citing 
even the indirect agreement obtained by referring to historical and 
contemporary authority, various interest groups, and informal 
conversations with others in their area of science.203  Those who would 
point to the successful scientist as being the one who develops strong 
networks realize that this contradicts science’s claim of pure 
moon is made of green cheese but this paper will not become definitive if 
others do not take it up and use it as a matter of fact later on.  You need 
them to make your paper a decisive one.  If they laugh at you, if they are 
indifferent, if they shrug it off, that is the end of your paper. 
 
Id.  Latour restates this paragraph as a metaphor: the proposed scientific claim is a ball in a 
rugby game.  The scientist who originally kicks the ball at one end of the field does not 
determine whether the ball is scored.  Instead, others impact the speed and direction of the 
ball when they come into contact with it on the field.  Id. 
199. BENT FLYVBJERG, MAKING SOCIAL SCIENCE MATTER 32–33 (2001).  Flyvbjerg 
argues why the social sciences are limited by what Anthony Giddens calls the “double 
hermeneutic.”  Id.  The people being studied are themselves making interpretations, and we 
must be aware of how those interpretations are formed.  Then the researcher also makes 
interpretations.  Context both determines and is determined by the researchers’ self-
understanding. 
200. See STEPHEN COLE, MAKING SCIENCE: BETWEEN NATURE AND SOCIETY 176 
(1992) (stating that interpersonal social relations play an important role in shaping the science 
process). 
201. See Yuval P. Yonay, When Black Boxes Clash: Competing Ideas of What Science Is 
in Economics, 1924–1939, 24 SOC. STUD. SCI. 39, 39–46 (1994) (analyzing this process at work 
in the struggle between neoclassical and institutionalist economists for control of the 
discipline and suggesting that the battle and eventual victory of the neoclassicals can be 
described in terms of a network-building duel, rather than rational consideration amidst 
Mertonian norms). 
202. See generally BRUNO LATOUR & STEVE WOOLGAR, LABORATORY LIFE: THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SCIENTIFIC FACTS (1986). Relying on participant observation in scientific 
laboratories, Latour and Woolgar argue that much lab activity attempts to create order from 
the disorderliness of both the world and the data collected from it.  Id. at 246.  Thus, “order,” 
or a claim accepted as truth, is constructed through creative processes.  Id. at 21–23, 246. 
203. Yonay, supra note 201, at 49–64. 
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objectivity.204  Moreover, the network-building contest is not carried out 
in conditions of perfect equality.  The position held by an actor 
determines the resources and ability he has to construct networks.  The 
community of science, like other human organizations, is stratified.205
C. Elites and Their Influences 
One of the factors determining the status and deference awarded to 
individuals within the scientific community206 is doubtless the intellectual 
abilities and accomplishments of those individuals.  However, this is not 
the only factor: the social characteristics and the operation of social 
processes in science also play a role in ensuring that the scientific claims 
of some individuals, the elites, are given attention, while other equally 
worthy claims may be overlooked.207
One way in which the elites gain an advantage is through 
accumulated research credit. “Once a scientist has been rewarded, his or 
her chance of receiving further rewards in the future are greater, 
independent of indicators of role performance,” explains Cole.208  Those 
204. Fuchs, supra note 184, at 4 (“[Scientists] frequently appear to support an idea not 
because of its sheer intellectual merit but because they have considerable investments in it.”). 
205. Id. at 12. 
 
Sharply stratified specialties have a monopoly within a monopoly.  The 
more one is known, the more one is heard, and so lesser known scientists 
working at the semi-peripheral or even marginal areas of the profession 
have fewer chances to attract attention to their work.  Together, these 
processes of professional recruitment, self-referential certification, and 
self-reinforcing reputational inequality exclude most outsiders. 
 
Id. 
206. See WALTON, supra note 5, at 17, where he argues, 
 
The main problem with the authority of science relates not so much to 
internal matters of how scientific reasoning is used in scientific research 
within the discipline to arrive at conclusions . . . as to the more subtle but 
more crucial problem: how the results of this research are communicated 
to a wider community of users who are not experts in that discipline. 
 
See BRINT, supra note 4, at 203 for an interesting example of how this deification of scientific 
expertise within society can cause harm.  “[T]he new, more exclusive emphasis on expertise 
. . . has primarily helped further to reduce the status of several occupations that are of great 
value from the perspective of their social contribution [teachers, nurses, social workers, city 
planners, and others].”  Id. 
207. The rhetorical force of intellectual authority has a profound impact upon the 
scientific audience.  See generally JONATHAN R. COLE & STEPHEN COLE, SOCIAL 
STRATIFICATION IN SCIENCE (1973). 
208. See COLE, supra note 200, at 165.  Cole refers to this process as the “accumulative 
advantage principle,” like wealth accumulation with compound interest.  Id.  Scientific 
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on the top of the stack tend to become more firmly established there; 
those on the bottom tend to be ignored. 
Intellectual suppression and hegemony also influence the science 
that creates expert testimony.209  The rigidity of disciplinary boundaries 
limits the scientific claims that can be proffered.  Disciplines will often 
attempt to tout their “unity”;210 however, this highlighting often covers 
the diversity within the discipline and marginalizes potentially valid 
claims.  The unity (i.e., the paradigm of the discipline) is perpetuated, 
not necessarily because it is valid, but because the costs of altering the 
paradigm are too high.  Gieryn refers to a “struggle for authority, 
power, and resources”211 influencing scientific decision making 
specifically leading to the development of strongly marked boundaries 
between scientific and non-scientific endeavors.212  Gieryn argues that 
creating an ideology of boundary work helped establish the 
independence and recognition awarded to science today.  Fuller 
corroborates this view by pointing out that disciplinary boundaries will 
be more clearly outlined in later accounts of the discipline’s history than 
in earlier ones.213  Klein refers to such histories as a means of 
research is certainly a worthy contribution, but this advantage means the scientist’s 
subsequent research is recognized over research of the non-elites, regardless of the actual 
worth of the research. 
209. While by hegemony we refer to a Gramscian situation in which the less powerful 
(to their own disadvantage) accept the view of things presented by those in control of 
resources; intellectual suppression is the actual silencing of discordant voices.  For an example 
of hegemony, see Jack Amariglio et al., Division and Difference in the ‘Discipline’ of 
Economics, in KNOWLEDGES: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES IN DISCIPLINARITY 160 
(Ellen Messer-Davidow et al. eds., 1993).  “[T]he portrayal of economics as a discipline with 
distinct boundaries is often a discursive strategy by one school or another to hegemonize the 
field of economic discourse.”  Id. at 150. 
210. See BROWN, supra note 177, at 67–68 (“Bakhtin’s notion of canonization captures a 
discursive process by which a range of voices loses its heterogenity or heteroglossia and 
becomes assimilated as a single-voiced and unified discourse.”). 
211. See Thomas F. Gieryn, Boundary-Work and the Demarcation of Science from Non-
Science:  Strains and Interests in Professional Ideologies of Scientists, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 781, 
792 (1983); see also Julie Thompson Klein, Blurring, Cracking, and Crossing: Permeation and 
the Fracturing of Discipline, in KNOWLEDGES: HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL STUDIES IN 
DISCIPLINARITY, supra note 209, at 185, 190 (arguing that the diversity of theories, 
assumptions, and methodologies within a single field is hidden by efforts to increase 
disciplinary recognition). 
212. Gieryn, supra note 211, at 781–82.  For example, members of the field of 
psychology recognized that quantitative data could be transformed into a potent source of 
social power for those who directed their production and interpreted their meaning to the 
public.  See DANZIGER supra note 181, at 147 (“Quantitative psychological knowledge was a 
species of esoteric knowledge that was held to have profound social implications.”). 
213. See STEVE FULLER, SOCIAL EPISTEMOLOGY 197–203 (1988). 
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“indoctrinating new entrants into a field, legitimating the field to 
outsiders, and controlling, promoting, or opposing change.”214
If consolidation of resources and the formation of consensus are the 
dual pathways to success, what becomes of the intellectually deviant?  
Huber has suggested that modern scientific enlightenment makes any 
recurrence of the treatment accorded Galileo impossible.215  The 
paradigm established by a discipline is difficult to challenge: “paradigm 
stickiness”216 and “cognitive cronyism”217 are powerful factors to be 
faced by the unorthodox. 
Thus, we see that while the positivist relies on scientific clear-
headedness, the focus on objective verification, and the ability of all 
scientists to have their claims fairly evaluated, there are compelling 
forces within science as a human endeavor218 that expose it to the flaws 
of which human interaction typically partakes.219  Expertise emerges 
from a process of particularism, solitariness, interestedness, and 
organized dogmatism220 in which the less powerful or intellectually 
deviant tend to be ignored.221
214. See Klein, supra note 211, at 196. 
215. See generally Peter Huber, Medical Experts and the Ghost of Galileo, 54 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 119. He assures us that the Galileo problem, still a 
concern for modern observers of science, belonged only to the unenlightened past of 
“scientific prehistory.”  Id. at 168.  Nowadays, the true “cranks” are obvious.  Id. at 169. 
216. See Mark A. Zupan, Paradigms and Cultures: Some Economic Reasons for Their 
Stickiness, 50 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 99 (1991). The reasons for this “stickiness” include the 
fear of the established scientist that alterations in the reigning paradigm would lessen the 
worth of their own work, the start-up costs of a new paradigm and the costs already sunk in 
building the old one, the scarcity of scientists willing to risk their positions in the current 
paradigm by standing up for a new idea, and the poor quality of communication between 
paradigms.  Id. at 99–103. 
217. See G.D.L. Travis & H.M. Collins, New Light on Old Boys: Cognitive and 
Institutional Particularism in the Peer Review System, 16 SCI. TECH. & HUM. VALUES 322 
(1991).  Travis and Collins, who had access to ten United Kingdom Science and Engineering 
Research Council meetings, noted “that committee members sometimes make decisions [to 
award grants] based on their membership in scientific schools of thought.”  Id. at 323.  This 
expression of solidarity is termed by them “cognitive cronyism”: the evaluator favors the 
evaluatee who is similar to himself.  Id. at 327. 
218. See Henry David Thoreau, Civil Disobedience, in HENRY DAVID THOREAU, 
WALDEN: OR LIFE IN THE WOODS; ON THE DUTY OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE 281, 291 (Holt, 
Rinehart & Winston 16th ed., 1964) (“For it is, after all, with men and not with parchment 
that I quarrel.”). 
219. See Lawrence J. Prelli, The Rhetorical Construction of Scientific Ethos, in 
RHETORIC IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, supra note 16, at 48, 48–68. 
220. These concepts are counter-norms of Merton’s four: universalism, communism, 
disinterestedness, and organized skepticism.  See supra notes 195–197. 
221. R.G.A. Dolby, Reflections on Deviant Science, in ON THE MARGINS OF SCIENCE: 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REJECTED KNOWLEDGE 9 (Ron Wallis ed., 1979).  The 
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Perhaps the best way to show the situated nature of expert testimony 
is to examine one particular form of expert advice under a microscope.  
Courts have various reasons to know when a particular party is or is not 
dangerous.  Not too surprisingly, they often wish for experts to come 
forward to assure the factfinder that the truly dangerous have been 
identified, while those who only appear dangerous are liberated from 
that often damaging designation.  But if what we have suggested in the 
first half of this Article is true, we can expect that courts relying on such 
expertise, unless guided by expertise from multiple legitimate 
perspectives on this matter, will risk significant error. 
IV. INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF DANGEROUSNESS 
In Kansas v. Hendricks,222 the Supreme Court affirmed the right of 
states to legislate procedures for the civil commitment of persons who, 
due to a “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder,” are likely to 
engage in “predatory acts of sexual violence.”223  This decision 
reaffirmed the Court’s acceptance of dangerousness as an appropriate 
legal criterion,224 and in doing so, revived the controversy surrounding 
expertise and predictions of violence.225  In contrast to the Court’s 
elites in science tend to agree with each other, thus making it difficult and discouraging for a 
deviant voice from a lower level to be heard.  Deviants are often “ignored or rejected after 
brief criticism.  A scientist who doubts whether he can make an impressive case on behalf of 
his deviant belief may not make the effort, and turn to other scientific matters, or even leave 
scientific research.”  Id. at 17.  Those who remain ambitious for change devise strategies to 
circumvent this conservatism.  See Julia M. Allen & Lester Faigley, Discursive Strategies for 
Social Change: An Alternative Rhetoric of Argument, 14 RHETORIC REV. 142 (1995). 
222. 521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
223. Id. at 350. 
224. See Christopher Slobogin, Dangerousness and Expertise, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 97, 
103–08 (1984), for a discussion of the challenges to the legitimacy of dangerousness as a legal 
issue.  Professor Slobogin concludes that as long as statutes specify the type of harm, the time 
frame, and the degree of probability that it will occur they are likely to withstand 
constitutional challenge.  Id. 
 Dangerousness is a necessary, but not sufficient, criterion for a statute to pass 
constitutional review.  See Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 358.  In general, the Court requires a statute 
to couple proof of dangerousness with proof of some additional factor, such as mental illness 
or abnormality.  The additional requirements “serve to limit involuntary civil confinement to 
those who suffer from a volitional impairment rendering them dangerous beyond their 
control.”  Id.; see also Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312 
(1993). 
225. See, e.g., John Kip Cornwell, Protection and Treatment: The Permissible Civil 
Detention of Sexual Predators, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1293 (1996); Sarah H. Francis, Note, 
Sexually Dangerous Person Statutes: Constitutional Protections of Society and the Mentally Ill 
or Emotionally-Driven Punishment?, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 125 (1995); Andrew Horwitz, 
Sexual Psychopath Legislation: Is There Anywhere to Go but Backwards?, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 
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affirmative stance regarding mental health professionals’ ability to 
predict violence,226 critics have vehemently opposed the introduction of 
dangerousness testimony.227
Recent cases challenging preventive detention commitments of 
sexual offenders provide just one example of the debate over experts’ 
ability to predict dangerousness.228  In this portion of the Article, we 
35 (1995). 
226. See Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 274 (1976) (addressing the constitutionality of a 
portion of the Texas Penal Code that made probability of future violence a consideration in 
capital punishment).  The petitioner argued that “it is impossible to predict future behavior 
and that the question is so vague as to be meaningless.”  Id.  The Court rejected this argument 
acknowledging, “It is, of course, not easy to predict future behavior.  The fact that such a 
determination is difficult, however, does not mean that it cannot be made.  Indeed, prediction 
of future criminal conduct is an essential element in many of the decisions rendered 
throughout our criminal justice system.” Id. at 274–75.  The Court again addressed the 
prediction of dangerousness in Barefoot v. Estelle, in which the majority compared the 
suggestion that psychiatric testimony concerning dangerousness should be abandoned to 
“asking us to disinvent the wheel,” asserting that “we are not persuaded that such testimony 
is almost entirely unreliable.”  463 U.S. 880, 896, 899 (1983).  Justice White stated, “We are 
unconvinced, however, at least as of now, that the adversary process cannot be trusted to sort 
out the reliable from the unreliable evidence and opinion about future dangerousness, 
particularly when the convicted felon has the opportunity to present his own side of the case.”  
Id. at 901; see also Shall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 278 (1984) (“[F]rom a legal point of view 
there is nothing inherently unattainable about a prediction of future criminal conduct.”); In re 
Young, 857 P.2d 989, 1017 (Wash. 1993) (acknowledging that “prediction of dangerousness 
has its attendant problems” but finding violence prediction testimony “sufficiently accurate 
and reliable” to be admitted); State v. Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 126 (Wis. 1995) (“[P]redictions 
of future dangerousness may be difficult, [but] they are still an attainable, in fact essential, 
part of our judicial process.”). 
227. See, e.g., People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 767 (1981) (holding that psychiatric 
predictions of dangerousness are exceptionally unreliable and highly prejudicial to the 
defendant); Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 921 (Blackmun, J. dissenting) (“[T]he unanimous conclusion 
of professionals in this field [is] that psychiatric predictions of long-term future violence are 
wrong more often than they are right. . . .  It is difficult to understand how the admission of 
such predictions can be justified as advancing the search for truth.”); Brief for American 
Psychiatric Association as Amicus Curiae, Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454 (1981); JAY ZISKIN 
ET AL., COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 12 (3rd ed., 1981); 
Joseph J. Cocozza & Henry J. Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of 
Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976) 
[hereinafter Rutgers Study]; Alan Dershowitz, The Role of Psychiatry in the Sentencing 
Process, 1 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 63 (1978). 
228. The revival of sexual psychopath statutes was inspired by a number of highly 
publicized child murder cases in which previously convicted sexual offenders were released 
into the community and subsequently committed another sexual offense.  See, e.g., Sam Howe 
Verhovek, Texas Frees Child Molester Who Warns of New Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 9, 1996, 
at B7 (quoting Larry Don McQuay, who warned that he was “doomed to eventually rape, 
then murder my poor little victims to keep them from telling on me”); Barry Siegel, Locking 
up “Sexual Predators,” L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1990, at A1 (describing the case of Earl Shriner, 
a sexual offender with a long history of violent offenses who was released from prison 
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propose that marked variation in the methods and reliability of expert 
predictions of dangerousness mandate that the judiciary take an active 
role in determining admissibility.  Specifically, we argue that the nature 
of violence predictions requires judicial inquiry on a case-by-case basis 
to address whether proffered dangerousness testimony meets 
admissibility standards.  We support this position on two separate 
grounds; the first is based on an analysis of the rules of evidence, while 
the second stems from an examination of variations in standards of 
proof. 
While psychological and psychiatric dangerousness testimony229 has 
been introduced in a variety of contexts in both civil and criminal 
litigation,230 we will restrict our focus to those contexts using long-term 
following the state’s inability to secure civil commitment in spite of psychiatric opinion that 
he experienced unusually sadistic sexual fantasies because Shriner had failed to commit a 
“recent overt act” that indicated dangerousness under Washington’s commitment statute; 
Shriner subsequently raped and mutilated a seven-year-old boy, abandoning him for dead). 
 Legislators have enacted statutes that provide for a special kind of civil commitment 
procedure to detain “dangerous” offenders who are unable to control their sexual behavior 
and thus threaten public safety.  See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 59-29a01 (2005); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. § 71.09.010–.120 (West 2002 & Supp. 2008).  A second response to sexual 
violence has focused on reducing risk to the community by enacting legislation that permits 
law enforcement agencies to notify residents when a sexual offender has moved into the 
community.  As a term of conditional release, these offenders are evaluated and assigned to a 
risk classification that determines the comprehensiveness of the notification.  This 
classification is based, in part, on dangerousness.  See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. ch. 2950 
(LexisNexis 1996). 
 This legislation relies on psychological or psychiatric [hereinafter “psychological”] expert 
testimony to prove future dangerousness. 
229. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 108 (acknowledging that while courts have 
occasionally relied on lay testimony to determine dangerousness, “in modern times the 
question of dangerousness has most often been the province of expert opinion by mental 
health professionals”); cf. Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 473 (1981) (reviewing a Texas capital 
sentencing statute and asserting that dangerousness “does not require resort to medical 
experts”; however, mental health professionals provide the vast majority of predictions of 
dangerousness and this portion of the Article will address this type of testimony).  See, e.g., 
Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346; Barefoot, 463 U.S. 880; Chambers v. State, 568 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 1978). 
230. See Saleem A. Shah, Dangerousness: A Paradigm for Exploring Some Issues in Law 
and Psychology, 33 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 224, 225 (1978) (identifying fifteen stages of the legal 
process in which assessments of dangerousness are made including pretrial release hearings, 
juvenile transfer decisions, and civil commitment hearings).  For a discussion of the 
evaluation of dangerousness in juveniles, see Randall T. Salekin et al., Juvenile Waiver to 
Adult Criminal Courts: Prototypes for Dangerousness, Sophistication-Maturity, and 
Amenability to Treatment, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 381 (2001).  “Psychological 
assessment of juveniles for waiver to adult criminal courts requires systematic evaluation of 
dangerousness, sophistication-maturity, and amenability to treatment.”  Id. at 381.  Even 
though these three components are required for transfers, there is still much confusion about 
the criteria; there are “wide differences of opinion in the understanding of the constructs held 
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predictions231 of dangerousness to others.232  We will focus on violence 
prediction testimony in three types of proceedings: capital sentencing 
by lawyers, judges, and psychologists.”  Id. at 403.  To determine dangerousness, Salekin et 
al., report four factors: “(a) extreme unprovoked violence; (b) severe, aggressive, antisocial 
personality; (c) lack of remorse/guilt and empathy; and (d) leadership role in the crime.”  Id. 
at 397.  If these four factors are present, there is a strong case for waiver to adult court.  Id.  
Salekin et al. argue that case-by-case assessment of juveniles is essential.  Id.  The Supreme 
Court, in Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), defined eight criteria for determining 
whether a juvenile should be transferred and tried in adult court.  These criteria include the 
following: 
  
(1) The seriousness of the alleged offense to the community and whether 
the protection of the community requires waiver.  
(2) Whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, 
premeditated or willful manner.  
(3) Whether the alleged offense was against persons or against property, 
greater weight being given to offenses against persons especially if 
personal injury resulted.  
(4) The prosecutive merit of the complaint, i.e., whether there is 
evidence upon which a Grand Jury may be expected to return an 
indictment (to be determined by consultation with the United States 
Attorney).  
(5) The desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one 
court when the juvenile’s associates in the alleged offense are adults 
who will be charged with a crime in the U.S. District Court for the 
District of Columbia.  
(6) The sophistication and maturity of the juvenile as determined by 
consideration of his home, environmental situation, emotional 
attitude and pattern of living.  
(7) The record and previous history of the juvenile, including previous 
contacts with the Youth Aid Division, other law enforcement 
agencies, juvenile courts and other jurisdictions, prior periods of 
probation to this Court, or prior commitments to juvenile 
institutions.  
(8) The prospects for adequate protection of the public and the 
likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation of the juvenile (if he is found 
to have committed the alleged offense) by the use of procedures, 
services and facilities currently available to the Juvenile Court. 
 
Id. at 566–67. 
231. That is, those predictions that purport to make predictions of violence for one year 
or longer after the assessment period.  We have chosen long-term prediction tasks because 
they are the most frequently used and most often criticized by opponents of violence 
prediction. 
232. All fifty states provide for the civil commitment of individuals found to be 
“mentally disordered” or found to suffer from a “mental abnormality” and are either 
“dangerous to others” or present a “substantial threat to the welfare of society.”  See Edward 
Beis, State Involuntary Commitment Statutes, 7 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 358 (1983); 
Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Back to Basics: A Critical Analysis of Dangerousness 
Research in a New Legal Environment, 9 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 209 (1985). 
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hearings,233 “criminal” commitment hearings,234 and civil commitment of 
sexual predator hearings.235  We have selected these prediction tasks 
because they are representative of the range of cases in which expert 
testimony may be solicited.236
233. Dangerousness has been identified as a mitigating factor in a number of capital 
sentencing statutes.  See Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Aggravating and Mitigating Factors: The 
Paradox of Today’s Arbitrary and Mandatory Capital Punishment Scheme, 6 WM. & MARY 
BILL RTS. J. 345, 363 (1998) (describing the role of a defendant’s “future danger” in the 
capital punishment scheme of the various statutes). 
234. Commitment and release hearings for individuals adjudicated “not guilty by reason 
of insanity” (“NGRI”).  In a majority of states, the standards for release are identical to those 
of the states’ civil commitment statutes with dangerousness being an explicit criterion for 
commitment.  See June Resnick German & Anne C. Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: 
Hospitalization of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, app. 
(1976). 
235. The sexual psychopath statutes provide for a special class of civil commitment 
hearings for “dangerous” offenders unable to control their sexual behavior and thus, present 
a threat to the public.  The evaluation of future dangerousness is a necessary component for 
preventive detention with mental health professionals providing this opinion evidence for the 
courts. 
236. In each of these tasks, the standards of proof, infringement on liberty, and even 
definitions of dangerousness are widely variable.  See Grant Morris, Defining Dangerousness: 
Risking a Dangerous Definition, 10 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 61 (1999).  Morris argues that 
individual autonomy is “sacrificed on the altar of collective security” without consistency or 
discussion about the criteria for determining future dangerousness.  Id. at 62–63. 
 
The Supreme Court has not informed us what magnitude of harm, or how 
probable its occurrence, justifies civil commitment of a mentally 
disordered person as “dangerous.”  Rarely have other courts considered 
whether the statutory definition of dangerousness assures that the civil 
commitment criteria reflect an appropriate balance between the 
individual’s liberty and society’s safety. 
 
Id. at 65.  Examining the ability of violence prediction testimony to meet the diverse 
requirements will encourage a more thorough analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
body of research, while also modeling the type of analysis Morris proposes that members of 
the judiciary should undertake. 
 Notably absent from our discussion, however, are civil commitment hearings; although 
imminent prediction of dangerousness is frequent and important in emergency commitments, 
there are fundamental differences in the procedures and outcome of these determinations.  
One of the most important of these differences involves the treatment and short-term 
incapacitation goal of the civil commitment process that differs markedly from the criminal 
commitment procedures.  See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 170–74 (discussing the differences 
between emergency commitment and long-term prediction contexts).  Thus, we are treating 
such predictions as beyond the scope of the Article.  Limiting analysis to this subset of 
prediction contexts keeps the argument within manageable boundaries while facilitating a 
careful examination of situations in which predictions are frequently provided and have been 
most frequently criticized.  For a review of the civil commitment process, see, e.g., Daniel W. 
Shuman, The Road to Bedlam: Evidentiary Guideposts in Civil Commitment Proceedings, 55 
NOTRE DAME LAW. 53, 54 (1979). 
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We begin by examining the empirical literature on the prediction of 
dangerousness and challenge some of the misconceptions about mental 
health professionals’ ability to predict future violence.  We provide a 
brief history of the “first-generation” dangerousness prediction 
literature and the legal community’s response to this research. 
V. EMPIRICAL PREDICTION STUDIES 
“Junk Science,”237 “quackery,”238 and “wrong about 95% of the 
time”239 are just a few of the allegations that critics have leveled at 
experts’ predictions of dangerousness.240  In this Part, we evaluate the 
credibility of these claims by exploring the research on violence 
prediction. 
A.  “First-Generation Research” 
The 1970s marked the birth of the first empirical studies examining 
the accuracy of mental health professionals’ predictions of violence in 
patients released from psychiatric facilities by the courts.241  In Baxstrom 
237. See HUBER, supra note 76, at 220 (coining the phrase “junk science” to describe 
judicial acceptance of unreliable expert testimony).  With regards to predictions of 
dangerousness, “one could favor the death penalty and ‘yet still recoil at the thought that a 
junk science fringe of psychiatry . . . could decide who will be sent to the gallows.’”  Giannelli, 
supra note 102, at 114 (quoting HUBER, supra note 76, at 220) (omission in original). 
238. See George E. Dix, The Death Penalty, “Dangerousness,” Psychiatric Testimony, 
and Professional Ethics, 5 AM. J. CRIM. L. 151, 172 (1977) (commenting on Dr. Grigson’s 
willingness to operate at the brink of quackery). 
239. See BRUCE J. ENNIS & RICHARD D. EMERY, THE RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 
20 (1978). 
240. Clinicians do not appear to share these concerns.  In 1974, a California court 
imposed tort liability on mental health professionals who failed to predict the violent actions 
of their patients.  See Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 529 P.2d 553 (Cal. 1974) (“Tarasoff 
I”), reargued, 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976) (“Tarasoff II”).  Tarasoff I found that mental health 
professionals have a duty to warn potential victims of their patients, while Tarasoff II revised 
that duty into a duty to protect.  A survey of 2,875 psychiatrists, psychologists, and social 
workers was conducted to answer questions related to this ruling.  See Daniel J. Givelber et 
al., Tarasoff, Myth and Reality: An Empirical Study of Private Law in Action, 1984 WIS. L. 
REV. 443, 454.  The authors were particularly concerned with whether the clinicians believed 
that the ruling was unworkable due to the “allegedly non-existent professional standards 
regarding the prediction of violence.”  Id. at 453.  The responding clinicians reported 
confidence in their ability to predict future violent acts committed by their patients, with 75% 
indicating they could make a prediction ranging from “probable” to “certain.”  Id. at 462. 
241. A number of societal forces converged to create the opportunity to examine the 
predictive accuracy of predictions of violence.  The civil rights movement had gained 
significant momentum during the early-to-mid 1960s, and these successes led civil libertarians 
to extend the attention beyond racial minorities to other traditionally marginalized groups 
including juveniles, criminal defendants, and the mentally ill.  The courts followed and 
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v. Herold,242 the Court rejected the State of New York’s administrative 
procedure by which time expired, mentally ill inmates were confined 
following the expiration of their sentences.  The Court concluded that 
the practice denied equal protection under the law.243  The significance 
of this case is its initiation of greater concern for the basis on which 
people could be determined dangerous and thus in need of mandatory 
commitment.244
Five seminal studies published between 1972 and 1980 examined the 
incidence of violence and criminal recidivism in patients classified as 
dangerous by psychiatrists but released by the courts.245  Taken together, 
the results were disappointing. 
The most comprehensive and methodologically sound of the studies 
was performed by Harry Kozol and four other clinicians who evaluated 
435 male offenders and classified them as dangerous or nondangerous 
prior to their community release.246  Clinical interviews, psychological 
testing, and life history information was provided from a variety of 
collateral sources.247  Clinicians classified forty-nine individuals as 
dangerous, seventeen of whom committed a serious assaultive act that 
resulted in arrest during the five-year follow-up period.248  Thus, 
clinicians’ accuracy rate was 35%; almost two-thirds of individuals 
predicted to be dangerous were not found to have committed a violent 
recognized the need to extend procedural protections to these classes of individuals.  See, e.g., 
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (providing juvenile offenders with constitutional privileges 
including the right to counsel, notice, cross-examination of witnesses, and self-incrimination); 
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (extending procedural protection to mentally ill 
offenders). 
242. 383 U.S. 107 (1966). 
243. Id. at 110.  Chief Justice Earl Warren, writing for the majority, concluded that 
Baxstrom was denied equal protection under the laws by the failure of the state to provide 
him opportunity for jury review of his civil commitment status.  Id. 
244.  The effects of this decision were to provide many more safeguards for those 
committed for compulsory psychiatric treatment.  See, e.g., Murel v. Baltimore City Criminal 
Court, 407 U.S. 355 (1972). 
245. The five studies are: (1) HENRY J. STEADMAN & JOSEPH J. COCOZZA, CAREERS 
OF THE CRIMINALLY INSANE (1974) [hereinafter BAXSTROM STUDY]; (2) Henry J. 
Steadman, A New Look at Recidivism Among Patuxent Inmates, 5 BULL. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 200 (1977) [hereinafter Patuxent Study]; (3) Harry L. Kozol et al., The 
Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness, 18 CRIME & DELINQ. 371 (1972) [hereinafter 
Kozol study]; (4) Rutgers Study, supra note 227; and (5) TERENCE P. THORNBERRY & 
JOSEPH E. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY INSANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP OF MENTALLY 
ILL OFFENDERS (1979) [hereinafter THORNBERRY STUDY]. 
246. See Kozol Study, supra note 245, at 388–89. 
247. Id. at 383. 
248. Id. at 390. 
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act during the follow-up.249
The accuracy rates of the remaining studies support the conclusion 
that clinicians vastly overestimated the incidence of violence in released 
patients.250  Thus, while across studies clinicians estimated that 50% to 
80% of these offenders would engage in a serious aggressive act, the 
actual base rate for violence in this population of individuals was found 
to range from 12% to 15%.251
Response to these reports was swift and nearly universal.252  Mental 
health and legal commentators alike rejected the contention that mental 
health professionals could accurately predict future acts of violence.253
249. Id. (reporting a false-positive rate for the study of 65%, a true-positive rate of 35%, 
a false negative rate of 8%, and a true negative rate of 92%). 
 The method of equating accuracy with false-positive rates—the group of individuals 
predicted to be dangerous who did not act violently—is only one of the indices appropriate 
for measuring the utility of a decision-making strategy.  If one considers the false-negative 
rate—the group of individuals classified as nondangerous who went on to commit a violent 
act—the conclusions would likely be more optimistic.  In the case of the Kozol study, false-
negatives were a low 8%, indicating that clinicians were accurate in 92% of the cases in which 
they classified an individual as nondangerous.  Id.; see Randy K. Otto, On the Ability of 
Mental Health Professionals to “Predict Dangerousness”: A Commentary on Interpretation of 
the “Dangerousness” Literature, 18 L. & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 55–58 (1994) (describing a 
number of formulas for determining predictive validity).  The author recommends comparing 
the overall rate of correct classification divided by the total number of persons classified to 
the overall rate of correct classification expected if subjects were predicted as a function of 
base rates.  Id.  See Janus & Meehl, supra note 11, at 47–49, for an excellent discussion of the 
implication of base rate on prediction problems. 
250. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245, at 139 (reporting a false-positive rate 
of 80%); JOHN MONAHAN, THE CLINICAL PREDICTION OF VIOLENT BEHAVIOR 44–49 
(1981) (describing the accuracy of the first-generation research).  In general, the false positive 
rates were unacceptably high, ranging from 58.7% to 86%.  See id. at 48. 
251. The incidence rate or “base rate” of violence is of great concern to clinicians and 
researchers alike.  The ability to detect an incident is directly related to the frequency with 
which it occurs within the population.   The optimal base rate is 50%, and as the proportion of 
incidents decrease, the number of false positives increase.  In instances where the base rate 
exceeds 50%, the number of false negatives increase.  See, e.g., TERRENCE W. CAMPBELL, 
ASSESSING SEX OFFENDERS 48 (2007).   
252. See Monahan, supra note 21, at 10.  “Rarely has research been so uncritically 
accepted and so facilely generalized by both mental health professionals and lawyers as was 
this first-generation research on the prediction of violence.”  Id. 
253. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 47, 49 (declaring “psychiatrists and 
psychologists are accurate in no more than one out of three predictions of violent behavior 
over a several-year period among institutionalized populations that had both committed 
violence in the past (and thus had high base rates for it) and who were diagnosed as mentally 
ill” (emphasis omitted); Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the 
Presumption of Expertise: Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CAL. L. REV. 693, 737 (1974) 
(emphasizing that psychiatric predictions of dangerousness are more often wrong than right); 
Rutgers Study, supra note 227, at 1099 (asserting that the high false positive rates provided 
“clear and convincing proof” of clinicians’ inability to predict dangerousness). 
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The courts, however, expressly rejected the conclusion that mental 
health professionals are incapable of predicting future dangerousness 
with an acceptable degree of accuracy.254  The apparent mandate to 
provide risk assessment and violence prediction led many critics to re-
examine their abolitionist positions.255  Ultimately, pragmatists, 
researchers, and clinicians recognized that the courts were unwilling to 
exclude violence prediction testimony.  Members of the discipline 
concluded that the best way to serve their clients was to shift the focus 
to improving prediction accuracy by critically analyzing the 
methodology of the early work. 
B.  Criticisms of First-Generation Literature 
Methodological problems significantly affect the credibility of first 
generation empirical evidence.  One of the most significant criticisms of 
these problems concerns the ways in which researchers evaluated the 
accuracy of outcomes.256  Researchers reported false positive rates 
ranging from 54% to 80%,257 leading critics to suggest that predictions of 
dangerousness are no less accurate than “flipping a coin.”258  The fatal 
error in the coin toss analogy involves the failure to consider the 
implications of base rates on prediction.259  Incorporating base rates into 
the analysis indicates that in two of the studies, clinicians’ judgments 
did, in fact, improve on chance.260
254. See Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (implying that the legal system’s 
reliance on prediction of dangerousness in a variety of contexts precluded exclusion in this 
particular prediction task). 
255. See Charles W. Lidz & Edward P. Mulvey, Dangerousness: From Legal Definition 
to Theoretical Research, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 41, 42–44 (1995) (describing Saleem Shah’s 
progression from abolitionist to advocate as a means of serving his forensic clients). 
256. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 111–14. 
257. See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 44–46.  The Baxstrom Study acknowledged an 
80% false positive rate.  BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245, at 139. 
258. See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 253, at 737 (“It is inconceivable that a judgment 
could be considered an ‘expert’ judgment when it is less accurate than the flip of a coin.”). 
259. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 111 (“In fact, knowledgeable clinicians are much 
better at predicting dangerousness than the random selection process suggested by the coin-
flipping analogy.”); see also Albert W. Alschuler, Preventive Pretrial Detention and the Failure 
of Interest-Balancing Approaches to Due Process, 85 MICH. L. REV. 510, 539–46 (1986). 
260. Using Ennis & Litwack’s coin toss method, five individuals would be predicted 
dangerous and five non-dangerous.  See Ennis & Litwack, supra note 253.  In the Baxstrom 
Study, for example, the base rate of violence was approximately two in every ten patients.  
BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245.  If both of the truly dangerous offenders were included in 
the predicted dangerous group, the remaining three of five, or 60%, would be false-positives.  
If one of the truly dangerous fell into the predicted non-dangerous group, the false-positive 
rate would rise to 80% while the false-negative rate would increase to 20%.  In the worst case, 
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Additional methodological concerns arise from definitional 
problems with the criterion variable.  Early research studies defined 
dangerousness261 as an arrest for serious violence.262  Use of such a 
narrow, restrictive definition necessarily results in inflated false positive 
rates.263  The reliance upon arrest records to identify violent patients 
also raises methodological concerns because of the significant number of 
violent individuals who evade police detection.264  False positive rates 
were likely inflated by the failure of the criterion variable to detect 
those violent acts. 
Characteristics of the sample studied,265 reliance on restricted 
if both truly dangerous offenders fell in the non-dangerous group, the false-positive rate 
would equal 100%, while the false-negatives would increase to 40%.  Clinicians’ accuracy in 
the Kozol and Patuxent studies both exceeded chance levels.  Kozol Study, supra note 245 
(reporting an accuracy rate three times better than chance); Patuxent Study, supra note 245 
(reporting an accuracy rate 1.2 times better than chance). 
261. Many commentators have criticized the use of the word “dangerousness” as 
problematic.  See Megargee, supra note 13, at 5 (“‘Dangerousness’ is an unfortunate term, for 
it implies there is a trait of ‘dangerousness’ which, like intelligence, is a relatively constant 
characteristic of the person being assessed.  However, the degree of danger an individual 
represents to himself or others varies markedly as a function of a number of variables.”); 
MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 4–5 (“‘Dangerousness” confuses issues regarding what one is 
predicting with the probability one is assigning to its prediction.”); see also Grisso & 
Appelbaum, supra note 13, at 623 n.3 (“Future discourse in this area might be facilitated by 
ridding ourselves of the phrase predictions of dangerousness.  It has no logical meaning in the 
context of the behavioral and social sciences.  To ‘predict’ is to make a statement about the 
likelihood of a future event or behavior.  Dangerousness seems to refer not to an event or 
behavior, but to a condition that exists as a function of the presence of someone or something 
perceived as ‘dangerous.’”). 
262. The definition of dangerousness in legal contexts has varied considerably, with 
courts generally adopting a broader definition of “dangerous behavior” in civil commitment 
contexts.  See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1983) (“We do not agree with 
petitioner’s suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established by proof that a 
person committed a non-violent crime against property.”).  Capital sentencing statutes have 
articulated a more stringent definition referencing the potential to cause serious bodily injury 
to another person.  See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2 (2004) (requiring “a probability that 
defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing serious 
threat to society”); see also Slobogin, supra note 224, at 101–02. 
263. See Otto, supra note 249, at 52. 
264. Every year the crime rate exceeds the arrest and conviction rate, indicating that a 
significant number of offenders are not apprehended for their crimes.  In violence prediction 
research, this could lead to a significant elevation in the number of “false-positives,” when in 
reality prediction was more accurate than follow-up measures demonstrated. 
265. The research was limited to examining patients who had been charged, convicted 
and had served prison terms for a prior violent offense.  Additionally, the patients had been 
hospitalized in a secure, forensic mental facility for long periods of time.  See, e.g., Patuxent 
Study, supra note 245 (describing the mean hospitalization period at twelve years).  The 
degree to which patients who have not experienced long-term custodial care nor engaged in 
prior violent acts are different from subjects studied limits the appropriateness of generalizing 
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samples,266 the frequent use of proxy measures of future violence,267 the 
failure to consider adequate predictor variables,268 and the use of cross-
contextual predictions of violence269 have all been identified as 
methodological deficiencies.  Collectively, these methodological 
problems restrict both the weight and the breadth of conclusions that 
can be reasonably drawn from this body of research.  Scholars concede 
that the accuracy of most kinds of violence predictions remained 
untested, and gradually new research programs emerged to address 
deficits in the early work.270
results to dissimilar groups. 
266. The inability to include the groups of individuals predicted by psychiatrists to be 
violent and with whom the courts agreed was significant.  By virtue of this categorization, this 
group remained in a secure environment where opportunity to engage in violent acts is 
necessarily restricted.  It is likely that, had these individuals been released, some unknown 
proportion would have engaged in violence, thereby increasing clinicians’ predictive accuracy.  
267. See, e.g., THORNBERRY STUDY, supra note 245; Patuxent Study, supra note 245.  
Both of these studies relied on administrative classification to infer predictions of future 
violence.  THORNBERRY STUDY, supra note 245; Patuxent Study, supra note 245.  One 
criticism of this method is that those administrative classifications were often stale (occurring 
months or years prior to transfer) and thus, did not accurately represent psychiatric opinion at 
transfer.  Additionally, it is possible that extraneous factors such as maturation or the 
treatment the individuals received impacted the propensity to commit violence upon release.  
A methodologically sound study would have used clinician ratings immediately prior to 
release.  But see Kozol Study, supra note 245 (incorporating this method but failing to 
demonstrate predictive accuracy).  Others have argued that psychiatrists did not, in fact, 
believe that the majority of patients would engage in future violence, but used 
characterizations of “dangerousness” to exert social control.  See MONAHAN, supra note 250, 
at 50–54. 
268. Although clinicians had access to a variety of information sources, analysis of 
decision-making strategies revealed that they relied upon only a few variables, primarily age 
(virtually all offenders under age fifty were classified as dangerous) and severity of index 
offense, in making classifications.  See, e.g., Patuxent Study, supra note 245.  The identification 
of factors or variables that are predictive of violence is an important goal of second-
generation research.  See, e.g., Randy K. Otto, Prediction of Dangerous Behavior: A Review 
and Analysis of “Second-Generation” Research, 5 FORENSIC REP. 103 (1992). 
269. See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 57–58 (discussing the inefficacy of predictions 
made in one context (such as a hospital) that an individual will be violent in another very 
different context (e.g. the community) and concluding that “cross-situational consistency of 
any type of behavior rarely exceeds the ‘sound barrier’ of a .40 correlation coefficient”). 
270. Professor Monahan led the field in articulating the need for improvement in 
violence prediction in his 1984 article calling for a second generation of scholarship and 
outlining a number of areas that should be emphasized when designing new research.  See 
Monahan, supra note 21, at 13 (suggesting researchers consider the effect of situational 
variables, vary the populations under investigation, and include more short-term predictions 
in community settings); see also Lidz & Mulvey, supra note 255, at 45 (“[A] field that had seen 
little research activity for several years was revitalized.  The issues no longer seemed settled.  
Instead they appeared as formidable challenges.”). 
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C.  Second-Generation Research 
Initial second-generation research efforts focused on examining the 
base rates of violence,271 exploring the relationship between predictor 
variables and violence,272 and assessing violence across multiple contexts 
and domains.273  Virtually abandoning long-term prediction as 
impossible,274 research focused on examining mental health 
professionals’ ability to make short-term predictions of violence.275
The groups of individuals studied were also expanded to include 
both mentally disordered and non-mentally disordered individuals,276 
271. The overestimation of violence was the single most important error in first-
generation research.  Thus, information regarding the occurrence of violence was a critical 
issue in improving the accuracy of violence predictions.  See, e.g., Otto, supra note 268, at 104 
(describing base-rate research as providing “data necessary to evaluate the predictive 
accuracy of professionals and information regarding the overall accuracy of dangerousness 
predictions”). 
272. Researchers expanded the variables under consideration to include static and 
dynamic variables that had not been attended to in first-generation research.  See infra notes 
284–90 and accompanying text. 
273. Incorporating more than one type of predictor variable, as well as limiting 
predictions to situationally similar contexts, have been posited to reduce error and increase 
predictive validity.  See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 57–59 (suggesting that research 
indicates that the correlation of behavior predicted in one situation and observed in another 
would be low). 
274. See Monahan, supra note 21, at 13 (referring to long-term predictions of violence, 
“There are so many nails now in that coffin that I propose we declare the issue officially 
dead.”); Otto, supra note 268, at 104 n.2 (“[I]t seems well established that mental health 
professionals are not able to make these types of predictions with any degree of accuracy.”).  
But see Douglas Mossman, Assessing Predictions of Violence: Being Accurate About 
Accuracy, 62 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 783, 789 (1994) (describing “an average 
accuracy for short-term clinical predictions . . . that is not different from the accuracy of the 
long-term predictions”). 
275. The impetus for this shift came from Monahan, supra note 21, at 56 (Discussing the 
limits of the one in three accuracy reported in first-generation research, he stated, “I believe 
that one situation may prove to be such an exception: prediction in short-term community 
contexts, such as emergency civil commitment and perhaps release on bail.”). 
276. See, e.g., Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, Crime, Inpatient Admissions, and 
Violence Among Male Mental Patients, 11 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 305, 306–10 (1988).  In 
this study, researchers attempted to answer questions about the relationship between 
hospitalization, arrest, and violence.  Id. at 306.  They concluded that the number of prior 
arrests, the diagnosis of substance abuse, and the number of prior admissions were all 
significant predictors of arrest following discharge of male mental patients (Multiple r = .49).  
Id. at 309.  Similarly, the number of prior arrests, young age, and the number of previous 
admissions predicted post-release violence (Multiple r = .26).  Id.  This study provides some 
evidence that the more frequently individuals are defined as disordered, the greater the 
likelihood that they will also be identified as criminal (arrested), and thus, demonstrates the 
importance of measures to address the needs of the patient both in the mental health care 
system and the criminal justice system.  Id. at 310; see also Jeffrey S. Janofsky et al., 
Psychiatrists’ Accuracy in Predicting Violent Behavior on an Inpatient Unit, 39 HOSP. & 
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inmates,277 inpatients in psychiatric hospitals,278 and individuals living in 
the community.279
Criterion variables were strengthened by including re-hospitalization 
for violent behavior,280 developing methods to track patients in the 
COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 1090 (1988); cf. Harold Hall et al., Dangerous Myths About 
Predicting Dangerousness?, 2 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL. 173, 181–84 (1984) (describing the 
base rates of violence in U.S. servicemen). 
277. See, e.g., Rueben E. Lang et al., Personality and Criminality in Violent Offenders, 2 
J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 179, 182–83 (1987); Jeremy F. Mills et al., Novaco Anger Scale: 
Reliability and Validity Within an Adult Criminal Sample, 5 ASSESSMENT 237, 239 (1998); 
Frank H. Walkey & D. Ross Gilmour, The Relationship Between Interpersonal Distance and 
Violence in Imprisoned Offenders, 11 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 331, 334 (1984).  The unique 
circumstances of the correctional environment have led social scientists to hypothesize about 
the relationship between environmental factors and violent behavior.  A body of literature 
suggests that overcrowded conditions are associated with increased frequency of violence in 
inmates who prefer greater interpersonal distance.  See, e.g., Claire Lawrence & Kathryn 
Andrews, The Influence of Perceived Prison Crowding on Male Inmates’ Perception of 
Aggressive Events, 30 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 273.  Results from the Walkey and Glimour 
study support this hypothesis; however, the study design prevented researchers from ruling 
out alternative causes.  Walkey & Gilmour, supra, at 337.  When viewed together, the 
evidence suggests that environmental factors, such as overcrowding, are related to an increase 
in violent acts.  Id. at 338. 
278. See, e.g., Cathy Owen et al., Repetitively Violent Patients in Psychiatric Units, 49 
PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1458 (1998) [hereinafter Owen et al, Repetitively Violent Patients] 
(reporting that the risk of inpatient violence can be significant).  In this study, researchers 
found that a small number (12%) of patients accounted for 69% of 752 serious violent 
incidents.  Id.  The frequency with which inpatients engage in violent acts demonstrates the 
importance of including these behaviors in any outcome measure of violent acts.  See Dale E. 
McNiel & Renée L. Binder, Clinical Assessment of the Risk of Violence Among Psychiatric 
Inpatients, 148 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1317 (1991); Cathy Owen et al., Violence and Aggression 
in Psychiatric Units, 49 PSYCHIATRIC SERVICES 1452 (1998) [hereinafter Owen et al., 
Violence and Agression]. 
279. See Jeffrey W. Swanson et al., Violence and Psychiatric Disorder in the Community: 
Evidence from the Epidemiologic Catchment Area Surveys, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 761 (1990).  This well-funded, methodologically sound study addressed the 
association between psychiatric disorder and assaultive behavior among patients in the 
community.  Id.  In this analysis, 10,000 respondents completed a structured interview 
designed to generate a DSM-III diagnosis.  Id. at 761–62.  This interview also addressed 
subject violence.  Id. at 761.  Results indicated an increased risk of violence for various 
psychiatric illnesses.  Id.  The highest risk was associated with those respondents with alcohol 
or substance abuse or dependence disorders (24.57% to 34.74%).  Id.  Although a single 
study rarely settles a research question, this study, with a large sample size and careful 
methodology, provides convincing evidence that psychiatric disorders increase the risk of 
violence.  See also Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, Assessing the Risk of Violence in 
Released Mental Patients: A Cross-Validation Study, 1 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 75 (1989). 
280. See Edward P. Mulvey & Charles W. Lidz, Measuring Patient Violence in 
Dangerousness Research, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 277, 278 (1993) (describing the advantages 
and disadvantages of using re-hospitalization as a criterion variable and concluding that it is 
best used as an ancillary data source); see also Owen et al., Violence and Aggression, supra 
note 278, at 1454. 
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community,281 and using self-report measures of violence.282
Using these methodological innovations, researchers explored the 
relationship between future violent behavior and a number of predictor 
variables, which can be loosely grouped into five general categories: 
criminal history, dispositional, demographic and case history, clinical, 
and situational/contextual factors.283  In the sections that follow, we 
review and synthesize the research literature addressing each of these 
categories of variables. 
1. Criminal History Variables 
One relatively consistent result of the second-generation literature is 
that the likelihood for future violence increases with past incidents of 
violence.284  Research using both mentally disordered and non-
disordered populations285 reports significant correlations of varying size 
281. See Henry J. Steadman et al., Designing a New Generation of Risk Assessment 
Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 
247, 298–305 (John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) (describing the MacArthur 
risk assessment project and its community follow-up procedures). 
282. See, e.g., Mark R. Weinrott & Maureen Saylor, Self-Report of Crimes Committed by 
Sex Offenders, 6 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 286, 291 (1991) (describing the discrepancy 
between official reports of offense history and anonymously provided self-report 
information).  This discrepancy was marked.  For the rapists in the study, official records 
revealed a mean of 1.8 rapes per offender and a total of 66 arrests for sexual offenses for the 
participants, while self-report information indicated a mean of 11.7 rapes per offender and a 
total of 433 actual rapes.  Id.  Those identified as child molesters showed a similar pattern of 
responding.  Id.  Participants in the study were individuals who had been identified as sexual 
predators and committed under the Washington Sexual Predator Statute, and who thus can 
likely be considered some of the most serious and frequent offenders whose offense patterns 
may not be representative of others.  Id.  This study does, however, support the contention 
that for the most serious offenders, use of official records may result in serious 
underestimation of offense history.  See Gene G. Abel et al., Behavioral Approaches to 
Treatment of the Violent Sex Offender, in CLINICAL TREATMENT OF THE VIOLENT PERSON 
95, 96 (Loren H. Roth ed., 1987); see also Robert Plutchik & Herman M. van Pragg, A Self-
Report Measure of Violence Risk, II, 31 COMPREHENSIVE PSYCHIATRY 450, 451 (1990) 
(providing a general discussion of the benefits of self-report measures of violence). 
283. Many commentators and researchers have found this taxonomy useful in classifying 
variables.  See Steadman et al., supra note 281, at 297 (elaborating on the distinctions of these 
classifications); see also Deidre Klassen & William A. O’Connor, A Prospective Study of 
Predictors of Violence in Adult Male Mental Health Admissions, 12 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 
143, 145–56 (1988). 
284. The adage “the best predictor of future behavior is past behavior” appears to be 
supported by the research.  See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 71 (“If there is one 
finding that overshadows all others in the area of prediction, it is that the probability of future 
crime increases with each prior criminal act.”).  The difficulty lies in discriminating between 
those who may continue to commit non-violent offenses and those who will re-offend 
violently. 
285. Although research exists for both groups, a significant majority of research on 
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between juvenile delinquency,286 number of prior arrests,287 prior 
incarcerations,288 previous arrest for violent crime,289 and self-report of 
violence290 to be predictive of future violent acts. 
Severity of violence at the index offense has unexpectedly been 
found to be inversely correlated with future violence.291  The counter-
intuitive relationship between severity and future violence may have 
accounted for a number of the clinical prediction errors of first-
mentally disordered samples has failed to consider the impact of criminal history variables on 
violent recidivism.  See, e.g., Janofsky et al., supra note 276; Owen et al., Repetitively Violent 
Patients, supra note 278.  But see Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 276.  Results from a recent 
meta-analysis indicate “that risk assessments of mentally disordered offenders should pay 
close attention to the general offender prediction literature.”  James Bonta et al., The 
Prediction of Criminal and Violent Recidivism Among Mentally Disordered Offenders: A 
Meta-Analysis, 123 PSYCHOL. BULL. 123, 137 (1998).  The failure to attend to these factors 
may be the result of the clinicians’ reluctance to address static variables whose association 
with risk is not modifiable with treatment. 
286. See, e.g., Pamela K. Lattimore et al., Predicting Rearrest for Violence Among 
Serious Youthful Offenders, 32 J. RES. CRIME & DELINQ. 54, 76 (1995) (“The majority of 
these variables are significant in our analysis of youthful recidivism, suggesting that each 
provides additional predictive power.” (describing measures of juvenile offending)); Bonta et 
al., supra note 285, at 128–34 (describing the criminal history variables generally, and juvenile 
delinquency variables specifically, as predictors of violent recidivism); see also David P. 
Farrington, Childhood Aggression and Adult Violence: Early Precursors and Later-Life 
Outcomes, in THE DEVELOPMENT AND TREATMENT OF CHILDHOOD AGGRESSION 5 
(Debra J. Pepler & Kenneth H. Rubin eds., 1991); David P. Farrington, Explaining the 
Beginning, Progress, and Ending of Antisocial Behavior from Birth to Adulthood, in 3 FACTS, 
FRAMEWORKS, AND FORECASTS: ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 253 (Joan 
McCord ed., 1992). 
287. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 279, at 79 (reporting a significant 
correlation between arrest record and future violence in a cross-validation sample of .26); 
Grant T. Harris et al., Violent Recidivism of Mentally Disordered Offenders: The Development 
of a Statistical Prediction Instrument, 20 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 315, 318–21 (1993) (describing 
criminal history variables as significant predictors of violent recidivism); Klassen & 
O’Connor, supra note 276 (reporting that the best predictor of subsequent arrests is the 
number of prior arrests). 
288. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245; Lattimore et al., supra note 286, at 64; 
Bonta et al., supra note 285. 
289. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting a significant effect 
size (.14) between arrests for violent crimes within the last year and violent recidivism); 
Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, A Comparison of Criminal Recidivism Among 
Schizophrenic and Nonschizophrenic Offenders, 15 INT’L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 397 (1992). 
290. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 154; Owen et al., Repetitively 
Violent Patients, supra note 278, at 1460–61 (reporting that inpatient violent recidivists gave 
warning signs, but that their threats were not taken seriously by hospital staff); Plutchik & van 
Pragg, supra note 282. 
291. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147 (describing the negative correlation 
between the severity of index offense and future violent recidivism as -.16); cf. Bonta et al., 
supra note 285, at 128 (“Neither a violent index offense . . . nor a sexual index offense 
predicted future violent behavior.”). 
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generation research, as examination of the decision-making policies of 
clinicians revealed that they relied heavily on the characteristics of the 
index offense to predict future violence.292
Taken together, criminal history variables have consistently been 
correlated with violent recidivism in both mentally and non-mentally 
disordered offenders in virtually every study in which they have been 
assessed;293 however, the strength of this relationship can be described 
only as “small.”294  Thus, researchers and clinicians must consider the 
impact of other variables to increase the predictive accuracy of violence 
predictions. 
2. Demographic and Case History Variables 
A second group of static predictors, including sex,295 socioeconomic 
status,296 educational attainment,297 marital status,298 employment 
292. See, e.g., BAXSTROM STUDY, supra note 245 (describing an analysis of the 
clinicians’ decision-making policies and their reliance upon the characteristics of the index 
crime as evidence for predictions of violence).  To the extent that second-generation studies 
rely upon clinicians that are unaware of this relationship, they too are likely to have elevated 
prediction errors. 
293. See supra notes 276–79 and accompanying text. 
294. Univariate correlations are in the .15 to .25 range, while those studies reporting 
effect sizes identify magnitudes within the .15 range.  While statistically significant, the 
practical significance of this relationship remains questionable.  See JACOB COHEN, 
STATISTICAL POWER ANALYSIS FOR THE BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 24–27 (2d ed. 1977) 
(proposing the following interpretation of effect size: .2 considered a small effect, .5 
considered a medium effect, and .8 considered a large effect). 
295. The weight of the evidence suggests that men are more likely to behave violently 
than women.  See, e.g., Melvin S. Heller & Saundra M. Ehrlich, Actuarial Variables in 9,600 
Violent and Non-Violent Offenders Referred to a Court Psychiatric Clinic, 4 AM. J. SOC. 
PSYCHIATRY 30 (1984); Dale E. McNiel et al., Predictors of Violence in Civilly Committed 
Acute Psychiatric Patients, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 965, 966 (1988).  But see James E. 
Hastings & L. Kevin Hamberger, Sociodemographic Predictors of Violence, 20 PSYCHIATRIC 
CLINICS N. AM. 323, 327 (1997) (“[T]he bulk of the research seems to show that men have a 
greater tendency to behave violently; however, in some samples, especially those with serious 
psychiatric diagnoses, the rate of violence among women may approach that of men.”); 
Charles Lidz et al., The Accuracy of Predictions of Violence to Others, 269 JAMA 1007, 1010 
(1993) (describing a sample in which violence among women was higher than among men). 
296. See, e.g., David A. Pritchard, Stable Predictors of Recidivism: A Summary, 17 
CRIMINOLOGY 15 (1979) (reporting that in a number of studies, low pre-prison income level 
was predictive of failure on parole); Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 764 (reporting that of 
the 10,000 subjects in the Epidemiologic Catchment Area (“ECA”) Survey, the rate of 
violence in the low socioeconomic status (“SES”) group was three times higher than the 
violence rate of the upper SES group). 
297. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (reporting data to suggest that on 
average violent recidivists completed one grade less than did non-recidivists). 
298. See, e.g., id. (describing a significant difference between recidivists and non-
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history,299 criminality of family members,300 history of childhood abuse,301 
elementary school maladjustment,302 and childhood aggression,303 have 
been consistently correlated with future violence, although, again, the 
strength of the relationship is small.304  The relationship between 
violence and other demographic variables, including age305 and race,306 
recidivists on “never married” variable); Wagdy Loza & Gurmeet K. Dhaliwal, Psychometric 
Evaluation of the Risk Appraisal Guide (RAG): A Tool for Assessing Violent Recidivism, 12 J. 
INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 779, 781 (1997) (describing items on a risk assessment 
instrument including “marital status at time of index offense”).  The marital status variable 
has been construed as an index of individuals’ general ability to form lasting interpersonal 
relationships with others.  Those who do not engage in these relationships tend to recidivate 
at higher rates than those who have. 
299. See, e.g., Bonta et al., supra note 285, at 133 (describing a significant effect for 
employment problems in a meta-analysis); Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (describing 
employment history as a variable capable of discriminating between recidivists and non-
recidivists); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 77. 
300. See, e.g., Harris et al., supra note 287; Dorothy Otnow Lewis et al., Violent Juvenile 
Delinquents, 18 J. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 307 (1979) (reporting that violent juvenile offenders 
reported witnessing extreme violence more frequently than did non-violent or less violent 
offenders); Jerome A. Yesavage et al., Family Conflict, Psychopathology, and Dangerous 
Behavior by Schizophrenic Inpatients, 8 PSYCHIATRY RES. 271 (1983) (reporting that parental 
fighting with someone outside the family was correlated with both violence prior to admission 
and inpatient violence). 
301. Proponents of a modeling explanation for violence have cited evidence that 
children who are abused engage in an increased frequency of violent acts.  See, e.g., Klassen & 
O’Connor, supra note 283, at 152 (reporting that being injured by a sibling before age fifteen 
was predictive of violence for both schizophrenic and non-schizophrenic male inpatients); 
Lewis et al., supra note 300, at 307 (reporting that childhood abuse differentiated between 
more-violent and less-violent juvenile offenders). 
302. See, e.g., Deborah M. Capaldi & Gerald R. Patterson, Can Violent Offenders Be 
Distinguished from Frequent Offenders: Prediction from Childhood to Adolescence, 33 J. RES. 
CRIME & DELINQ. 206, 225 (1996) (“Compared with the rest of the sample, violent and 
nonviolent arrestees appeared to be at considerable risk at Grade 4 in family background, 
their own antisocial behavior, and overall adjustment.”); Loza & Dhaliwal, supra note 298, at 
781. 
303. See, e.g., LEFKOWITZ ET AL., GROWING UP TO BE VIOLENT: A LONGITUDINAL 
STUDY OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF AGGRESSION (1977); Capaldi & Patterson supra note 302; 
Lattimore et al., supra note 286; R. Loeber & T. Dishion, Early Predictors of Male 
Delinquency: A Review, 94 PSYCHOL. BULL. 68 (1983) (citing early youth behavior problems 
and aggression, later youth aggression, and antisocial behavior as consistent predictors of 
subsequent delinquency). 
304. Univariate correlations for this class of variables have been in the .22 (“parents had 
physical fights with others”) to the .28 (“injured by a sibling before age 15”) range.  See 
Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 tbl.1; see also Harris et al., supra note 287, at 324 
(reporting univariate correlation between violent recidivism and elementary school 
maladjustment at .31; the highest correlations then account for 9% of the total variance). 
305. A majority of the research has reported a consistent inverse relationship between 
age and subsequent violent offending.  See, e.g., Jessica M. Tanner, “Continuing Threat” to 
Whom?: Risk Assessment in Virginia Capital Sentencing Hearings, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 381, 384 
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remains less clear. 
3. Dispositional Variables 
Dispositional risk factors are those individual traits or styles that are 
considered relatively enduring personal characteristics.307  This category 
includes risk factors such as anger,308 impulsivity,309 and psychopathy or 
(2005); Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 764 (noting that younger people accounted for seven 
times as much violence as did older individuals); Loza & Dhaliwal, supra note 298, at 789–90 
(describing violent offenders as being significantly younger at the time of the index offense 
than non-violent offenders); Harris et al., supra note 287, at 318 (reporting the average age of 
recidivists as six years younger than non-recidivists (23.5 to 29.7, respectively)).  But see 
Robert Menzies & Christopher D. Webster, Construction and Validation of Risk Assessments 
in a Six-Year Follow-up of Forensic Patients: A Tridimensional Analysis, 63 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCH. 766, 772 (1995) (reporting “individuals 30 years or older at time of 
assessment were involved in more transactions than their younger counterparts, b = -.21, p < 
.01—a finding that contradicts the general expectation of an inverse correlation between age 
and violence propensity”); Heller & Ehrlich, supra note 295 (reporting that subjects who had 
committed multiple violent acts were significantly older than nonviolent defendants or those 
who had only committed only one violent crime).  While Hastings and Hamberger, supra note 
295, at 326, dismiss these findings as “anomalies,” another researcher has hypothesized that 
the sometimes-inconsistent findings may be due to an interaction between risk factors.  See 
Dale E. McNiel, Correlates of Violence in Psychotic Patients, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 683, 
686–87 (1997). 
306. The effect of race is another variable for which findings have frequently been 
contradictory.  Some research has indicated a slight but significant relationship between race 
and violence.  See, e.g., Steadman et al., supra note 281, at 274 (suggesting that African-
Americans accounted for a significantly greater number of arrests for violence than would be 
expected); Maureen S. Baum et al., Predicting Violent Behavior Within a Medium Security 
Correctional Setting, 3 INT’L J. ECLECTIC PSYCHOTHERAPY 18, 21 (1984) (reporting that race 
differentiated violent from non-violent inmates).  But see Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 
764 (reporting that race was unrelated to violent crime in the ECA sample when 
socioeconomic status was controlled for).  Others have suggested that membership in a 
violence-accepting subculture (e.g., some gangs) may provide a better explanation than the 
more heterogeneous classification of race.  See McNiel, supra note 305, at 687. 
307. See VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, 
supra note 281, at 19 (describing dispositional risk factors as “those that reflect the individual 
person’s predispositions, traits, tendencies, or styles”). 
308. Until recently the construct of anger has been conceptualized as an everyday 
experience, and anger assessment procedures have been developed in primarily non-clinical 
populations.  As a consequence, instruments were unavailable to differentiate the 
dysfunctional elements of anger and its relationship to violence.  See Raymond W. Novaco, 
Anger as a Risk Factor for Violence Among the Mentally Disordered, in VIOLENCE AND 
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 21, 21.  Some 
research has found a relationship between anger and violence.  See, e.g., Thomas J. Craig, An 
Epidemiologic Study of Problems Associated with Violence Among Psychiatric Inpatients, 139 
AM J. PSYCHIATRY 1262 (1982) (reporting that anger was the factor most strongly associated 
with patient violence in a study of 1,033 psychiatric patients); Stanley R. Kay et al., Profiles of 
Aggression Among Psychiatric Patients, 176 J. NERVOUS & MENTAL DISEASE 547 (1988) 
(indicating that anger was one of the strongest predictors of violence in a group of 
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antisocial attitudes.310  Debate continues about the utility and 
hospitalized psychiatric inpatients); see also Robert A. Baron, Magnitude of Victim’s Pain 
Cues and Level of Prior Anger Arousal as Determinants of Adult Aggressive Behavior, 17 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 236, 239 (1971) (reporting that angered subjects delivered 
more intense shocks to subjects than did non-angered subjects). 
 Although research suggests that anger may be predictive of violence, no published 
research studies have incorporated a measure of anger within a comprehensive assessment.  
An assessment instrument has been developed to assess the role anger plays in violence, 
however.  See Mills et al., supra note 277, at 247 (describing the Novaco Anger Scale as “an 
effective measure of anger in an offender population”).  The MacArthur Risk Assessment 
Study currently underway has included this measure in an attempt to determine the predictive 
validity of anger as a factor in future violent acts.  See Henry J. Steadman et al., Designing a 
New Generation of Risk Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 297.  In the future, other research 
programs should incorporate this factor into risk assessment in an effort to improve the 
prediction of dangerousness. 
309. Impulsiveness is “related to the control of thoughts and behavior[s].”  See Ernest S. 
Barratt, Impulsiveness and Aggression, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 61, 61.  The failure to inhibit 
aggressive behaviors has been hypothesized to relate to certain types of violence.  See, e.g., 
G.V. Caprara et al., Indicators of Impulsive Aggression: Present Status of Research on 
Irritability and Emotional Susceptibility Scales, 6 PERSONALITY & INDIVIDUAL 
DIFFERENCES 665, 666–67 (1985); G.V. Caprara et al., Instigation to Aggress and Escalation of 
Aggression Examined from a Personological Perspective: The Role of Irritability and of 
Emotional Susceptibility, 9 AGGRESSIVE BEHAV. 345 (1983).  Problems with assessment 
instruments have once again limited the assessment of this factor in violence prediction 
research.  The MacArthur Risk Assessment Survey researchers have developed an 
instrument, the “Barratt Impulsiveness Scale,” that shows promise in elucidating the 
relationship between violence and impulsiveness.  See Barratt, supra, at 63. 
310. Personality disorders have been described as “an enduring pattern of inner 
experience and behavior that deviates markedly from the expectations of the individual’s 
culture, is pervasive and inflexible, has an onset in adolescence or early adulthood, is stable 
over time, and leads to distress or impairment.”  DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL 
OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-IV-TR 287–88 (4th ed. 2000); Stephen D. Hart et al., 
Psychopathy as a Risk Marker for Violence: Development and Validation of a Screening 
Version of the Revised Psychopathy Checklist, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: 
DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 81, 81. 
 
Interpersonally, psychopaths are grandiose, egocentric, manipulative, 
dominant, forceful, and coldhearted.  Affectively, they display shallow 
and labile emotions, are unable to form long-lasting bonds to people, 
principles, or goals, and are lacking in empathy, anxiety, and genuine guilt 
or remorse.  Behaviorally, psychopaths are impulsive and sensation-
seeking, and tend to violate social norms; the most obvious expressions of 
these predispositions involve criminality, substance abuse, and a failure to 
fulfill social obligations and responsibilities. 
 
Id.  The Psychopathy Checklist (“PCL”) (and subsequent revisions) was developed to assess 
psychopathy, and reliability and validity of the measure appears to be good.  See, e.g., Robert 
D. Hare et al., Psychopathy and the DSM-IV Criteria for Antisocial Personality Disorder, 100 
J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 391 (1991); Robert D. Hare et al., The Revised Psychopathy 
Checklist: Reliability and Factor Structure, 2 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 338 (1990). 
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meaningfulness of these factors, but generally findings suggest that they 
have some predictive validity within limited populations.311
4. Clinical Variables 
This category encompasses the relationship between diagnosis or 
symptomology of various types of mental disorders and violence.  The 
impact of diagnostic categories including schizophrenia312 and mood 
 Subsequent research has demonstrated a relationship between psychopathy and violence.  
See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147 (reporting that scores on the PCL-R were the 
single best predictor of violent offending, obtaining a correlation of .34 with violent 
recidivism); Grant T. Harris et al., Psychopathy and Violent Recidivism, 15 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 625, 632 (1991) (describing the rate of violent failure to be significantly higher in 
psychopaths at 77% compared to only 21% of nonpsychopaths); Stephen D. Hart et al., 
Performance of Male Psychopaths Following Conditional Release from Prison, 56 J. 
CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 227 (1988) (reporting that offenders who scored in the 
top third of the PCL distribution were three times more likely to violate the conditions of 
release, and approximately four times more likely to commit a violent offense than those in 
the bottom third of the distribution).  This research suggests that psychopathy is an important 
construct to consider when predicting violent recidivism; however, two recent meta-analyses 
reported less impressive results.  Paul Gendreau et al., Is the PCL-R Really the 
“Unparalleled” Measure of Offender Risk? A Lesson in Knowledge Cumulation, 29 CRIM. 
JUST. & BEHAV. 397 (2002) (reporting phi coefficients of .23 and .21 for general and violent 
recidivism, respectively).  Glenn D. Walters, Predicting Criminal Justice Outcomes with the 
Psychopathy Checklist and the Lifestyle Criminality Screening Form: A Meta-Analytic 
Comparison, 21 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 89 (2003) (examining only prospective studies of adult and 
juvenile offenders and reporting a weighted r of .26 for general recidivism). A subsequent 
study revealed that Factor 2, which assesses social deviance and antisocial behavior, appeared 
to be more strongly correlated with both general and violent recidivism (rw = .32 and .26, 
respectively) than did Factor 1, which taps the affective and interpersonal components of 
psychopathy (e.g., callousness and superficial charm).  See Glenn D. Walters, Predicting 
Institutional Adjustment and Recidivism with the Psychopathy Checklist Factor Scores: A 
Meta-Analysis, 27 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 541, 541–51 (2003). 
311. Additional research addressing the impact of these constructs on violence is an 
important next step in improving the accuracy of predictions.  Researchers or clinicians who 
fail to consider the impact of dispositional factors will likely experience increased error 
compared to those who take a more comprehensive approach. 
312. Public perception of the mentally ill as dangerous has long been the norm.  In 
contrast, mental health professionals, motivated by the desire to reduce the stigma associated 
with mental illness have historically dismissed the connection between psychiatric disorder 
and violence.  See, e.g., NAT’L MENTAL HEALTH ASSOC., STIGMA: A LACK OF AWARENESS 
AND UNDERSTANDING (1987) (pamphlet claiming that “people with mental illness pose no 
more of a crime threat than do other members of the general population”); MONAHAN, supra 
note 250, at 19.  Recent research challenges this assertion and has demonstrated a small but 
consistent finding of increased risk of violence in the mentally ill when compared to the 
general population.  See Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 768–69 (“The ECA data clearly 
demonstrate that individuals in the community with psychiatric disorders are more likely to 
engage in assaultive behavior . . . than those who are free of mental illness and substance 
abuse.”); Bruce G. Link et al., The Violent and Illegal Behavior of Mental Patients 
Reconsidered, 57 AM. SOC. REV. 275, 290 (1992) (“[T]he simple assertion that mental patients 
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disorder,313 as well as the relationship between symptoms such as 
delusions and hallucinations,314 on violent recidivism has been explored.  
The presence of neurological impairment,315 low intelligence,316 and 
and former mental patients are on average no more dangerous than nonpatients is 
incorrect.”).  Currently, researchers and clinicians concede there exists a “weak association” 
between mental illness and community violence but stress that other factors, for example, 
substance abuse, are much more strongly correlated with violent acts.  See John Monahan & 
Jean Arnold, Violence by People with Mental Illness: A Consensus Statement by Advocates 
and Researchers, 19 PSYCHIATRIC REHABILITATION J., Spring 1996, at 67, 70. 
313. Affective or mood disorders include depression, mania, and bipolar disorder.  
Researchers have reported an increase in the prevalence of mood disturbances in violent 
individuals.  See, e.g., Swanson et al., supra note 279, at 765 (“The prevalence of affective 
disorder was three times higher among respondents who were violent (9.37 percent) than 
among those who were not (2.95 percent).”); see also Renée L. Binder & Dale E. McNiel, 
Effects of Diagnosis and Context on Dangerousness, 145 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 728 (1988); 
Jerome A. Yesavage, Bipolar Illness: Correlates of Dangerous Inpatient Behaviour, 143 BRIT. 
J. PSYCHIATRY 554 (1983) (reporting correlations between violence and the manic phase of 
bipolar illness). 
314. The exploration of relationships between violence and delusional content is a 
relatively recent development in the literature.  Delusions and hallucinations occur while 
individuals are in an actively psychotic state and are defined as a pathological distortion in 
beliefs or sensory experiences.  Research suggests that delusions are the most widely 
experienced positive symptom of people with schizophrenia, with 90% of individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia experiencing delusions at some point during the course of their 
illness.  See, e.g., Pamela J. Taylor et al., Delusions and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL 
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 161, 165; Pamela J. 
Taylor et al., Handedness and Schizophrenic Symptoms, 55 BRIT. J. MED. PSYCHOL. 287 
(1982).  Preliminary research suggests an association between delusional content and 
violence.  See, e.g., John Junginger et al., Delusions and Symptom-Consistent Violence, 49 
PSYCHIATRIC SERV. 218, 220 (1998) (reporting results that suggest “evidence for a moderate 
risk that delusions would motivate violence at some time during the course of a violent 
subject’s illness”); see also J. Arturo Silva et al., Delusional Misidentification and 
Dangerousness: A Neurobiologic Hypothesis, 38 J. FORENSIC. SCI. 904 (1993).  Research 
efforts have been hampered, however, by the absence of a reliable and valid measure of 
delusional content.  MacArthur Risk Assessment Survey researchers have attempted to fill 
this void by developing the Maudsley Assessment Delusion Schedule (“MADS”).  See Taylor 
et al., Delusions and Violence, supra, at 178.  Initial research appears promising; however, the 
ability of this instrument to improve the predictive accuracy of violence prediction remains 
unknown. 
315. See, e.g., McNiel, supra note 305, at 684–85 (describing the association between 
head injury and aggressive behavior both in the first few days following the injury, and 
subsequently in the context of the irritability associated with post-injury personality change).  
He also reports data to suggest brain lesion in the temporal and orbitomedial part of the 
frontal lobe may elicit aggression.  Id.; see also Menahem Krakowski, Neurologic and 
Neuropsychologic Correlates of Violence, 27 PSYCHIATRIC ANNALS 674 (1997); Menahem I. 
Krakowski et al., Neurologic Impairment in Violent Schizophrenic Inpatients, 146 AM. J. 
PSYCHIATRY 849 (1989). 
316. See, e.g., MARTIN WOLFGANG ET AL., DELINQUENCY IN A BIRTH COHORT (1972) 
(describing the relationship between low intelligence and violence); Travis Hirschi & Michael 
J. Hindelang, Intelligence and Delinquency: A Revisionist Review, 42 AM. SOC. REV. 571 
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alcohol or substance abuse317 has also been correlated with violence.  
Research demonstrating the relationship between clinical variables and 
violence has been equivocal, and generally clinical variables are 
considered poorer predictors of violent recidivism than are the 
preceding categories.318  This may change, however, as methodological 
refinements in assessment instruments increase the ability to distinguish 
between violent and non-violent offenders. 
5. Situational/Contextual Variables 
A number of authors have strongly advocated for the use of 
situational factors to predict future violence.319  Home environment,320 
(1977) (describing the relationship between low intelligence and criminal behavior); Klassen 
& O’Connor, supra note 276 (predicting low intelligence to be related to violent recidivism). 
317. The association between alcohol or substance abuse and violence is a consistent 
finding throughout the studies reviewed.  See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147 
(reporting the correlation between alcohol abuse score and violent recidivism to be .13); 
Richard Heyman et al., Alcohol and Aggressive Personality Styles: Potentiators of Serious 
Physical Aggression Against Wives?, 9 J. FAM. PSYCHOL. 44, 52 (1995) (discussing the finding 
that “husbands’ problem drinking is significantly, albeit moderately, related to serious 
husband-to-wife aggression in young married couples”); Andrew Johns, Substance Misuse: A 
Primary Risk and a Major Problem of Comorbidity, 9 INT’L. REV. PSYCHIATRY 233, 235 
(1997) (asserting that “alcohol consumption is a major risk factor for violent offending” and 
that female substance abusers are equally likely to engage in violent acts as their male 
counterparts); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting a significant correlation 
between “assaultive when drinking or using drugs” and violent recidivism of .16); Swanson et 
al., supra note 279, at 765 (“Substance abuse was by far the most prevalent diagnosis among 
those who were violent; 41.64 percent had alcohol or drug abuse disorders, compared with 
only 4.93 percent of the nonviolent respondents.”). 
318. See Bonta et al., supra note 285, at 132 (reporting a mean effect size of -.03 for 
clinical variables, and concluding that many of the diagnostic categories were either unrelated 
to violence (mood disorders) or negatively related to violence (psychosis)).  But see Susanne 
Strand et al., Clinical and Risk Management Factors in Risk Prediction of Mentally Disordered 
Offenders—More Important Than Historical Data?, 4 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 
67, 74 (1999) (reporting results from a Swedish study of an actuarial instrument to predict 
violent recidivism in which clinical and risk management factors were more predictive of 
violent recidivism than were historical variables). 
319. See, e.g., Megargee, supra note 13, at 6 (opining that “knowledge of both 
personality and situational variables was essential for accurate prediction”). 
320. Research indicates that a chaotic home environment contributes to violent 
behavior.  See Sue E. Estroff & Catherine Zimmer, Social Networks, Social Support and 
Violence Among Persons with Severe, Persistent Mental Illness, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL 
DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 259, 259–60 (“Chaotic, 
violent family environments where there was alcohol or substance abuse, an ongoing history 
of conflict among family members, and a controlling atmosphere were associated with 
violence.”); Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 152 (reporting significant correlations 
between violent recidivism and measures of dissatisfaction and conflict in the home).  
Homeless, mentally ill individuals are also at increased risk of violence.  See, e.g., McNiel, 
supra note 305, at 687 (“Previous research has indicated that the mentally ill among the 
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quality of interpersonal relationships,321 social support,322 treatment 
compliance,323 and presence of therapeutic alliance324 have been 
investigated to determine their association with future violence.  Until 
recently, these variables had been excluded from research because they 
demand more frequent data collection and increasingly complex 
statistical analyses.325  Thus, findings regarding these variables are 
preliminary, and additional research is needed before a consensus 
concerning their impact on the predictive validity of violence prediction 
can be achieved. 
The explosion in second-generation violence prediction research 
resulted in a number of philosophical and methodological problems 
unanticipated by researchers, scholars, or commentators. 
D.  Methodological Problems of Second-Generation Research 
Arguably, the single most significant problem impacting this body of 
research is the failure of researchers to communicate or coordinate 
research efforts.326  Uniform definitions of predictor variables are 
homeless are more likely to engage in violent behavior and felonious criminal behavior.”). 
321. See, e.g., Klassen & O’Connor, supra note 283, at 151 (reporting significant 
correlations between violence and a number of interpersonal factors including “how long ago 
last sexual intercourse,” “dissatisfaction with siblings,” and “how long ago last relationship 
with a woman”). 
322. See Estroff & Zimmer, supra note 320, at 288, 291.  Estroff and Zimmer conclude 
that social supports are related to violence and suggest, “One way to think contextually about 
the risk for violence is to consider that the social network represents the opportunity to 
engage in violence, and social support or quality of relationships the source of provocation or 
perceived need for such behaviors,” but acknowledge that none of the instruments alone 
yielded information that was a reliable predictor in who would be violent.  Id. 
323. The impact of medication compliance on violent recidivism by psychotic patients 
has been established.  See, e.g., Alec Buchanan & Anthony David, Compliance and the 
Reduction of Dangerousness, 3 J. MENTAL HEALTH 427 (1994); Antonio Convit et al., 
Characteristics of Repeatedly Assaultive Psychiatric Inpatients, 41 HOSP. & COMMUNITY 
PSYCHIATRY 1112 (1990); Jerome A. Yesavage, Correlates of Dangerous Behavior by 
Schizophrenics in Hospital, 18 J. PSYCHIATRIC RES. 225 (1984). 
324. See Estroff & Zimmer, supra note 320, at 275 (reporting a significant bivariate 
relationship between involvement with mental health professionals and violence). 
325. See, e.g., Mossman, supra note 274, at 783–86 (describing the receiver operating 
characteristic (“ROC”) analysis to evaluate attempts to predict violence).  Asymptomatic 
receiver operating characteristic (“AROC”) methods describe accuracy “with indices of 
performance that are unaffected by base rates or by clinicians’ biases for or against Type I or 
Type II prediction errors.” Id.; see also QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 50–54. 
326. See John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman, Toward a Rejuvination of Risk 
Assessment Research, in VIOLENCE AND MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK 
ASSESSMENT, supra note 281, at 1, 12. 
 
This fragmentation of research efforts has seriously hindered the 
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virtually non-existent, follow-up periods vary considerably, and cross-
validation studies are rarely undertaken.327  Inconsistent findings result 
in reduced confidence in both the validity and generalizability of results. 
The absence of consensus concerning the appropriate measures for 
evaluation and communication of research findings is another 
impediment to the development of accuracy in violence prediction.328  
Failure to recognize a standard statistic for use in analyzing and 
reporting results has made comparison of research findings difficult, 
thereby suppressing discourse and debate among mental health 
professionals.329
development of knowledge of the actuarial correlates of violence.  The 
fact that each research site idiosyncratically defines its predictor and 
criterion variables and rarely replicates the measures used by others 
drastically reduces the confidence with which findings can be generalized 
and impedes the cumulative development of knowledge. 
 
Id. 
327. See, e.g., Norman G. Poythress, Expert Testimony on Violence and Dangerousness: 
Roles for Mental Health Professionals, 5 FORENSIC REP. 135, 143 (1992) (describing 
idiosyncratic predictor variables, limited cross-validation studies, and the need for larger 
sample, multisite research). 
328. The importance of a common metric to facilitate discourse cannot be understated.  
An increasing number of researchers have proposed abandoning the dichotomous predictions 
of the past and adopting receiver operating characteristic analysis.  See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., 
supra note 33; Douglas Mossman, Dangerousness Decisions: An Essay on the Mathematics of 
Clinical Violence Prediction and Involuntary Hospitalization, 2 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 
95, 99 (1995); Mossman, supra note 274, at 783; cf.  Stephen D. Hart et al., A Note on 
Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 695, 696 (1993) 
(describing problems with two-by-two contingency tables as a method of evaluating violence 
predictions). 
329. An illustrative example involves the way in which researchers have defined the 
false-positive rate as a measure of predictive accuracy.  In his influential monograph, 
Professor Monahan calculated the “percent false positives” in five first-generation studies.  
See MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 48.  He calculated this percent by first taking all cases 
predicted to be violent and determined the percentage correctly predicted (true positives) 
and the percentage incorrectly predicted (false positives).  See id.  He then divided the sum of 
the false-positives by the sum of the true-positives plus the false-positives and multiplied this 
sum by 100, resulting in the proportion of people predicted to be violent who were not violent 
at follow-up.  See id. 
 Professor Randy Otto summarized second-generation research initiated after 1981 and 
concluded that accuracy had improved.  See Otto, supra note 268.  He based this opinion on 
his calculation of false-positive error rates, a concept that is mathematically dissimilar from 
that used by Monahan.  Id.  Professor Otto divided the number of individuals predicted to be 
violent but not violent at outcome (i.e., the false positives) by the sum of the false-positives 
and the true-negatives—those people predicted to be non-violent who had not been violent at 
follow-up.  Id.  Monahan’s method yields higher figures than that of Otto and has led to 
confusion in the literature.  See also Hart et al., supra note 328, at 697; Douglas Mossman, 
Further Comments on Portraying the Accuracy of Violence Predictions, 18 LAW & HUM. 
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Reliance upon weak criterion measures,330 impoverished predictor 
variables,331 and constricted validation samples has also been identified 
as an ongoing methodological concern that must be addressed if 
substantial improvements in predictive accuracy are to occur.332
Methodological deficiencies notwithstanding, researchers have used 
information gleaned from projects examining the “cues,” or predictors 
of violence, to inform two very different methods of decision making.333  
In first-generation research, clinicians who were studied relied solely 
upon clinical judgment to identify dangerous offenders.  Proponents of 
this method have continued with efforts to inform clinical judgments by 
educating clinicians about potential variables’ predictive power and base 
rate estimates, then evaluating subsequent predictive efficiency of 
clinical judgments.334  Another contingent of investigators has combined 
the information gathered about individual predictors and used these 
cues to develop actuarial techniques335 in the effort to improve 
prediction accuracy.  An overview of the decision-making strategies and 
BEHAV. 587 (1994). 
330. A number of research studies have continued to rely on “official” measures of 
recidivism and thus are likely underestimating violent recidivism.  See, e.g., Menzies & 
Webster, supra note 305, at 769 (describing reliance upon re-arrest and hospitalization data).  
See generally Mulvey & Lidz, supra note 280 (discussing the ways to improve methodology 
and criterion variable measurement). 
331. The continued reluctance of researchers to include situational or contextual 
variables has contributed to this methodological deficiency. 
332. See John Monahan, Violence Prediction: The Past Twenty and the Next Twenty 
Years, 23 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 107, 115–17 (1996) (describing necessary advances, including 
“[a] rich array of theoretically chosen risk factors in multiple domains,” “[r]isk must be 
treated as a probability estimate that changes over time and context,” and “[l]arge and 
broadly representative samples of patients at multiple, coordinated sites must participate in 
the research”). 
333. “Clinical” judgment refers to the informal, intuitive means of combining 
information “in one’s head,” while “actuarial” refers to a more formal, explicit decision-
making strategy that combines data using a predetermined equation, table, or algorithm. 
334. See, e.g., William Gardner et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Predictions of Violence in 
Patients with Mental Illness, 64 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 602 (1996); Janofsky et 
al., supra note 276 (indicating that psychiatrists significantly under-predicted violent behavior 
in a group of inpatient admissions).  “We found the doctors had no ability to predict battery 
. . . .”  Janofsky et al., supra note 276, at 1093.  False-negative errors are unusual in clinical 
prediction literature and may have resulted from clinicians attempting to adjust their 
judgment to correspond with the relatively low base rate of violence for this population of 
voluntary inpatients.  A small sample of only forty-seven patients also likely contributed to 
the error.  See id. 
335. Actuarial methods also involve gathering information in a similar way but rely on 
variables that have been predetermined to have some statistical correlation with future 
violence.  These variables are then combined using a mathematical formula to produce a 
numerical probability that the individual will be violent during some specified time period. 
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their impact on accuracy follows. 
VI. CLINICAL PREDICTION 
Clinical judgment336 in the traditional sense involves the means by 
which clinicians aggregate the data they gather337 through personal 
interview or collateral sources concerning life history, psychometric test 
scores, and diagnostic impressions.338  The judgments derived from this 
method are often described as intuitive, and clinicians have rarely been 
asked to explicitly detail the processes by which they estimate risk.339  In 
336. It is important to note that first-generation research studies relied solely on clinical 
judgment for prediction decision-making.  Actuarial instruments were generated by second-
generation studies that identified variables correlated with violence.  It is also important to 
clarify that the term clinical judgment refers to the method of aggregating data and does not, 
as used by Meehl and others, “denote the judgments, inferences, observations, and practices 
of clinicians.”  See Drew Westen & Joel Weinberger, When Clinical Description Becomes 
Statistical Prediction, 59 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 595 (2004).  A separate body of research 
examines the accuracy of clinicians’ observations, thought processes, and diagnostic 
capabilities. 
337. While clinical and actuarial methods refer to the means for combining the data, a 
separate, but often misunderstood, issue involves the character of the data itself.  Information 
concerning the prediction of violence has been dichotomized into “hard” variables (those 
data that are relatively unambiguous and can be easily scored based on verifiable information 
such as age, number of prior arrests, sex, or marital status) and “soft” variables (usually 
nonpsychometric findings that may include diagnostic impressions, clinician ratings on 
psychometric instruments, or other qualitative judgments).  Methods that include only hard 
data are less susceptible to reliability challenges than those that incorporate soft factors.  
However, it is incorrect to assume that the decision-making strategy necessarily restricts the 
type of information used.  Many clinical and actuarial techniques use both hard and soft data 
in predicting dangerousness.  But cf. Slobogin, supra note 224, at 117–19 (describing “hard” 
actuarial data). 
338. See PAUL MEEHL, CLINICAL VERSUS STATISTICAL PREDICTION 3–4 (1954); 
William M. Grove & Paul E. Meehl, Comparative Efficiency of Informal (Subjective, 
Impressionistic) and Formal (Mechanical, Algorithmic) Prediction Procedures: The Clinical-
Statistical Controversy, 2 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 293, 294 (1996) (“[T]he other method 
relies on an informal, ‘in the head,’ impressionistic, subjective conclusion, reached (somehow) 
by a human clinical judge.” (describing clinical judgment)); Westen & Weinberger, supra note 
336, at 595 (“Although psychologists have revisited the question of clinical versus statistical 
prediction many times since Meehl’s book, . . . the weight of the evidence remains the same as 
it was in 1954: In the vast majority of studies, a good formula matches or trumps an intuitive 
clinical soothsayer . . . .”). 
339. See Mossman, supra note 328, at 100 (reporting what he considers a non-
controversial assumption that the “clinical decision process that is often governed by implicit 
assumptions or unconscious heuristics”); Alec Buchanan, Risk and Dangerousness, 29 
PSYCHOL. MED. 465, 466–67 (1999) (“Clinicians, on the other hand, are seldom required to 
describe in detail the processes by which they estimate risk.”).  Empirical research suggests 
that we have very little awareness of factors that influence our judgments.  See, e.g., Eugene 
F. Gauron & John K. Dickinson, Diagnostic Decision Making in Psychiatry, 14 ARCHIVES OF 
GEN. PSYCHIATRY 225 (1966); Richard E. Nisbett & Timothy D. Wilson, Telling More Than 
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this method, the focus is on the unique features of the individual for 
whom predictions are being made beyond the individual’s membership 
in a broad class or classes.340
Historically, clinicians have pointed to their experience and training 
as justification for claims of accuracy concerning predictions of 
dangerousness; in fact, the presumption that expertise is developed 
through experience and training has long been accepted by the general 
public and the judiciary alike.341  Nonetheless, empirical research has 
failed to demonstrate the relationship between experience and expertise 
on virtually any prediction task.342  Rather, actuarial methods have 
consistently outperformed human judgment.343
To understand the reasons why clinical prediction and, specifically, 
violence determinations present such a formidable challenge, it is 
important to explore the impediments to accurate clinical judgment.  
We Can Know: Verbal Reports on Mental Processes, 84 PSYCHOL. REV. 231 (1977). 
 “Heuristics” is a phrase coined by cognitive psychologists to “refer[] to implicit thinking 
devices that individuals use to oversimplify complex, information-processing tasks.”  See 
Mossman, supra note 328, at 100 n.32.  Use of these procedures often leads to “systematically 
erroneous decisions.” Id.  For an overview of heuristics and their impact on accurate decision 
making, see also HOWARD N. GARB, STUDYING THE CLINICIAN: JUDGMENT RESEARCH 
AND PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSESSMENT 182–206 (1998), and infra note 352 and accompanying 
text. 
340. See DAWES, supra note 19. 
341. See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes, Experience and Validity of Clinical Judgments: The 
Illusory Correlation, 7 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 457, 458 (1989) (“It was simply obvious to everyone 
involved (except me) that clinical experience was a sound basis for clinical judgment and that 
personal contact with people is the sine qua non for understanding what they are like.”); see 
also Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637 (D.C. Cir. 1962). 
342. See, e.g., JERRY S. WIGGINS, PERSONALITY AND PREDICTION: PRINCIPLES OF 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 131–35 (1973); AM. PSYCHOLOGICAL ASSOC., REPORT OF THE 
TASK FORCE ON THE EVALUATION OF EDUCATION, TRAINING AND SERVICE IN 
PSYCHOLOGY (1982) (noting that there is no evidence that professional training and 
experience are related to professional competence); Harold N. Garb, Clinical Judgment, 
Clinical Training, and Professional Experience, 105 PSYCHOL. BULL. 387 (1989) (concluding 
that there is no relationship between years of clinical experience and accuracy of judgment). 
343. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 296–300.  These authors performed a meta-
analysis of the existing prediction literature, and “[o]f the 136 studies [included in the 
analyses], 64 favored the [actuarial methods], 64 showed approximately equivalent [results], 
and 8 favored the clinician[’s judgments].”  Id. at 298.  This discrepancy occurred in spite of 
the fact that a majority of the research favored the clinician by providing them with more data 
than used in the actuarial method.  Id. at 299.  No pattern emerged concerning the small 
number of studies favoring the human judges, and, in fact, fewer studies favored the clinician 
than would be expected by chance.  See id.  Earlier empirical analysis of this body of literature 
reported remarkably similar results.  See also Janus & Meehl, supra note 11, at 48–49 
(“[C]linical judgment is at best as good as, but often worse than, actuarial methods.”).  See 
generally MICHAEL WIERZBICKI, ISSUES IN CLINICAL PSYCHOLOGY: SUBJECTIVE VERSUS 
OBJECTIVE APPROACHES (1993). 
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Clinical prediction of violence is a complex task that involves a two-part 
process of identifying relevant risk factors or variables within the 
information provided and then assigning the appropriate weight to those 
factors within the prediction task.344  “People . . . have great difficulty 
combining qualitatively distinct” variables with knowledge about the 
distributions and the predictability of each predictor.345  Research into 
these processes has led Paul Meehl to conclude, “There are no strong 
arguments . . . for believing that human beings can assign optimal 
weights in equations subjectively or that they apply their own weights 
consistently . . . .”346
Cognitive psychologists have identified many specific impediments 
to the decision-making process;347 for example, preconceived notions or 
344. See Buchanan, supra note 339, at 466. 
345. See DAWES, supra note 19, at 99–100; Robyn M. Dawes, Probabilistic Versus 
Causal Thinking, in THINKING CLEARLY ABOUT PSYCHOLOGY 235, 252–61 (Dante Cicchetti 
& William M. Grove eds., 1991). 
346. Paul E. Meehl, Causes and Effects of My Disturbing Little Book, 50 J. 
PERSONALITY ASSESSMENT 370, 372 (1986).  A significant majority of academic and research 
psychologists have accepted Dr. Meehl’s argument, first articulated in the 1950s.  See, e.g., 
Judith V. Becker & William D. Murphy, What We Know and Do Not Know About Assessing 
and Treating Sex Offenders, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 116, 124 (1998) (“We do not want 
to belabor the point, but, as Meehl pointed out in his classic text, actuarial prediction 
continues to outperform clinical prediction.”) (citations omitted); Eugene W. Wang & 
Pamela M. Diamond, Empirically Identifying Factors Related to Violence Risk in Corrections, 
17 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 377, 377 (1999) (“However, ‘informal’ (clinical, subjective, 
impressionistic) predictions have historically been extremely poor in all domains, including 
aggression.”); Hart et al., supra note 328, at 696 (1993) (“In the context of psycholegal 
assessments, unwillingness to qualify one’s confidence in violence predictions or failure to 
make probabilistic statements regarding the likelihood of future violence is, at best, poor 
practice; at worst, it is simply unethical.”); Monahan & Steadman, supra note 326. 
 Nevertheless, commentators have acknowledged the failure of practitioners and 
clinicians to accept these assumptions concerning clinical judgment.  See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER 
D. WEBSTER ET AL., THE HCR-20 SCHEME: THE ASSESSMENT OF DANGEROUSNESS AND 
RISK v (1995) (“The great challenge in what remains of the 1990’s is to integrate the almost 
separate worlds of research on the prediction of violence and the clinical practice of 
assessment.  At present the two domains scarcely intersect.”); see also Randy Borum, 
Improving the Clinical Practice of Violence Risk Assessment: Technology, Guidelines, and 
Training, 51 AM. PSYCHOL. 945, 947 (1996) (describing the failure to incorporate research 
findings into a “useful, empirically based framework for clinical assessment”); Christopher D. 
Webster & David Cox, Integration of Nomothetic and Ideographic Positions in Risk 
Assessment: Implications for Practice and the Education of Psychologists and Other Mental 
Health Professionals, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 1245, 1246 (1997) (describing the difficulties in 
achieving the true “scientist-practitioner”). 
347. See Hal R. Arkes, Impediments to Accurate Clinical Judgment and Possible Ways to 
Minimize Their Impact, 49 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 323 (1981); Michael J. Saks 
& Robert F. Kidd, Human Information Processing and Adjudication: Trial by Heuristics, 15 L. 
& SOC’Y REV. 123, 130 (1980–1981). 
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expectancies have been demonstrated to impede accurate processing of 
information by experienced clinicians.348  Additional research indicates 
that preconceived notions also influence the perception of current data, 
as opposed to recalled data.349
Overconfidence,350 hindsight bias,351 and the inability to assess 
covariation accurately352 have all been identified as obstacles to accurate 
prediction.  Although some recommendations concerning methods of 
348. See Loren J. Chapman & Jean P. Chapman, Genesis of Popular but Erroneous 
Psycho-Diagnostic Observations, 72 J. ABNORMAL PSYCHOL. 193 (1967) (presenting drawings 
paired randomly with personality traits, presumably characteristic of the individual who drew 
the picture).  Subjects fabricated illusory correlations between drawing features and 
personality traits (for example, large eyes were reportedly drawn by suspicious people).  Id. at 
194.  Researchers proposed that the illusory correlations were influenced by a prior 
association between eyes and suspicion.  Id. 
349. See Arkes, supra note 347, at 325. 
 
It is quite likely that all subsequent data gleaned from the client will be 
biased by whatever opinions have been formed during this brief initial 
period.  Data consistent with the tentative diagnosis will be given added 
credence; data inconsistent with the hypothesis will be disregarded.  The 
fact that the initial hypothesis or diagnosis is merely tentative does not 
decrease its biasing influence. 
 
Id.; see also Lee Ross et al., Social Explanation and Social Expectation: Effects of Real and 
Hypothetical Explanations on Subjective Likelihood, 35 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
817 (1977). 
350. Research has consistently demonstrated the significant overconfidence clinicians 
have in their diagnoses.  See, e.g., Stuart Oskamp, Overconfidence in Case-Study Judgments, 
29 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 261 (1965) (suggesting that providing a judge with more 
information increases confidence without necessarily increasing accuracy); see also James 
Quintar Holsopple & Joseph G. Phelan, The Skills of Clinicians in Analysis of Projective 
Tests, 10 J. CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 307, 316 (1954) (reporting that the most confident judges tend 
to be the least accurate). 
351. This refers to the tendency of judges, when provided information about a certain 
outcome, to rate the probability that they would have predicted that outcome substantially 
higher than if they had had no information concerning the outcome.  See Arkes, supra note 
347, at 326 (describing this phenomenon); see also Baruch Fischhoff, Hindsight ≠ Foresight: 
The Effect of Outcome Knowledge on Judgment Under Uncertainty, 1 J. EXPERIMENTAL 
PSYCHOL.: HUM. PERCEPTION & PERFORMANCE 288 (1975). 
352. See Arkes, supra note 347, at 323 (describing the tendency of judges who are 
interested in a particular symptom to only attend to those individuals who have the symptom 
and either do or do not develop the disease).  However, in order to make an accurate 
determination concerning whether or not the symptom is related to the disease, the clinician 
must also look to the number of cases in which the symptom is absent and the disease does or 
does not occur.  Only by considering all four groups can the hypothesis—that the symptom is 
predictive of the disease in this case—be adequately tested.  See GARB, supra note 339 
(providing an excellent discussion of cognitive biases, heuristics, and knowledge structures 
that affect the accuracy of clinical judgment, as well as identifying the representative, 
availability, anchoring and adjustment, and past-behavior heuristics). 
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rehabilitating clinical judgment have been proposed,353 a recent review 
of the judgment research has failed to demonstrate judgment accuracy 
equivalent or superior to actuarial methods.354
Proponents of the clinical judgment method have articulated a 
number of responses to critics who suggest abandoning this model.355  
Perhaps the most frequently cited argument has become known as the 
“broken leg countervailings” phenomenon.356  Specifically, clinicians 
argue that, by virtue of their training and experience,357 they are 
uniquely qualified to assess the idiosyncratic factors that alter violence 
and subsequently incorporate these variables into the final 
determination of risk.358  Philosophical problems concerning the 
legitimacy of predicting ideographic outcome from nomothetic data 
have also been acknowledged.359  The convincing argument that 
unambiguous “facts” are rarely present in the prediction of human 
behavior, especially when coupled with the failure of empirical results to 
demonstrate improved efficacy in clinical prediction despite their ability 
to attend to these variables, has remained unanswered.360
353. Arkes, supra note 347, at 327–29 (suggesting that clinicians receive additional 
instruction in Bayesian statistics and reduce their reliance on memory, which leads to illusory 
correlations becoming more pronounced); see also David Faust & Jay Ziskin, The Expert 
Witness in Psychology and Psychiatry, 241 SCI. 31, 34 (1988). 
354. See Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320 (referring to clinical judgment as the 
“less efficient of two prediction procedures”). 
355. See, e.g., Hillel J. Einhorn, Accepting Error to Make Less Error, 50 J. PERSONALITY 
ASSESSMENT 387, 388–89 (1986); Thomas R. Litwack et al., The Assessment of Dangerousness 
and Predictions of Violence: Recent Research and Future Prospects, 64 PSYCHIATRIC Q. 245, 
262–69 (1993); Mossman, supra note 274, at 783. 
356. See MEEHL, supra note 338, at 25 (using an analogy to acknowledge that clinicians 
can detect statistically rare events—such as a broken leg—that would significantly alter the 
probability of an event, yet fail to be detected by an actuarial instrument).  But see QUINSEY 
ET AL., supra note 33, at 181 (rejecting the assertion that detection of “unique psychological 
qualities” justifies abandonment of actuarial techniques). 
357. See supra notes 341–42 and accompanying text. 
358. DAWES, supra note 19, at 79 (asserting that “professional psychologists claim to be 
able to make predictions about individuals that transcend predictions abut ‘people in general’ 
or about various categories of people”); Lisa Tsoi Hoshmand & Donald E. Polkinghorne, 
Redefining the Science-Practice Relationship & Professional Training, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 55, 60 
(1992) (reporting that experts’ knowledge is comprised of practice and experience that 
“involves accommodating previous understanding to the uniqueness of a particular clinical 
situation”). 
359. See, e.g., QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 180 (“People routinely use information 
about groups to make individual decisions.”); Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 305 (making 
the point that while actuarial or statistical prediction is, by nature, probabilistic rather than 
deterministic, statistical information can inform decision-making). 
360. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 181 (rejecting the “broken leg 
countervailings” argument and providing anecdotal evidence of a case in which a serious 
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Others have argued that appropriate actuarial formulas do not exist 
for the population of offenders for which they make predictions,361 that 
their skill as clinicians is greater than that of clinicians participating in 
the prediction research,362 or that actuarial instruments have not been 
sufficiently evaluated to justify widespread use.363  The debate continues 
to rage concerning the appropriateness of clinical judgment as a 
prediction strategy.364  In spite of these concerns, reliance on clinical 
physical disability—blindness—failed to incapacitate a released offender as clinicians had 
predicted, and the legally blind offender committed murder). 
361. This argument is based on the notion that the “slight nonoptimality of beta 
coefficients or other statistical parameters due to validity generalization . . . would liquidate 
the superiority of the actuarial over the impressionistic method.”  Grove & Meehl, supra note 
338, at 301–02 (suggesting that “it does not make mathematical sense for those predictive 
tasks where the actuarial method’s superiority is rather strong”).  Grove and Meehl conclude 
that if an actuarial equation predicts something with 20% greater accuracy than clinicians, 
and there are “no affirmative reason[s] for thinking that one’s patient group is extremely 
unlike all other psychiatric outpatients, . . . it is improbable . . . that a decrement of [even] 
10% for the actuarial method will reduce its efficacy to the level of the clinicians.”  Id. at 302. 
 Others have suggested that it is unethical to apply a prediction scheme to one’s clients 
without validation; however, this argument is illogical if one accepts that clinical prediction 
relies on invalidated anecdotal evidence in the same circumstance.  Id. (“Clinical experience is 
only a prestigious synonym for anecdotal evidence when the anecdotes are told by somebody 
with a professional degree and a license to practice a healing art.”). 
362. The underlying basis for this argument is professional arrogance.  Research studies 
examined professional judgment from some of the most well-respected clinicians, often by 
those who specialized in performing these kinds of assessments, and failed to demonstrate 
greater accuracy than actuarial methods.  Clinicians who use this argument should be 
challenged to produce empirical evidence of their claim or recognize that they will be 
discounted. 
363. See supra notes 191–212 and accompanying text for a discussion of the validation of 
actuarial instruments.  Additionally, the logic of this argument fails to demonstrate 
superiority of clinical judgment unless the clinician in question has performed some kind of 
outcome assessment to determine the validity of his clinical judgment; otherwise, the accuracy 
of both types of decision-making models remains unknown. 
364. See, e.g., Kirk Heilbrun et al., Sexual Offending: Linking Assessment, Intervention, 
and Decision Making, 4 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL. & L. 138, 152 (1998) (describing the “early 
debate on clinical versus statistical prediction, for which research has convincingly 
demonstrated the superiority of actuarial prediction across a range of studies”) (citations 
omitted); Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320 (“To use the less efficient of two prediction 
procedures in dealing with such matters is not only unscientific and irrational, it is unethical.” 
(referring to clinical judgment)); Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 13, at 623–29 (suggesting 
that clinicians should avoid dichotomous, yes-no predictions of dangerousness and should 
instead attempt to make actuarially based risk assessments); cf. Litwack et al., supra note 355, 
at 262 (rejecting research that has questioned the legitimacy of clinical assessments of 
dangerousness and instead asserting that “[w]e believe that any such conclusions would be 
seriously misguided and would reflect a misreading of the actual findings—and lack of 
findings—of recent (and prior) research”); Buchanan, supra note 339, at 468 (“Mathematical 
methods have yet to provide clinicians with information of a quality to challenge the clinical 
judgment.”). 
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judgment has historically been the normative method of decision 
making in violence predictions.365
VII.  ACTUARIAL PREDICTION 
Actuarial or statistical methods involve the use of automatic decision 
rules to determine probabilities.366  Variables that have been statistically 
correlated with violence in the past are used to predict future violent 
acts.367  Information regarding the subjects’ response to these variables is 
entered into an equation that produces a predicted likelihood of 
violence for that individual.368  Therefore, the resultant probability 
figure is a function of the degree of correspondence between his profile 
on previously identified factors and that of similar persons whose level 
of violence had been previously determined.369
Critics of the actuarial method have generally focused on its 
“inflexibility” or failure to consider important, case-specific 
information;370 however, consideration of these factors has failed to 
demonstrate substantial improvements in predictive accuracy.371
A third type of decision making involves using actuarial prediction 
to inform or anchor clinical prediction.372  Proponents of actuarial 
365. Cf. William Gardner et al., A Comparison of Actuarial Methods for Identifying 
Repetitively Violent Patients with Mental Illnesses, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 35, 35 (1996) 
(“[B]ut in practice actuarial methods seem to be used rarely.”). 
366. See MEEHL, supra note 338, at 3 (“The mechanical combining of information for 
classification purposes, and the resultant probability figure which is an empirically 
determined relative frequency, are the characteristics that define the actuarial or statistical 
type of prediction.”). 
367. Regression is the most common type of equation for prediction. In this method the 
identified variables are first converted into a numeric form.  Predictions are then made by 
using the regression equation to develop weighted averages of the numbers.  These weights 
are chosen to yield the best possible prediction of future violence.  See, e.g., Buchanan, supra 
note 339, at 466; DAWES, supra note 19, at 80–81. 
368. See Stephen D. Gottfredson & Don M. Gottfredson, Violence Prediction Methods: 
Statistical and Clinical Strategies, 3 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 303, 308–11 (1988) (describing the 
more commonly used statistical methods of prediction including additive linear models, 
clustering models, and multidimensional contingency table analysis). 
369. Actuarial instruments assume that errors will be made and work to reduce that 
error to the smallest possible percentage.  Similarly, they cannot predict whether a particular 
individual will commit another violent offense, but they can offer an estimate of the increased 
likelihood that persons with similar characteristics have engaged in violence in the past. 
370. See, e.g., Buchanan, supra note 339, at 468; Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 
368, at 313.  Note that this argument is essentially the “broken leg countervailings” rephrased.  
See supra notes 356–60 and accompanying text. 
371. See generally Grove & Meehl, supra note 338. 
372. See, e.g., MONAHAN, supra note 250, at 81–90 (suggesting clinicians improve 
predictive accuracy by using statistical data); Gottfredson & Gottfredson, supra note 368, at 
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prediction who contend that introducing unaided clinical judgment into 
the prediction invariably reduces predictive accuracy have rejected this 
“hybrid” method.373
A.  Overview of the Judgment Literature 
Second-generation research has attempted to demonstrate improved 
efficacy in clinical judgment with mixed results.  Jeffrey Janofsky and his 
colleagues evaluated psychiatric predictions of violence in patients 
admitted voluntarily to a university-based inpatient unit.374  Results 
indicated that physicians demonstrated no ability to predict battery or 
suicide in their patients.375
Dale McNiel and Renée Binder assessed the accuracy of short-term 
clinical predictions of the potential for violence by physician and nursing 
staff.376  They concluded that staff demonstrated a moderate ability to 
accurately categorize patient risk but conceded that overprediction of 
violence continued to influence outcome.377
In a unique study, researchers at the University of Pittsburgh School 
of Medicine compared an actuarial method to clinical judgment of 
dangerousness.378  Patients presented at a psychiatric emergency room 
were evaluated independently by clinicians and followed for six months 
in the community following discharge.379  An actuarial instrument 
assessing correlates of violence was also completed using information 
318 (“[P]rediction may be improved through a combined use of methods.”). 
373. The ability of clinical adjustments to improve on the predictive accuracy of an 
actuarial prediction instrument depends upon the amount of remaining variance after the 
actuarial method is used, and how accurately clinicians can deal with the residual 
individuating information.  Little evidence supports an optimistic point of view.  See 
QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 65. 
374. See Janofsky et al., supra note 276, at 1091–94.  Following an intake interview that 
included historical and demographic data, as well as a mental status exam, psychiatrists 
predicted whether the patient would engage in battery or threatening or suicidal behavior 
over the course of the next seven days.  Id. at 1091. 
375. Id. at 1093.  Researchers reported a slight correlation between predictions and 
subsequent threatening behavior, although the increased frequency of this behavior likely 
accounts for the correlation.  Id. 
376. See McNiel & Binder, supra note 278.  Upon admission, nurses and physicians 
independently ranked the potential for violence of the patient using an overt aggression scale.  
Id. at 1319.  Although the authors report a moderate level of reliability for predictions, they 
acknowledge that “probability estimates appeared to overpredict the rate of inpatient 
violence.”  Id. at 1320. 
377. Id. at 1320. 
378. See Gardner et al., supra note 365. 
379. Gardner et al., supra note 334, at 602. 
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from the patients’ medical records, along with interview data.380  
Statistical analysis indicated that the actuarial instruments resulted in 
significantly lower false-positive and false-negative rates than clinical 
judgment.381
B.  Development of Actuarial Instruments 
The Dangerous Behavior Rating Scheme382 (“DBRS”) has been 
recognized as the first systematic attempt to develop an actuarial 
instrument to predict future violence.383  Based partially on a theoretical 
framework developed by Edwin Megargee,384 the semi-structured 
interview included personality attributes, situational factors, and 
perceived facilitators and inhibitors of violence.385  Researchers were 
able to achieve only modest correlations with future violence, however, 
and were generally pessimistic about the possibility of predicting future 
violence.386
McNiel and Binder developed a screening checklist for assessing the 
380. Id. at 602–03. 
381. Id. at 609.  Researchers compared clinical judgment to actuarial predictions using 
the Receiver Operating Characteristic Curve Analysis and concluded, “Even simple actuarial 
models, such as those presented here, are substantially more accurate than unaided clinical 
prediction.”  Id. 
382. See Robert Menzies et al., The Dimensions of Dangerousness Revisited: Assessing 
Forensic Predictions About Violence, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 2–4 (1994). 
383. See Borum, supra note 346, at 948–49. 
384. See Megargee, supra note 13. 
385. See Menzies et al., supra note 382, at 10 tbl.2 (including passive aggressive, hostility, 
anger, rage, emotionality, guilt, capacity for empathy, capacity for change, self-perception of 
dangerousness, control over actions, tolerance, emotional stress, environmental support, 
dangerousness increased with alcohol, dangerousness increased with drugs, and 
manipulative).  This instrument has been considered a “hybrid” model, as it included both 
clinical and actuarial components.  See also John Kip Cornwell, Confining Mentally 
Disordered “Super Criminals”: A Realignment of Rights in the Nineties, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 651, 
713 (1996). 
386. Menzies et al., supra note 382, at 17–18 & tbl.5 (reporting correlations between 
DBRS and violence at one to six years ranging from .10 to .20, leading researchers to 
conclude, “the accuracy of both single-item and scalar predictions, as with the original study, 
remained decidedly unimpressive when validated against aggregate general incidents, 
criminal charges, and violent transactions”).  The researchers went on to opine that in the 
1990s, there remains “a dearth of statistically verifiable and clinically operational assessment 
criteria.”  Id. at 25.  This failure to achieve improvements in predictive accuracy may be a 
result of the instruments’ reliance upon clinical or impressionistic type data that have not 
been correlated with violence in the past.  See Borum, supra note 346, at 948–49 (suggesting 
that the failure to operationalize item definitions may also have contributed to error in the 
instrument). 
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risk of violence at the time of psychiatric admission.387  Using a simple 
equally weighted linear model,388 they developed a five-item 
instrument389 that demonstrated some predictive accuracy in 
distinguishing between violent and non-violent offenders.390
In one of the largest, most comprehensive studies of actuarial 
prediction methods to date, Canadian researchers developed the 
Violent Risk Appraisal Guide (“VRAG”).391  Hailed by Professor 
Monahan as “[a] major advance in the development of actuarial risk 
assessment,”392 the instrument was developed on a combined sample of 
offenders, half of whom were admitted for treatment in a maximum 
security psychiatric institution, and half of whom were admitted only for 
a brief pretrial assessment.393  Participants were 618 serious offenders, 
387. See Dale E. McNiel & Renée L. Binder, Screening for Risk of Inpatient Violence: 
Validation of an Actuarial Tool, 18 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 579 (1994). 
388. See Robyn M. Dawes, The Robust Beauty of Improper Linear Models in Decision 
Making, 34 AM. PSYCHOL. 571 (1979) (contending that in many clinical situations, “improper” 
linear models, in which each variable is weighted equally, typically perform almost as well as 
“proper” linear models and require much simpler calculations).  Proponents of actuarial 
methods have generally considered the more complex calculations an obstacle to clinical 
utilization of actuarial prediction.  See, e.g., Gardner et al., supra note 365, at 35–36 
(describing obstacles to the clinical use of actuarial methods).  “First, clinicians may be averse 
to actuarial predictions because the calculations required by, for example, a regression-based 
method may be hard to understand and hard to perform in a clinical setting.”  Id.  Thus, any 
method to simplify the approach may result in wider acceptance of the method. 
389. By combining clinical judgment and research, the authors selected the following 
five items: (1) “History of physical attacks and/or fear-inducing behavior within two weeks 
before admission”; (2) “Absence of suicidal behavior (attempts, gestures, or threats within 
two weeks before admission)”;  (3) “Schizophrenic or manic diagnosis”;  (4) “Male gender”; 
and (5) “Currently married or living together.”  Each item was phrased so that a positive 
answer would increase the probability of violence (scored “one”) “whereas a negative answer 
was scored as a ‘zero.’”  McNiel & Binder, supra note 387, at 581. 
 Interestingly, several of these items appear to have tapped variables whose relationship 
to violence remains less than clear.  For example, female inpatients with serious psychiatric 
diagnoses have, in some studies, engaged in violence at about the same rates as their male 
counterparts.  See Johns, supra note 317, at 235. 
390. “When the outcome variable was limited to physical attacks, the screening checklist 
had a sensitivity of 55.0%, a specificity of 64.0%, a false positive rate of 67.9%, a false 
negative rate of 18.0%, a positive predictive value of 41.1%, a negative predictive value of 
82.1%, and a total predictive value of 61.8%.  The likelihood ratio was 1.52.  The screening 
checklist had a 25.0% relative improvement over chance in classifying which patients would 
become physically assaultive.  McNiel & Binder, supra note 387, at 583. 
391. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33; Harris et al., supra note 287. 
392. See Monahan, supra note 332, at 113. 
393. Constructing the sample in this way allows researchers some latitude in generalizing 
results to both forensic psychiatric patients as well as non-mentally disordered offenders who 
may be referred to forensic clinicians for assessment of dangerousness or pretrial assessments.  
See Harris et al., supra note 287, at 317–19. 
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85% of whom had been charged with at least one violent offense.394  The 
outcome or criterion variable was defined as “any new criminal charge 
for a violent offense.”395  Initially, researchers began with approximately 
fifty predictor variables396 and examined univariate correlation for each 
predictor.397  A least squares stepwise multiple regression was used to 
select variables that contributed independently to the prediction of 
violent recidivism.398  Twelve variables399 remained in the prediction 
equation that calculated weighted variables on their deviation from the 
base rate.400  Scores on the VRAG ranged from B28 to +33, with scores 
divided into nine groups or “bins” of eight points each.  With an average 
follow-up of 81.5 months, the instruments’ classification accuracy was 
76%.401  In numerous replication studies, the VRAG continued to 
394. Generalizability is limited, however, to those with serious criminal histories, and 
“cannot be expected to generalize to offenders with less serious criminal histories or, of 
course, to persons without any criminal conduct.”  Id. at 320. 
395. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 142 (defining violent offense as: “homicide, 
attempted homicide, kidnapping, forcible confinement, wounding, assault causing bodily 
harm, . . .  rape,” “armed robbery,” and all sexual assaults involving physical contact). 
396. Including “sociodemographic . . . (e.g., socioeconomic status, age, marital status, 
educational attainment, employment history); childhood problems (e.g., DSM-III conduct 
disorder items, [intact biological family until age sixteen], criminal history of parents and 
siblings, [etc.]); adult adjustment ([e.g.], psychiatric history, criminal record, . . . alcohol use, 
social supports . . . ); characteristics of the index offense (e.g., offender’s relationship to the 
victim, . . . weapon used, sex of victim, motive for the index offense); and psychological 
assessment variables (e.g., IQ, MMPI results, Level of Supervision . . . items, . . . PCL-R score, 
[etc.]),” and clinical variables (e.g., expression or remorse, “insight,” etc).  See id. at 143. 
397. Variables without a significant univariate correlation were dropped from 
consideration.  In the few pairs of variables that were highly correlated, such as a prior 
criminal charge and prior convictions for violent offense, the variable with the lower 
correlation to violent recidivism was dropped.  Id. at 145–46. 
398. Id. at 146 (conceding that more sophisticated statistical modeling such as event 
history analyses, for example, which take into account the length of time until recidivism, 
exist; however, application of these models found few differences in the final predictor list 
that was generated by the simpler method); see Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Cross-
Validation and Extension of the Violence Risk Appraisal Guide for Child Molesters and 
Rapists, 21 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 231, 231–32 (1997). 
399. The variables were: Revised Psychopathy Checklist Score (.34); elementary school 
maladjustment (.31); meets DSM-III criteria for any personality disorder (.26); age at the time 
of index offense (-.26); separation from either parent (except death) under age 16 (.25); 
failure on prior conditional release (.24); nonviolent offense history score (using the Cormier-
Lang scale) (.20); never married or equivalent (.18); meets DSM-III criteria for schizophrenia 
(-.17); most serious victim injury (from index offense) (-.16); alcohol abuse score (.13); and 
female victim in the index offense (-.11).  See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 147. 
400. See J. NUFFIELD, PAROLE DECISION-MAKING IN CANADA: RESEARCH TOWARDS 
DECISION GUIDELINES (1982) (discussing the method of anchoring weights to deviations 
from base rate response). 
401. No other instrument has reported such a high degree of predictive accuracy.  
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perform well with no appreciable decrement in predictive validity.402  
Perhaps the most significant concern related to the VRAG is the failure 
of independent clinicians and researchers to demonstrate validity of the 
instrument; however, the instrument’s accuracy has been robust, and 
without an “affirmative reason” for why the instrument would not 
apply, its application to other serious offender populations appears 
justified. 
A second instrument, the HCR-20, is a violence risk assessment 
scheme that the authors contend has potential applicability to a variety 
of settings.403  The HCR-20 assesses past, present, and future indicators 
of risk and includes empirically derived factors to assess both static and 
dynamic variables associated with increased violence.  The ten historical 
factors include items related to criminal history, demographic and case 
history, and individual disposition (including psychopathy) that are 
relatively immutable,404 while the five clinical items are intended to 
reflect current, dynamic correlates of violence,405 and the five risk 
management items address environmental, post-assessment factors that 
may either aggravate or mitigate risk.406  Research in a variety of settings 
suggests that the HCR-20 demonstrated predictive utility with a variety 
of groups, including male and female civil psychiatric patients,407 forensic 
Additionally, the instrument enables clinicians to provide specific numerical probabilities or 
range of values, along with normative information about how this individual’s risk score 
compares to other offenders.  Thus, clinicians using this instrument can avoid the ethically 
questionable practice of providing testimony in conclusory terms, see, e.g., Grisso & 
Appelbaum, supra note 13; Poythress, supra note 327, but can instead leave the 
determination of the appropriate level of risk to require intervention up to individuals elected 
or appointed to do so. 
402. See, e.g., Marnie E. Rice & Grant T. Harris, Violent Recidivism: Assessing 
Predictive Validity, 63 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 737 (1995); Rice & Harris, 
supra note 398 (considering this study to be a cross-validation study in that it evaluated sexual 
offenders not previously included in the construction sample); Vernon Quinsey et al., 
Actuarial Prediction of Sexual Recidivism, 10 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 85 (1995).  But 
see QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33, at 153–55 (failing to recommend use of the VRAG with 
fire setters without additional empirical study). 
403. See WEBSTER ET AL., supra note 346; see also CHRISTOPHER WEBSTER ET AL., 
HCR-20: ASSESSING THE RISK FOR VIOLENCE (VERSION 2) (1997). 
404. The ten historical factors are: previous violence, young age at first offense, 
relationship instability, employment problems, substance use problems, major mental illness, 
psychopathy, early maladjustment, personality disorder, and prior supervision failure.  
WEBSTER, supra note 403. 
405. The five clinical items are: lack of insight, negative attitudes, active symptoms of 
major mental illness, impulsivity, and unresponsive to treatment.  Id. 
406. The five risk management items are: plans lack feasibility, exposure to destabilizers, 
lack of personal support, noncompliance with remediation attempts, and stress.  Id. 
407. See, e.g., Kevin S. Douglas et al., Assessing Risk for Violence Among Psychiatric 
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psychiatric patients,408 and incarcerated offenders;409 however, more 
recent research findings have suggested that the HCR-20’s predictive 
accuracy diminishes in restrictive settings.410  In summary, the HCR-20 
has been praised for its empirical basis, operationally defined coding 
system, and practical use,411 but critics note that a majority of the 
research studies using the HCR-20 have been conducted abroad, and 
thus, questions remain about the applicability of findings to U.S. 
offenders. 
C.  Summary and Conclusions 
Empirical evidence fails to support that clinicians can predict 
violence in either an inpatient or community setting with accuracy 
equivalent to or exceeding simple actuarial instruments.412  We agree 
with William Grove and Paul Meehl’s suggestion that “a practitioner 
Patients: The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme and the Psychopathy Checklist: 
Screening Version, 67 J. CONSULTING & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 917 (1999) (reporting data on 
193 patients followed for an average of 626 days, finding that AUCs ranged from .76 for any 
physical violence to .80 for a violent offense and that patients scoring above the median on 
the HCR-20 were six times more likely to commit any act of physical violence and thirteen 
times more likely to commit a violent crime in the community than persons who scored under 
the median); Tonia Nicholls et al., Comparing Risk Assessments with Female and Male 
Psychiatric Outpatients; Utility of the HCR-20 and Psychopathy Checklist: Screening 
Version, Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological 
Association (1997). 
408. See, e.g., Henrik Belfrage, Implementing the HCR-20 Scheme for Risk Assessment in 
a Forensic Psychiatric Hospital: Integrating Research and Clinical Practice, 9 J. FORENSIC 
PSYCHIATRY 328 (1998); Mats Dernevik, Preliminary Findings on Reliability and Validity of 
the Historical-Clinical-Risk Assessment in a Forensic Psychiatric Setting, 4 PSYCHOL. CRIME & 
L. 127 (1998). 
409. See, e.g., Henrik Belfrage et al., Prediction of Violence Within the Correctional 
System Using the HCR-20 Risk Assessment Scheme, 11 J. FORENSIC PSYCHIATRY 167 (2000); 
Kevin S. Douglas & Christopher D. Webster, The HCR-20 Violence Risk Assessment Scheme: 
Concurrent Validity in a Sample of Incarcerated Offenders, 26 CRIM. JUST. & BEHAV. 3 
(1999). 
410. See, e.g., Mats Dernevik et al., Violent Behaviour in Forensic Psychiatric Patients: 
Risk Assessment and Different Risk-Management Levels Using the HCR-20, 8 PSYCHOL. 
CRIME & L. 93 (2002). 
411. See Borum, supra note 346, at 950. 
412. But see Thomas R. Litwack, Actuarial Versus Clinical Assessments of 
Dangerousness, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 409 (2001).  Litwack suggests that “[a]lthough 
. . . actuarial predictions have been demonstrated to be superior to clinical predictions for a 
fairly wide range of prediction tasks,” it is not clear they are superior for dangerousness 
predictions.  Id. at 410.  “If actuarial instruments . . . are to be used in the fairest and most 
effective manner, they must be validated in a far more precise manner than has occurred.”  
Id.  Thus, Litwack concludes that “it is premature to substitute actuarial for clinical 
assessments of dangerousness.”  Id. 
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who claims not to need any statistical or experimental studies but relies 
solely on clinical experience as adequate justification, by that very claim 
is shown to be a nonscientifically minded person whose professional 
judgments are not to be trusted.”413  The claim that many clinical 
judgments in violence predictions remain untested414 is not a compelling 
argument for their continued use in a variety of legal contexts.  Untested 
assumptions, supported only by guesswork or speculation, are 
appropriately prohibited under the Federal Rules of Evidence.415  In the 
next Part, we will evaluate this assertion by examining the evidentiary 
admissibility standards prescribed in the Federal Rules of Evidence and 
Daubert. 
VIII.  EVIDENTIARY ADMISSIBILITY ANALYSIS 
The Court in Daubert interpreted the Federal Rules to imply a 
mandate that members of the federal judiciary perform a “preliminary 
assessment” to determine whether the proffered testimony meets a 
standard of evidentiary reliability through which scientific evidence 
must pass.416  Courts, however, have been reluctant to apply 
413. Grove & Meehl, supra note 338, at 320. 
414. See, e.g., Litwack et al., supra note 355, at 247 (suggesting that the “validity of 
clinical assessments of dangerousness in a variety of important contexts remains untested”). 
415. But cf. Thomas R. Litwack, Communications Regarding Risk, 52 AM. PSYCHOL. 
1245 (1997) (“In any event, the necessity of relying on categorical and unproven (although 
hopefully informed and rational) clinical judgments regarding many groups of individuals 
(e.g., many civil committees, or potential civil committees, and insanity acquittees) 
remains.”).  Professional standards have also addressed limits on prediction testimony.  See 
AM. PSYCHOL. ASSOC., ETHICAL PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGISTS AND CODE OF CONDUCT 
§§ 2.04(b), 7.04 (Section 2.04(b) states, “Psychologists recognize limits to the certainty with 
which diagnoses, judgments, or predictions can be made about individuals,” and section 7.04 
states, “Whenever necessary to avoid misleading, psychologists acknowledge the limits of 
their data or conclusions.”); see also Committee on Ethical Guidelines for Forensic 
Psychologists, Specialty Guidelines for Forensic Psychologists, 15 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 655, 
665 (1991) (requiring forensic psychologists to be “aware that their own professional 
observations, inferences, and conclusions must be distinguished from legal facts, opinions, and 
conclusions.”  They must further be “prepared to explain the relationship between their 
expert testimony and the legal issues and facts of an instant case.”).  The Association for the 
Treatment of Sexual Abusers (“ATSA”) also issued a cautionary statement.  See ASSOC. FOR 
THE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL ABUSERS, ATSA PRACTITIONER’S HANDBOOK 2, 20 (1993) 
(instructing its members to “avoid drawing conclusions or rendering opinions that exceed the 
present level of knowledge in the field or the expertise of the evaluator,” and to “be very 
cautious in offering predictions of criminal behavior for use in imprisoning or releasing 
individuals.”).  ATSA further requires that prediction testimony include “the acts being 
predicted; the estimated probability that these acts will occur during a given period of time; 
and the facts on which these predictive judgments are based.”  Id. 
416. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993).  The Court 
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admissibility criterion to expert psychological testimony.417  Professor 
Slobogin hypothesized that the courts readily except psychological 
testimony because it has not been regarded as “novel.”418  Recent 
rulings, however, have rejected the view that evidentiary admissibility 
standards apply only to novel testimony.419
A second reason that courts may have been reluctant to apply 
admissibility criteria to psychological testimony is that the justice system 
has become dependent on psychologists “‘to establish the presence or 
absence of mental disorders and the causal connections between such 
disorders and criminal or tortious conduct.’”420  The sentiment that the 
courts are unwilling to “disinvent the wheel”421 is pervasive and difficult 
described the duty of the trial judge as follows: 
 
Faced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge 
must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a), whether the expert 
is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the 
trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue.  This entails a 
preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology 
underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that 
reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue. 
 
Id. at 592–93. 
417. One notable exception was In re Wilson, 33 CRIM. L. REP. (BNA) 2115 (D.C. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 14, 1983).  In this case, the District of Columbia Superior Court applied the 
Frye “general acceptance” test to dangerous testimony and held that because professional 
organizations, including the American Psychiatric Association and the American 
Psychological Association, questioned the reliability of prediction testimony, it should not be 
admissible in civil commitment proceedings.  Id.; see Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. 
Cir. 1923); cf. Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 901 (1983) (noting that “[n]either petitioner 
nor the [APA] suggests that psychiatrists are always wrong with respect to future 
dangerousness, only most of the time” and incredibly upholding the admission of Dr. 
Grigson’s testimony). 
418. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 138 n.155 (“One reason testimony by mental health 
professionals is accepted so readily by the courts is that is has never been regarded as ‘novel’; 
it has long been an everyday feature of the justice system.”). 
419. See Gammill v. Jack Williams Chevrolet, Inc., 972 S.W.2d 713, 721 (Tex. 1998) 
(finding that the rules of evidence regarding admission of expert scientific testimony should 
not apply only to evidence deemed novel or unconventional, but ruling that all scientific 
expert testimony must meet reliability and relevancy requirements).  The court supported this 
position on several grounds: first, that differentiating between novel and conventional 
evidence would be a difficult task; second, that it would be illogical to require some expert 
opinion testimony to be reliable but other not; and third, that the majority of federal courts 
have applied relevancy and reliability requirements to all expert testimony.  Id. at 721. 
420. See James M. Doyle, Applying Lawyers’ Expertise to Scientific Experts: Some 
Thoughts About Trial Court Analysis of the Prejudicial Effects of Admitting and Excluding 
Expert Scientific Testimony, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 619, 623 (1984) (quoting Comment, The 
Psychologist as Expert Witness: Science in the Courtroom?, 38 MD. L. REV. 539, 544–46 (1979). 
421. See Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 896. 
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to counter.  The analysis provided in this Article does not support a 
wholesale exclusion of predictions of dangerousness; rather, only 
unreliable or speculative predictions would be deemed inadmissible.  
This moderate position should make the adoption of admissibility 
analysis more probable. 
A final reason that psychological testimony may have been excused 
from the admissibility standards is the belief that expert testimony of 
this kind does not sway the trier of fact as easily as does more complex, 
less intuitive testimony.422  This argument is not credible in light of the 
weight of evidence indicating the contrary.423
Judges have been assigned the gatekeeping role. The arguments for 
failing to perform admissibility assessments are not compelling.  Courts 
have begun to recognize the importance of applying the standards to all 
types of testimony, and as this trend continues, experts should expect to 
demonstrate predictive accuracy or have their testimony excluded.  
Judges and attorneys must also be prepared to appropriately challenge 
proffered expert testimony of this kind.  In the last Part, we will review a 
few circumstances in which this testimony would likely be presented and 
emphasize the admissibility criterion that might be at issue. 
IX.  STANDARDS OF PROOF 
In the second component of this Article, we have expressed a clear 
preference for prediction testimony informed by actuarial data.  In this 
final Part, we will analyze the most significant prediction context in 
which dangerousness testimony is frequently offered—capital 
punishment—and we will discuss the admissibility and standard of proof 
issues likely to arise when the trier of fact evaluates this type of evidence 
in a capital sentencing case. 
“Future dangerousness” is currently identified as a statutory 
aggravating factor in capital cases in seven states.424  In all of these 
422. See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 138 n.155. 
423. See, e.g., Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (describing an 
“impressionable jury” influenced by the “inevitable untouchability of a medical specialist’s 
words”); People v. Murtishaw, 29 Cal. 3d 733, 774 (1981) (holding that expert predictions of 
future dangerousness are prejudicial and unduly influence the lay jury). 
424. See IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2515(9)(h) (2001) (“The defendant, by prior conduct 
or conduct in the commission of the murder at hand, has exhibited a propensity to commit 
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 21, § 701.12(7) (West 1983) (“The existence of a probability that the defendant would 
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.150(1)(b)(B) (1996) (“Whether there is a probability that the defendant 
would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society.”); 
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jurisdictions, the state must demonstrate future dangerousness “beyond 
a reasonable doubt”425 to secure a death sentence.426  The quantification 
associated with each burden of proof becomes critical when judges 
evaluate prediction testimony based on actuarial instruments.  As an 
illustrative vehicle, we will review a hypothetical case using Wyoming’s 
capital sentencing statute, which requires jurors to be convinced 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” that a defendant will “likely” commit 
continued acts of criminal violence.427
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(2)(b)(1) (West Supp. 2006) (“[W]hether there is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing threat to society.”); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.2(1) (2004) (“[T]here is a 
probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a 
continuing serious threat to society.”); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi) (2007) (“The 
defendant poses a substantial and continuing threat of future dangerousness or is likely to 
commit continued acts of criminal violence.”).  In Washington, the future dangerousness 
factor is considered only after a defendant is convicted of aggravated first-degree murder by a 
finding of at least one other aggravating factor.  See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.020 
(West Supp. 2002) (listing the other aggravating factors for aggravated first degree murder); 
Id. § 1095.070(8) (“Whether there is a likelihood that the defendant will pose a danger to 
others in the future.”). 
425. See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 423 (1979) (addressing the standards of proof 
and opining, “The standard serves to allocate the risk of error between the litigants and to 
indicate the relative importance attached to the ultimate decision.”).  Attempts to quantify 
the burden of proof have resulted in some general parameters (for example, beyond a 
reasonable doubt = 95% chance of future violence; clear and convincing evidence = 75% 
chance of future violence; and preponderance of the evidence = 51% of the evidence).  See 
C.M.A. McCauliff, Burdens of Proof: Degrees of Belief, Quanta of Evidence, or Constitutional 
Guarantees?, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1293, 1322, 1327 (1982) (discussing the differences between 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” at 95% versus 99% certainty).  This author went on to survey 
members of the judiciary to determine their understanding of the probability attached to each 
designated burden of proof.  Judicial consensus appears to be that “reasonable doubt” rests 
somewhere between 80% to 100%.  Id. at 1324–27. 
426. Several authors have considered the ethics of participation in capital sentencing 
hearings.  See, e.g., Dix, supra note 27 (concluding that expert predictions of dangerousness in 
capital sentencing hearings violate evidentiary and constitutional standards); Barefoot, 463 
U.S. at 916 (Blackman, J., dissenting). 
 
In the present state of psychiatric knowledge, this is too much for me.  
One may accept this in a routine lawsuit for money damages, but when a 
person’s life is at stake[,] . . . a requirement of greater reliability should 
prevail.  In a capital case, the specious testimony of a psychiatrist, colored 
in the eyes of an impressionable jury by the inevitable untouchability of a 
medical specialist’s words, equates with death itself. 
 
Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 916 (Blackman, J., dissenting) 
427. See WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102(h)(xi).  For the purposes of this exercise, we will 
assign “likely” to 70% probability.  As the specificity of scientific evidence increases, 
legislators should be encouraged to be more specific in statutes incorporating dangerousness 
as a criterion.  These statutes should include the type of harm that is being predicted 
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Suppose that a psychologist proffers testimony in a capital 
sentencing hearing concerning the defendant’s risk of future violence 
based on his score of the Violence Risk Assessment Guide.428  She 
opines that “[t]he defendant’s score places him in the sixth category, or 
third from the highest risk group.  Among offenders in prior studies, 
approximately 42% reoffended violently within an average of 10 years 
following release.”  The probability estimation generated by quantifying 
the burden of proof standards indicates that, in this example, the state 
fails to meet its burden of proof in the case.429
Sexual offender civil detention statutes also generally rely on the 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” standard.  One of the most significant 
questions related to these predictions involves the specificity of the 
prediction task.  Typically, sexual, rather than general, violence is being 
predicted; this should be reflected in the expert’s assessment.430
(physical, emotional, property); the degree of probability that this behavior will occur (50%, 
95%, or more likely than not) and the period of time that risk is predicted to occur (a year, 
indefinite).  See Slobogin, supra note 224, at 104 n.28. 
428. See QUINSEY ET AL., supra note 33. 
429. That is, an actuarial prediction of .42 would fail to meet the statutory standards that 
“beyond a reasonable doubt” (95%) the defendant would “likely commit a violent act” (70%) 
(.95 x .70 = .665; .665 > .42), thus, the aggravating circumstance would not be met.  See 
Slobogin, supra note 224, at 104 n.28. 
 This case presumes that the judge had previously conducted an admissibility assessment 
on the proffered testimony.  In this example, the judge must have previously assessed the 
ability of the expert’s opinion to assist the trier of fact and would have determined that the 
expert demonstrates some expertise in both prediction of violence and actuarial methods.  At 
first glance, relevancy and fit appear to be fairly obvious in this case; however, recent research 
examining the use of actuarial instruments to predict institutional violence in correctional 
settings suggests that predictive accuracy is significantly lower than originally expected and 
has led one group of researchers to contend that, at least in the context of predicting violence 
by capital defendants, the VRAG, PCL-R, and HCR-20 have resulted in judgments that are 
“highly inaccurate” and “gross overestimations of risk.”  See John F. Edens et al., Predictions 
of Future Dangerousness in Capital Murder Trials: Is It Time to “Disinvent the Wheel?,” 29 
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 55 (2005).  If these obstacles to admissibility were satisfactorily 
addressed, reliability questions would then be significant.  The expert must demonstrate that 
he used appropriate methodology, that he has a good foundation for the use of this 
instrument, and that the use of the instrument is logically connected to the defendant.  Jurists 
should review the original empirical studies that the expert relied upon as justification for 
using this instrument.  Differences between characteristics of the defendant (e.g., race, age, 
severity of the current offense, length of time since publication of the studies) and 
environment (e.g., community versus high security correctional institution) should be 
evaluated to determine whether the connective reliability criterion has been met.  Judges 
should ask about the type of information relied upon in generating this score, paying close 
attention to the reliability of the underlying data.  Did the expert verify his sources whenever 
possible or did he rely on hearsay or other inadmissible evidence? 
430. Several new actuarial instruments have recently been introduced to predict future 
sexual violence, such as the Minnesota Sex Offender Screening Tool-Revised (“MnSOST-R”) 
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The lowest threshold for predictions of violence involves the 
commitment of individuals found “not guilty by reason of insanity.”  A 
unique aspect of these cases is the shift of the burden of proof from the 
state to the defendant.  The broad definition of violence established by 
the courts in these cases431 again should be reflected in the assessment.432
This hypothetical case and accompanying summaries illustrate the 
importance of specificity in sentencing statutes.433  Predictions of 
dangerousness based on actuarial data preclude attempts by the expert 
to usurp the decision maker’s role.  The degree of accuracy necessary to 
justify a particular judicial action (civil commitment, maximum 
sentencing, or even death) is a value judgment best made by elected or 
appointed officials, not by an expert whose implicit values are cloaked in 
the guise of medical certainty. 
X. CONCLUSION 
Members of the judiciary face a difficult but important task when 
evaluating proffered expert testimony to determine whether it meets 
admissibility standards.  Legislators and the courts have recognized the 
importance of assuring that proffered expert testimony meets minimum 
reliability standards. But what our argument attempts to add is 
recognition of the importance of perspective and contextual complexity 
in assuring that reliability.  Nothing in this argument diminishes the 
importance of experts; courts very much need the advice of specialized 
opinions.  But those opinions often have an aura to outsiders, regardless 
and the Sexual Offender Risk Appraisal Guide (“SORAG”).  See QUINSEY ET AL., supra 
note 33, at 119–36.  Judges should ascertain the characteristics of the validation sample and 
the similarities or differences between study participants and the individual currently being 
evaluated.  It may be helpful to hear the expert describe and explain discrepancies in risk 
assessment on each of the two instruments. See Cornwell, supra note 385 (discussing the 
problems with dangerousness prediction in this context).  See generally Steven I. Friedland, 
On Treatment, Punishment, and the Civil Commitment of Sex Offenders, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 
73 (1999) (questioning the use of violence prediction as a means of social control). 
431. See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 364–65 (1983) ( “We do not agree with the 
petitioner’s suggestion that the requisite dangerousness is not established by proof that a 
person committed a non-violent crime against property.”). 
432. Judges should pay special attention to the appropriateness of using an actuarial 
instrument in these cases.  Many of the actuarial data have been collected from individuals 
with a history of serious violence.  The extent to which the defendant differs in this way 
should raise connective reliability concerns. 
433. Quantification of this kind may result in statutes being deemed unconstitutional on 
the grounds that they are unacceptably vague.  See, e.g., Williamson v. Reynolds, 904 F. Supp. 
1529, 1569–71 (E.D. Okla. 1995) (granting writ of habeas corpus in a capital case in which the 
statutory aggravating circumstances of future dangerousness, without guidance on the 
definition of the language of the statute, was unconstitutionally vague). 
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of the acuity of those non-experts in their own realms, which 
exaggerates the authority of the expertise. 
We have argued here that while, in many instances, prediction 
testimony based on clinical judgment should be deemed inadmissible,434 
prediction testimony based on actuarial data can assist the court and 
meet admissibility criterion under most circumstances.  One caveat to 
this admission is that opposing expert testimony must be presented to 
prevent the expert’s opinions from being unfairly prejudicial and, thus, 
inadmissible. 
In the context of reviewing admissibility criterion, members of the 
judiciary should conduct a preliminary assessment to ascertain whether 
the proffered expert testimony meets the criterion described in the 
Federal Rules of Evidence and subsequent case law.  Judges should 
examine the qualifications of a witness to determine whether he or she 
has special expertise in predicting dangerousness; they should determine 
whether the testimony is based on clinical or actuarial data, and they 
should review the studies and literature that the expert contends support 
his opinion.435  The size of the construction and validation samples, 
number of independent validation studies, and degree of similarity 
between the study participants and the individual presently evaluated 
should all be considered in determining the reliability of the opinion.  
Undeniably, these assessments present a daunting task to trial court 
judges.436  In spite of the difficulties, members of the judiciary must 
assume this role to protect the reliability and integrity of judicial 
decisions. 
434. Some have raised the question of whether prediction testimony based on clinical 
judgment has been fairly tested.  We would agree that methodological problems inherent in 
violence prediction studies have limited the generalizability of the research.  We concede that 
in some instances intuitive clinical judgment will beat actuarial prediction; however, we do 
not believe that clinical judges will ever outperform actuarial models.  We based this belief on 
a very common sense notion of the complexity of decision making and the prevalence of 
heuristics. Clinical skill is indispensable in violence prediction, but we conclude that actuarial 
combination of that data will be more accurate, and fairer, than any other method. 
435. See Christopher D. Webster & Natalie H. Polvi, Challenging Assessments of 
Dangerousness and Risk, in COPING WITH PSYCHIATRIC AND PSYCHOLOGICAL TESTIMONY 
1371, 1381 (Jay Ziskin et al. eds., 1995) (providing an excellent example of the kinds of 
questions that judges or attorneys should ask of expert witnesses regarding the prediction of 
dangerousness). 
436. See Brown, supra note 28, at 784 (“Federal judges ruling on the admissibility of 
expert scientific testimony face a far more complex and daunting task in a post-Daubert world 
than before.”) (quoting Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 311, 315 (9th Cir. 1995); 
see also Ronda R. Harrison, Daubert and the Federal Judiciary: Understanding Science 
Methodology (1998) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Bowling Green State University) (on file with 
author). 
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While we appreciate the workload and skill of the judiciary, we still 
contend that every opportunity should be seized to benefit from hearing 
the arguments of experts from different schools of thought in a specialty 
area.  Even if no other benefit were achieved from such an effort, the 
resulting heightened awareness of the diversity of expertise within a 
domain of expertise would give pause to fact finders who otherwise 
might be tempted to permit the expert to determine the court’s 
judgment.  Courts that show their concern for the reliability of experts 
by making every effort to hear as many different scientific perspectives 
within a realm of expertise as is practical will be putting experts in their 
proper epistemological place in our judicial system. 
 

